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95th Congress 1
2d Session J
' A NEW REALIS
Factfinding Mission to the Peopl
July 3-13, \l
SUBCOMMITTEE OX ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1978
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia
E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska
John J. Brady,
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New Yoik
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California I
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington 2
Jr., Chief of Staff
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affaies
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York, Chairman
L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
Edward J. Palmer
Jon D. Holstine,
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
Subcomviittce Staff Director
Minority Staff Consultant
Christopher D. W. Nelson, Subcommittee Staff Associate
James J. Przystup, Subcommittee Staff Associate
Linda G. Silver, Staff Assistant
1 Resigned from the committee Sept. 20, 1078.
» Elected to the committee Sept. 20, 1978.
Washington, D.C., December 15, 1978.
The following report has been submitted to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives by a delegation
of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs which visited the
People's Republic of China July 3 to July 13, 1978. The reportjs being
printed for use by the Congress in its deliberations on matters affecting
relations between the United States and the People's Republic of
The views and findings in the report are those of the congressional
delegation and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of
the Committee on International Relations.
Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Washington, D.C., December" J. 5, 1978.
Hon. Clement J. Zablocki,
( I 'lirman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives,
Dear Mr. Chairman: The enclosed report, "A New Realism:
Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China," covering the
period July 3-13, 1978, is hereby submitted to the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee.
The members of the delegation were Chairman Lester L. Wolff,
Representatives L. H. Fountain, J. Herbert Burke, and R. Tennyson
Guyer, of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs; Representa-
tives Eligio de la Garza and Larry Winn, Jr., of the International
Relations Committee; and Representative Charles Rangel of the
Committee on Ways and Means. Others with the delegation included
Mr. Edward Palmer, staff director of the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Christopher Nelson, staff associate on the
subcommittee. Upon the delegation's arrival in Shanghai, Mr. Richard
Bock, Counselor at the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking, joined the
delegation at our request.
During the 10-day stay, the delegation visited Shanghai, Peking,
Sian, and Canton. We met with various Government officials, in-
cluding Senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping; Vice Foreign Minister
Wang Hai-jun; Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Wang Jun-sheng;
Ambassador Hao Teh-ching, President of the People's Institute of
Foreign Affairs; Dr. Chou Pei-yuan, Vice President of the Academy
of Sciences and President of Peking University and many other indi-
viduals who gave generously of their time, hospitality, and views.
Ambassador and Mrs. Leonard Woodcock, and their staff at the
Liaison Office in Peking provided excellent assistance, and helped
make this mission highly successful. The itinerary of the mission in-
cluded onsite inspections of factories, hospitals, communes, and
educational and cultural institutions.
The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress with
current and personal impressions of the People's Republic of China
and an evaluation of the changes in China since the fall of the "Gang
of Four," and the reemergence of Vice Premier Teng.
The delegation is indebted to Ambassador Han-hsu and his staff
at the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washing-
ton, D.C., for their work with the subcommittee in preparing for the
mission. The delegation wishes to extend special thanks to Ambassador
Hao and his staff at the People's Institute, who provided invaluable
information, escort, and translation services during our visit. The sub-
committee also wishes to thank Ambassador Leonard Woodcock and
his staff in Peking, and Counsel General Thomas Shoesmith and his
staff in Hong Kong for their advice and assistance during and after the
mission. Dr. Robert Sutter, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress, provided information and written materials to the sub-
committee which have been of great assistance. Finally, the delegation
would like to thank Mr. Edward J. Palmer and Mr. Christopher D. W.
Nelson of the subcommittee staff for their assistance in the planning
and execution of the mission and in the preparation of this report.
We hope that the following report will be helpful to the committee,
the Congress, the administration, and the American people as we
attempt to develop policy toward normalization of relations with the
People's Republic of China.
Lester L. Wolff,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Letter of transmittal V
Delegation introduction 1
Principal themes 1
Key questions 3
Delegation conclusions 5
The normalization process 5
The Republic of China (Taiwan) 5
Foreign affairs 6
Domestic policy, trade, and economics 7
Delegation recommendations 9
Delegation report 11
Purpose of the 1978 mission 11
1978 mission 13
Foreign affairs 14
The Republic of China (Taiwan) 16
Education, foreign trade, and domestic growth 18
Supplemental statement of Representative L. H. Fountain 21
Conversations with PRC officials 23
Vice President Teng Hsiao-ping 23
Ambassador Hao Teh-ching 28
Vice Foreign Trade Minister Wang Jun-sheng 36
Vice President Chou Pei-yuan, Academy of Sciences 42
The itinerary 49
Peking University and Chiaotung University, Sian 53
Supplementary analyses 57
PRC foreign policv 57
Normalization: PRC and ROC 62
Trade and economic development in the PRC 66
Modernization: The workers and the peasants 69
China since the cultural revolution 74
A. Itinerary listing 85
B. Hong Kong press conference transcript 87
C. Teng Hsiao-ping interview with Japanese journalists 93
D. Selected press clippings 96
E. PRC defense "white paper" 113
F. Summaries of 1977 normalization hearings held by the Subcom-
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs 122
G. American Bar Association delegation 128
Digitized by the Internet Archive
From July 3 to 13, 1978, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs conducted a factfinding: mission to the People's Republic of
China. Members of the delegation included Subcommittee Chairman
Lester L. Wolff, Representatives L. H. Fountain, J. Herbert Burke,
and R. Tenrryson Guyer of the subcommittee; Representatives Eligio
de J a Garza and Larry Winn of the Committee on International Rela-
tions; and Representative Charles Rangel of the Committee on Ways
The delegation represented the first time a formal, standing com-
mittee of the House of Representatives had been officially invited, as
a subcommittee, to the People's Republic of China. Our hosts, the
People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, extended the invitation to the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Previous congressional
groups had visited China in a private capacity, or through arrange-
ments facilitated by the executive branch.
In this report, the delegation will describe principal themes which
emerged from our observations, and from conversations with our
(1) The delegation left the People's Republic of China with a sense
that what we have termed a "new realism" that encompasses all aspects
of China's life — its politics, social institutions, economy, and educa-
(2) The rhetoric of the past has been moderated, if not eliminated.
Mao's "little red book" was not in evidence, and the only theme re-
peated consistently was the injunction of Chairman Mao to "Let 100
flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend." During the mission,
we perceived that this rallying cry of the 1950's had been rehabilitated
to set the tone for a new atmosphere, one the Chinese hoped would
stimulate a freer flow of creative ideas and initiatives. Such a renewed
flow was seen by China's leaders as a way to break the ideological
straitjacket of the Cultural Revolution, and the rule of the "Gang
of Four," which had paralyzed China for nearly a decade by inhibiting
not only popular criticism, but also those officials favoring expertise
over ideology, and "seeking truth from facts," rather than dogma.
(3) The delegation felt that the new realism, and the themes of "Let
100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought contend," also extended
to the conduct of China's economic and foreign policy, particularly
China's foreign trade, so that China could once again "learn from
(4) The rationale advanced by our hosts to stimulate China's
progress in the "Four Modernizations," that is progress in industry,
agriculture, science, and defense, was the need to resist what was seen
as the worldwide efforts at "hegemony" by the Soviet Union — the
"Polar Bear." The Chinese stated how meaningful progress had been
retarded, and the gap between China, the U.S.S.R., and the West had
been widened, and how much they had to accelerate progress to meet
the challenges of the decades ahead.
(5) For the United States, the Chinese constantly warned against
what they termed "the policies of appeasement." They felt the United
States was subordinating defense requirements in the face of the real
and potential threat posed by the Soviets on an international basis.
This is in contrast to past exhortations which centered on the need to
concentrate our attention solely in Europe. The Chinese were critical
of the United States-Soviet SALT talks, and other efforts at pursuing
"detente." They also warned against "feeding chocolates to the Polar
Bear," a colorful expression used to ridicule Western pursuit of trade
and technological exchange with the Soviet Union.
(6) In contrast to the past several years, the tone of statements
about the Republic of China (Taiwan) and particularly the Kuomin-
tang, seemed deliberately low key. The possibility of the PRC's coming
to an accommodation with the leaders of the KMT was raised as
having two historical precedents; therefore, we were told "since there
has already been cooperation with the Kuomintang twice, can you
rule it out the third time?"
(7) The leaders of the People's Republic of China made it clear they
wished to normalize relations with the United States. [Throughout
this report, "normalization" will be defined as that process including
or culminating in an exchange of ambassadors between Washington
and Peking.] But at the same time, People's Republic of China loaders
repeated their past insistence on American acceptance of the "three
points" regarding the Republic of China (Taiwan). [By the "three
points," the United States would be required to withdraw diplomatic
recognition of the Republic of China, cancel the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the Republic of China, and withdraw all U.S. troops
(8) In return for U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China
as the government of all of China, the delegation was told that leaders
in Peking were prepared to discuss what they termed the "political
realities" and the "modalities" of a continued American relationship
with the people of Taiwan. The so-called "Japanese Formula" 1 was
cited as one possible model for postnormalization relations between
the United States and Taiwan. Steadfastly refusing to make any com-
mitments on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, PRC
leaders stressed they would do their best to create conditions to solve
this question by peaceful means.
The delegation has entitled this report "A New Realism: Factfind-
ing Mission to the People's Republic of China" to describe what it
perceives as a new realism on China's pail. However, we also seek to
indicate thai an opportunity exists for a new realism on the part of
I r.S. policymakers.
'• The "Japanese Formula" is the term used to describe iho process whereby in 1972 tiio
Government of Japan formally terminated mi official relations with the Republic of China
(Taiwan) upon exchanging ambassadors with the People's Republic of China. The Japanese
replaced their embassy in Taipei with a "private" trade office, which in effect issues visas,
and carries out nil the duties necessary to facilitate a continued social and economic
relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Unlike the United states, Japan had no formal
defense relationship with the Republic of China (Taiwan).
Our consensus on this matter should not be interpreted as a blanket
endorsement of all that we were told, or all that we were expected to
see in China. Far from it. Delegation members emerged from the
People's Republic with many questions stemming from their experi-
ences. Among them:
(1) Are the current trends we report in China deep-seated, or are
there likely to be new upheavals, similar to the many change^ which
have kept the People's Republic of China in political turmoil for 20
(2) Is the "new realism" and its possible application to the Taiwan
situation merely a ploy on the part of China's leadership, designed for
external, and particularly United States, consumption? Or, is it a
genuine effort to explore new approaches that recognize the past and
present relationship of the United States and the Republic of China
(3) Does the apparent opening for negotiation on Taiwan perceived
by the delegation exist because of China's domestic needs for
(4) Can the United States help keep the People's Republic of China
in its current posture by helping China to meet her domestic needs?
(5) Even if the changes now underway in China take root, what
guarantees are there that they will continue across-the-board, par-
ticularly regarding China's attitude toward the United States?
(6) Will cooperation in meeting China's strategic goals reap divi-
dends for the United States? If so, what dividends?
(7) Do the possible risks of helping the Chinese meet their strategic
goals outweigh the possible benefits for the United States?
(8) Can a relationship, based primarily on perception of a common
adversary (the U.S.S.R.) endure?
We recognize that there can be no "10-day experts" on any country,
much less a land as vast and as complicated as the People's Republic of
China. But the background available to the delegation in the form of
the work of the subcommittee over several years, and the excellent
briefings received prior to the mission, have given us confidence that
we can report accurately on what we saw and heard.
The above summarizes the principal observations of the delegation.
The section which follows details the delegation's conclusions and
recommendations. In subsequent sections, the delegation's full re-
port is presented, followed by individual members' reports, and
conversations with leaders of the People's Republic of China, including
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping. Following the conversations, detailed
sections on various aspects of PRC policy are included as supple-
mentary analyses in order to help place into an overall context the
findings and recommendations of the delegation. Finally, the appendix
contains press reports, PRC position papers, and other items designed
to serve as backup material to the report.
Before presenting our principal recommendations, the delegation
wishes to summarize the conclusions which lead to the recommenda-
tions. They are:
The Normalization Process
(1) The direct statements and cumulative impressions received by
the delegation are evidence of a clearly positive outlook on normaliza-
tion by China's leadership.
— At formal meetings and informal gatherings throughout our visit,
the delegation was repeatedly told that normalization was a
desirable- goal and that it was hoped that our visit would help
— Economic and strategic advantages to both sides were consistently
cited by our Chinese hosts as the fruits of normalization.
(2) The delegation believes that if the normalization process is
pursued, the positive outlook it perceives can extend to negotiations
on the modalities of normalization in an atmosphere of respect for the
positions of the parties involved.
— Explicit Chinese statements about the potentially negotiable na-
ture of what were termed the realities and modalities of the U.S.
relationship with Taiwan led the delegation to feel that the "grey-
area" necessary for compromise between the hard positions of
each side might be located by negotiation.
— The delegation feels that the positive outlook stems from an in-
creasing perception by the PRC leadership of economic, strategic,
and political interests which both governments have in common.
— The treaty of peace and friendship, and the long-term trade
agreements negotiated in 1978 between Japan and the People's
Republic of China are of interest as potential guideposts for the
The Republic of China (Taiwan)
(1) The delegation notes the existence and the importance of the
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROC.
(2) The delegation considers that conversations with the PRC's
leaders regarding Taiwan and the Kuomintang represent a potential
opening, and therefore, in the context of an official U.S. congressional
mission, a new opening.
— Considering its source, the delegation recognizes the importance
of the remark that cooperation between the Communists and the
KMT could not be ruled out because twice, prior to 1949, the
KMT and the Communists had cooperated.
— We recognize that the PRC has raised the possibility of negotia-
tions with the ROC several times since 1949. However, we believe
that the significant difference in 1978 is the tone and context of
the discussion, and that domestic PRC policies of pragmatism
and modernization reinforce the foreign policy and Taiwan
(3) The delegation concludes that the possibilities for negotiations
relative to Taiwan, with genuine respect for the positions of all parties,
appear more favorable now than at any time in the past 20 years.
— We note such instances as the 1955-56 offers by then-Premier
Chou En-lai to negotiate a peaceful settlement of United States-
China differences in the Taiwan Straits.
— We question whether inaction in the present, or opting for
the status quo, will help perpetuate the presently favorable
(4) The delegation understands the "three points" of the PRC
regarding a peaceful settlement of the future of Taiwan.
— At the same time, the delegation states its support of the
position that the future well-being of the people of Taiwan, and
the question of stability in the region, are related, and that they
rest on maintenance of peace in the region.
(5) The delegation wishes to state its concern that the resort to
force by parties on either side of the Taiwan Strait would jeopardize
stability in the region, and should prompt reassessment by the United
JStates of its relationship with any party initiating violence.
— We believe that any invitation to a third party to active involve-
ment in the question of Taiwan's future would itself jeopardize
stability in the region, and should prompt reassessment of the
U.S. position regarding any party involved in such an invitation.
(1) The People's Republic of China now perceives the Soviet Union
to be its preeminent threat. This is in contrast to the past, when the
United States was seen as an equal, if not greater, enemy.
— The Chinese now state that the Soviets are a direct threat to
China, and not just the West, in contrast with the past, and cite
the Soviet border regions as possible initial areas of conflict.
— China seeks to build an international alliance of common
strategic and political interests against what it terms "Soviet
expansionism," and "hegemony."
— China believes the Soviet Union is attempting to "encircle"
the PRC, but that China can break this encirclement (as she
has other encirclements) by pursuing common interests with
the United States, the nations of Europe, the Middle East, and
— Premier Hua Kuo-feng's mission to Europe, European arms
purchases and economic initiatives, the signing of the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship with Japan, and a worldwide pattern of
diplomatic visits are all related to China's efforts to counter
what it M'es as the Soviet threat.
(2) The PRC wants the United Slates and its allies to strengthen op-
position to the Soviet Union in each hemisphere of the world.
— The Chinese no longer emphasize the NATO alliance as the only
bulwark against the I'.s.s.K.
— They consider the U.S. goals of pursuing ''detente through the
SALT agreements, and increased trade and technological ex-
change with the Soviel Union to he a policy of "appeasement."
— They urge upon the United States and the West a three point
plan of direct political and strategic action to deny the Soviets
the advantages they now enjoy through "detente" and exchanges.
The Chinese say their plan would make war between the United
States and Russia no longer "imminent," but perhaps "post-
ponable" for as much as 25 years.
Domestic Policy, Trade, axd Economics
(1) The PRC is engaged in the "Four Modernizations," an orga-
nized campaign to upgrade and modernize all aspects of its educational,
scientific, technological, military, and commercial capacities, and has
rejected the militant self-reliance policies of the Cultural Revolution.
— The Hua-Teng leadership is attempting to reestablish and carry
to conclusion the initiatives begun under then-Premier Chou
En-lai in 1972-74, prior to Chou's death and the rise of the "Gang
— In pursuit of these goals, present PRC leadership welcomes
"learning from foreign friends," and emphasizes "seeking truth in
facts," rather than making facts fit ideology.
— As a result, the preeminence of Chairman Mao's sayings and
writings have been increasingly muted in favor of specific state-
ments by the current leadership.
— Mao is now being reinterpreted, if not redefined, to justify a re-
examination of and criticism of past policies, including the policies
of Mao himself.
— Integral to the process of redefining the ideological backing for the
practical policies now being pursued in criticism of the so-called
"Gang of Four," led by Mao's wife, Chaing Ching, and also
criticism of former defense minister and party vice chairman Lin
Paio, and their supporters.
(2) The PRC is taking active steps to pursue domestic mod-
— The announced goal of the PRC, involving potential expendi-
tures in excess of $100 billion, is to modernize the nation com-
pletely by the year 2000. Steps in this process include such goals
as 80 percent mechanisation of agriculture by 19S0 and 120 major
new industrial projects by 1985.
— Military missions to Western Europe have already explored sales
of more than $1 billion for weapons ranging from jet fighter
engines to antitank missiles.
— Plans have been announced for United States-China, and a China-
worldwide student exchange program, eventually involving
15,000 to 20,000 students of primarily scientific and technical
— A goal of training 800,000 new scientific research and technical
workers by 1985 has been set, thus emphasizing educational re-
form, and exchanges.
— Large-scale purchases of entire technologies and industries from
Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, and other nations in the
vital areas of coal, oil and steel production have been announced,
involving billions of dollars.
(3) The PRC is moving toward full participation in the international
economic and financial system in order to pursue its modernization
— PRC worldwide trade for the first half of 1978 exceeded by 30
percent trade for the first half of 1977, reaching $19 billion.
— Credit financing, joint production projects, "payback" develop-
ments, and direct loans from Japanese banks, have all been
publicly discussed or announced.
— Long-term trade agreements, such as one with Japan reported
to involve $20 billion, have been announced or are under con-
(4) The delegation was told that expanded trade with the United
States would be a major fruit of normalization.
— Chinese leaders indicated that the question of frozen assets
stemming from the Communist takeover in 1949 was no longer
considered an obstacle, quoting discussions with U.S. officials
in recent } r ears.
— The Chinese said they desired normalization in order to end the
trade restrictions, particularly certain export controls, which have
prevented technological sales in recent years.
■ — PRC leaders indicated that United States-China trade would
increase, even without normalization, because of China's strategic
— However, Chinese officials indicated that if export restrictions
are not lifted by the United States, they will feel compelled to
develop trade with U.S. competitors.
Based on the findings and conclusions presented above, the dele-
gation makes the following principal recommendations:
(1) The possible implications of China's "new realism" as it affects
establishing full diplomatic relations with the United States should
be pursued by the administration in a timely manner.
- — It has been nearly 7 years since the signing of the Shanghai
Communique. The question of timing, therefore, is important in
order that U.S. inaction — or the appearance of inaction — not
help induce a return to the more inflexible attitudes of recent
years in China. •
(2) An active search for the "grey area" between the fixed positions
of both sides on the Taiwan question should be pursued in light of
the presently favorable atmosphere perceived by the delegation.
■ — The 1955-56 offer to negotiate a treaty with the United States,
combined with informal suggestions to the delegation of willing-
ness to consider negotiations with the Kuomintang, would seem
to constitute the boundaries of a "grey area" which could produce
favorable results, so long as a positive attitude continues to exist
between Washington and Peking.
(3) To foster a continued positive attitude on both sides, the United
States and the People's Republic of China should encourage and
develop increased exchanges of people and views on official, private,
and corporate-business levels.
— Such exchanges, particularly when they are designed to increase
trade, are both a stimulus to, and an actual component of, the
normalization process. The delegation feels that a growing trade
and cultural relationship between China and the United States
can lead to a genuine bond between our two countries.
— Specifically, the delegation now formally recommends what it
has already informally suggested: that the administration send
the President's Special Negotiator on Trade at the head of an
official trade mission to China to follow up and seek to expand
on the initiatives being pursued by private corporations and
— The delegation urges a realistic and systematic approach to
expanding United States-China relations, particularly in the
areas of industrial and scientific exchange, coupled with a care-
ful analysis of the estimated returns to the United States and its
interests, particularly in the security area.
(4) The question of normalization should be based on the common
bilateral interests and concerns of the United States and the People's
Republic of China.
— The delegation notes that despite their harsh statements concern-
ing Soviet intentions, PRC leaders stressed that normalization
should not be pursued purely as an anti-Soviet measure.
— The delegation feels that opposition to the Soviet Union is
inadequate to serve as the foundation for a solid relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
(5) The delegation urges upon the administration the necessity of
full cooperation with the Congress regarding its normalization plans
— The work of the subcommittee and its predecessor (the Future
Foreign Policy Subcommittee) since 1975, including the factfind-
ing mission of July 197S, has been designed to minimize the pos-
sibility of divisive debate (as occurred on the Panama Canal
Treaty) because the Congress and the American people are un-
familiar with the history and issues involved in normalization,
including progress, or lack of it.
■ — In order to avoid unwarranted fears or misunderstandings, the
component parts or packages of the normalization process must
be recognized and spelled out, particularly those regarding trade,
security, and related questions which wull require congressional
approval, and which in many cases will require congressional
— The delegation recognizes that normalization is a process which
may either begin with, or culminate in, an actual exchange of
ambassadors, and that the decision regarding this exchange rests
with the Executive, but that its implementation must be a shared
process with the Congress.
Purpose of the 1978 Mission
The 1978 mission of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
was planned as a followup to the then recently completed fall 1977
hearings on the practical implications of normalization with the PRC.
The delegation desired to see firsthand the effects of changes in China
since the fall of the "Gang of Four, ,, the accession to power of Pre-
mier Hua, and particularly the influence of Senior Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping, whose pragmatism has been his characteristic for the
past 25 years,
In planning the itinerary with the liaison office of the PRC in
Washington, D.C., the delegation's purpose was to see and experience
within the limitations of a 10-day visit as wide a cross section of China
as possible — the people, the culture, the industry, commerce and
agriculture, and political leadership.
A number of changes had occurred in China since 1976. The "smash-
ing" of the "Gang of Four" and the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping
were two key shifts. The delegation wished to assess the extent of
impact of the leadership of Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng.
Furthermore, the delegation felt that the issue of the future of
Taiwan, which has served as the principal stumbling block to fulfill-
ment of the policy goals outlined in the Shanghai communique,
should be explored in an atmosphere free of the attitudes and rhetoric
of the "Gang of Four" and their followers.
On the eve of its departure, the delegation held the general view
that for economic, political, and strategic reasons, normalization
between the United States and the People's Republic of China was an
important question to be addressed.
At the same time, the need to achieve normalization without endan-
gering the well-being of the people of Taiwan remained a parallel
concern. In these views, the delegation reflected the opinions of the
Congress, the American people, and each administration since 1972. x
As background to this report of the 1978 mission, two previous
investigations of the PRC will be highlighted:
(1) The 1976 study mission of Chairman Wolff and Republican
1 Opinion poll by Potomac Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C., 1977. Perhaps the most
systematic of recent polls on this issue, the Potomac Associates findings mirrored, and
have subsequently been reflected in polls by a variety of professional organizations.
2 "United Statos and China: Future Foreign Policy Directions," Subcommittee on Future
Foreign Policy, USGPO, 1976.
(2) The 1975-76, and 1977 series of 14 hearings on normaliza-
tion with China held by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
THE 1976 MISSION
The 1978 delegation met and talked with the leaders of a China
which was in many ways quite different from the country previously
visited by Chairman Wolff and Representative Burke in 1976. At that
time, China was in the grip of the now discredited "Gang of Four."
In 1976, the previous delegation met with then Senior Vice Premier
Chiang Ching-chiao, and heard from Chinese officials at all levels a hard
line on self-reliance and isolation from external influences. This deter-
mined isolation extended to all of the vital issues surrounding normali-
zation, particularly regarding the Republic of China (Taiwan).
This matter, Representatives Wolff and Burke were told in 1976,
was purely China's internal affair, in which no external interference
would be permitted or even discussed.
Thus, in contrast with the present, there was very little solace in
1976 for those members who sought recognition by the PRC that the
United States might have strong concerns regarding the ultimate des-
tiny of Taiwan and her people. 4
The 1976 delegation was told repeatedly that the PRC neither
wanted nor needed the outside world. The Soviet Union was then — as
it is now — perceived as China's principal enemy. But in 1976, no direct
assistance from the West was seen as necessary for China to with-
stand the threat of the "Polar Bear."
By 1976, the grip of the cultural revolution had passed its peak,
but many aspects of Chinese life from universities to factories, from
communes to urban apartment complexes, were still captive of the
revolution's rhetorical, and political strait jacket. For 10 years, this
movement virtually halted the scientific, technical, and educational
progress occurring in the West, and which was being enjoyed by many
of the PRC's Asian neighbors.
There were some relatively positive aspects. The "Gang of Four''
apparently still sought the goal of normalization discussed in the
Shanghai communique by Chairman Mao and the then recently
deceased Premier Chou En-lai. Also, the "Gang of Four" desired at
least indirect Western assistance in order to divert Soviet resources
to the NATO flank in Europe, thus lessening pressure on the Sino-
1977 SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS
In September and October 1977, the Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs held a series of six hearings on the practical implications
of U.S. Government policy since the signing oi the Shanghai com-
munique. The question pursued was not whether, but when, and how,
■ "The United Btatea-Sovlel Union-China ; The Great Power Triangle, " USGPO, 197C. and
"Normalization of Relations With the People's Republic of China: Practical Implications,"
USGPO, 1977, hearings held by the Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee, and its buc-
. the Subcommittee on Asian and PadflC Affairs, House International Relations
'in November 1976, Representative Fountain, with Representatives Sam Gibbons and
Robert Lagomarslno, and then-Chairman Thomas B. Morgan <>f the International Relations
Committee, visited the Republic of China (Taiwan). In their report, entitled "Outlook on
The Far Bast, November um;." USGPO, December it>7(>, the members urged retaining
formal diplomatic and military relations with the KOC.
to pursue normalization with the People's Republic of China 5 in terms
of the interests of the United States.
These hearings were a follow up to the 1975-76 hearings 8 and the
1976 factfinding mission. They highlighted the fact that, no matter
what the international economic, political, and strategic situation, the
prime concern over the issue of normalization with the PRC revolved
about the question of Taiwan's future, and the many business, tech-
nical and legal matters surrounding that issue. Specifically, the 22
witnesses in 1977 testified repeatedly that the key question involved
both the intent and present function of the Mutual Defense Treaty,
generally regarded for the past 24 years as the only reliable source
of international security for the people of Taiwan. 7
For example, witnesses favoring continuation of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty testified that only its protective cover would provide the
security that international business concerns required to continue
operating in Taiwan. It was suggested by some that the Japanese were
able to negotiate their "formula" with Peking precisely because of the
protective umbrella of the United States and its continuing relation-
ship with Taipei.
Given the PRC's theme of self-reliance, and pre-1978 policies re-
garding credit or long-term financing, witnesses generally felt that with
or without normalization, anticipated U.S. trade with China could not
be expected to increase substantially. U.S. trade with Asia now ex-
ceeds that with Europe. But some witnesses expressed doubt whether
U.S. -PRC trade would ever amount to the two-way street enjoyed
by the United States and the other nations of Asia.
Some experts on strategic questions testified during the 1977 hear-
ings that uncertainty over possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement should
serve as a counter to other experts who urged normalization as an
anti-Soviet move in the world arena.
In the main, though, those witnesses in favor of normalization with
the PRC did so on the basis of specific bilateral concerns between the
United States and China. Such witnesses urged that if normalization
could be accomplished it should be done in an atmosphere free of
actual or implied threats to the Soviet Union.
During 10 days in July 1978, the delegation traveled some 2,600
miles and visited 4 cities in the People's Republic of China. 8 Detailed,
frank, and open exchanges were held with Senior Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jun, Mr. Wang Jun
Sheng, Vice Minister for Foreign Trade, Ambassador Hao Teh-
ching, president of the People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Chou
Pei-yuan, vice president of the Academy of Sciences and president
of Peking University, and many other individuals who gave generously
of their hospitality, time, and views.
Since the 1976 visit by Chairman Wolff and Representative Burke,
many new faces had appeared in Peking. As noted, the "Gang of Four"
had been "smashed," and Teng Hsiao-ping had been rehabilitated for
5 "Normalization of Relations With the People's Republic of China : Practical Impli-
cations," hearings before Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, USGPO (1977).
6 "The United States-Soviet Union-China : The Great Power Triangle," Subcommittee on
Future Foreign Policy, USGPO (1976).
'- Summarized testimony from each hearing appears in the appendix.
8 See appendix A for itinerary.
the second time, now sharing power with Chairman Mao's handpicked
successor, Premier Hua. But the changes the delegation both witnessed
and sensed as being under debate appeared far deeper than simple
shifts in the corridors of power in Peking.
The delegation came out of China with both individual impressions
and factual findings which cast light on the key concerns of the
American people regarding the normalization question. The resulting
distillation of meetings between the delegation and China's leadership
should help illuminate many of the questions raised by the sub-
committee in 14 hearings over the past 3 years.
As noted in the press conference 9 in Hong Kong, just 48 hours after
crossing the border from Canton, and as was discussed again with
Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke in Washington,
the delegation emerged from the People's Republic of China with
the sense that a "new realism" was beginning to assert control of
affairs in that great land through the pragmatism of Vice Premier
Much of what was seen and heard in China was not new in itself.
But the tone and context of what the delegation was told and shown
quickly built in the delegation a strong sense of the pragmatic hand
of Senior Vice Premier Teng in the day-to-day life of China. This
was particularly evident in the areas of foreign policy and economic
development, which the Chinese now see as closely related.
Certainly no visit of only 10 days could qualify any group as expert
on the policies of or events in another nation, especially a society as
closed to independent inspection as China. But the delegation had
the benefit of considerable background experience, as previously
described. Consequently, the delegation feels that what it perceived
to be the "new realism" now growing in China will bear close study
in the future.
It is in the area of foreign affairs that China's "new realism" would
appear to have its most obvious roots. It is a convincing rationale for
explaining wiry the leaders of China seem determined to modify — if
not turn away from — the policies and strict ideologies of the recent
At all levels of discussion on foreign affairs, the need to meet and
resist what was termed "Soviet expansionism" was the common
theme, and, therefore, the motivation, for China to upgrade her
scientific, technical, and military capacities. In this limited sense-
definition of the Soviet Union as the arch foe — China of 1976 and 1978
merge into one. But the differences in approach in 1978, both, at
Li and abroad, are striking, and warrant closer scrutiny.
In general, the delegation emerged from China with a definite
sense of the critical strategic and political problems facing the People's
Republic of China in the form of the Soviet Union — the "Polar
Bear"— and what the Chinese Labeled the Soviet Union's "Asian
Bowever, on the basis of its conversations with China's leaders,
the delegation feels licit while China seeks an acceleration of normali-
zation with the United States ns ;m integral part of its struggle
• Preii conference transcript is presented in full in the appendix.
against the Soviet Union, the leaders in Peking do not want normali-
zation to be played as "the China card," that is, as an anti-Soviet
move. Instead, they stressed repeatedly what they termed the common
strategic and political interests of the United States and China.
Thus, they said, the best path to normalization with the United
States lay in fostering a climate of mutual understanding and coopera-
tion, particularly in the economic, scientific, and educational fields
which are vital to China's modernization plans.
The delegation was informed by the Chinese leadership that the
Soviet Union feared two actions by the PRC — normalization with
the United States, and conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship
with Japan. As this report was written, word of a successful conclusion
to the negotiations on a Sino-Japanese peace treaty was released. 10
The delegation was told that the Soviet Union seeks to bring China
to its knees by a policy of encirclement. Further, the Chinese
warned, the United States should not be deceived by Soviet attempts
to "bluff" the West into thinking that the Sino-Soviet split could be
healed, so deep are the political and strategic divisions between them.
Nor, said the delegation hosts, should the Soviets be allowed to
bluff us into thinking that differences between China and the United
States would prompt rapprochement between Moscow and Peking.
DIKECT SOVIET THREAT
Two major developments merit close study, should they continue;
first, PRC leaders laid heavy stress on Soviet "encirclement" of China,
and second, the Delegation was told of the threat of a major Soviet
attack on China. In the past, Peking had seen Moscow as merely
"operating" against China in Asia while actually preparing for all-
out war against the United States and the NATO alliance. But now,
China herself is publicly discussed as a possible first target for the
Soviet Union. 11
Another subtlety with possibly broad policy implications is that
no longer did the delegation hear the old 1976 refrain that war between
the United States and the Soviet Union was "imminent." Instead,
the Chinese urged a three-point program of being tough and con-
fident with the Soviets as the best way to resist them. 12 If the United
States followed these "three methods," war could be "postponed"
for as much as 25 years, if not indefinitely.
The importance of this new line would seem to be that Chinese
leaders now recognize that they need time, perhaps as much as 25
years, if they are to progress to a point of being able to compete with
the flourishing economies of the West, not to mention the economic
and military might of the Soviet Union.
10 Subsequent events included an announcement by Vice Premier Teng that the 1950
Sino-Soviet treaty, which included anti-Japanese references, would not be renewed upon
its expiration in 1979.
11 The appendix to this report includes a lengthy article by Hsu Hsiang-chien, a senior
People's Liberation Army official, discussing in much harder terms the full range of
Chinese strategic and military thinking, and the conflict between '•socialism," "revisionism."
and "imperialism." The entire document has been reproduced because of its comprehensive
nature, which approaches a virtual "White Paper" on PRC theory and strategy.
: - The delegation was urged repeatedly to support the "three methods" of resisting "Soviet
expansionism." The three methods :
(1) Make concrete preparations against war; have no illusions.
(2) Upset all Soviet efforts at strategic deployment.
(3) Do not adopt a policy of appeasement toward Russia.
It was also clear to the delegation that the Chinese recognize the
need for U.S. cooperation, in Europe and Asia, principally, but also
in Africa and the Middle East, in order to stem what they see as the
tide of "Soviet expansionism." The Chinese repeatedly sketched a
world map showing Soviet activity — and gains — from Cuba to Africa,
up to the Middle East via South Yemen, into Afghanistan, and across
Again and again, the delegation was told that the Chinese consider
the policy of pursuing "detente" with the Soviet Union to be an
illusion, and that the United States is actually following a policy of
"appeasement." As noted by Ambassador Hao, and others, the
Chinese saw no utility in the SALT talks, and even opposed "feeding
the Polar Bear chocolates" in the form of increased trade and tech-
The Republic of China (Taiwan)
While many issues were discussed, the question of Taiwan — to
date, the primary question in the U.S. debate on normalization — is
perhaps the key area where the delegation felt a potentially important
example of the "new realism" was being applied by China's leaders.
The basic Chinese position regarding the need for U.S. adherence
to the principles of the Shanghai communique, and to the "three
points" — (1) ending formal recognition of the Republic of China
(Taiwan) ; (2) abrogating the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of China; and (3) withdrawing all
U.S. forces from Taiwan — has not altered. However, the delegation
sensed a new realism in terms of an emphasis on seeking ways to
settle the Taiwan question on a strictly bilateral basis, between the
In this regard, and in contrast to 1976, the talk was not in terms of
harsh rhetoric about the rulers of Taiwan, or thinly veiled hints about
ultimate resorts to force. Rather, the delegation perceived a growing
Chinese willingness to discuss Taiwan's future even with officials of
of the Kuomintang, on the basis of what were termed existing realities.
The delegation was even informed that Chiang Ching Kuo, President
of the Republic of China (Taiwan), had been a "classmate" of senior
PRC officials. No rancor toward Taipei's leaders was manifested
od a personal level during the delegation's talks. Historical instances
of BlMT-Communist "cooperation" were discussed not once in pass-
ing, but were specifically raised twice, with the comment, can you
rule it out a third time? In addition to these potentially favorable
references to the KMT — unprecedented in any previous conversations
with PRC leaders — conversations with senior Chinese officials beard
repeated references to recognition of the "realities" of the U.S.
involvement on Taiwan. The delegation was told that within the
context of the Shanghai communique, the "modalities" of normaliza-
tion were negotiable.
Linking these thoughts to the stated willingness of the Chinese to
accept the SO-Called ''Japanese Formula" of trade and economic ties,
hnt without formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as the ffQVern-
ment of China, the delegation felt that a clear pattern of willingness
to discuss Taiwan with the United States was being exhibited. The
striking contrast between 1976 and 1978, is that in the past, any sort
of discussion on Taiwan had been ruled out on the basis that it was
solely China's "internal affair."
SHIFT ON TAIWAN
That a shift has occurred would seem borne out by the fact that in
the preceding 6 months, similar pronouncements had been made to
(1) In December 1977, for example, Party Chairman Yeh Chien-ying
noted that China is relying, as he put it, on the people of Taiwan to
liberate themselves. While not ruling out the possible use of force,
Yeh's statement would seem to move away from discussing force in
any provocative way. 13
(2) In January, Ambassador Hao told the mission led by Senator
Cranston and Representative Whalen that China recognized what
were termed domestic "problems" in the United States with respect
to Taiwan. 14
(3) In April of this year, a lead article in a Peking daily quoted the
late Chou En-lai's desire for peaceful liberation of Taiwan. 13
(4) Finally, the friendly tone of the conversations held by the dele-
gation were anticipated by Chairman Yeh in May, when he greeted a
visiting delegation of former American Foreign Service officers, 16 and
called for "peaceful and friendly cooperation between China and the
United States," particularly on the normalization question.
It was within this context that the delegation heard repeated refer-
ences by the Chinese to past cooperation with the Kuomintang. The
historical fact was raised that twice in the past the Chinese Communist
Party and the Kuomintang had come together and cooperated when
it was in their common interest : First, during the time of Dr. Sun Yat
Sen and the Northern Expedition against the old warlords, and also-
against the Japanese to achieve liberation before and during World
As observers have pointed out since the delegation's return, since
1949, the Chinese have sent several signals on willingness to negotiate'
the Taiwan question. One of the more explicit examples would seem
to be of some potential relevance:
In 1955-56, at the height of the Eisenhower-Dulles polic}^ of "con-
tainment" against "Red China," Peking made repeated public efforts
to bring the United States to the negotiating table. Peking even offered
the prospect of a treaty specifically calling for peaceful settlement of
the Taiwan issue in terms of United States-China bilateral relations.
Then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected the Chinese
initiatives, although several talks were held in Geneva.
The language of the PRC during this period is of interest today. For
example, on March 4, 1956, the Foreign Ministry in Peking issued a
statement including this clause :
13 Yeh's remarks in a speech to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
on Dec. 27, 1977, were replayed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report,
People's Repuhlic of China, Dec. 29. 1977, pp. E1-E6.
i4 "The United States and the People's Republic of China," joint House-Senate report,
USGPO, May 1978.
13 Kwangniing Daily, Apr. 10, 1978, replayed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Daily Report, People's Republic of China, Apr. 26, 1978, pp. E8-E12.
16 New China News Agencv, May 19, 1978. replayed in Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Daily Report, People's Republic of China, May 22, 1978, pp. A6-A7.
(The Chinese side) put forward as early as September, 1955, the proposal for a
Sino-American Conference of Foreign Ministers to settle the question of relating
and eliminating tension (between the United States and China) in the Taiwan area.
It did not oppose the American proposal for issuing an announcement of renunciation
of force by both sides. [Italic supplied.]
Three paragraphs later, the Foreign Ministry statement repeats
the same theme, this time actively endorsing the U.S. position, saying,
China and the United States should settle disputes between the two countries by
peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force, and that in order to
realize this common desire, a Sino-American Conference of Foreign Ministers
should be held to settle through negotiation the question of relaxing and eliminating
tension in the Taiwan area. [Italic supplied.]
The Foreign Ministry statement later credits with the inspiration
for this initiative then-Premier Chou En-lai. In an April 1955 speech
at the Bandung Conference, Chou proposed,
that China and the United States should sit down and enter into negotiations.
* * * (the Premier) stated definitely that the aim of the negotiations should be to
settle through negotiation the question of relaxing and eliminating tension in the
Taiwan area. [Italic supplied.]
In 1955-56, the Chinese were serious, it is now agreed. The possi-
bility of a 1978 ploy on the Chinese part, is, of course, present. But
the preponderance of evidence available to the delegation would
seem to indicate a general pattern in line with China's historical
practice. In 1955-56 the United States was China's "encircler." In
1978, the Chinese see the Soviet Union in this role. In 1955-56, the
Soviet Union was even then backing off its support of China. In both
1955-56, and 1978, the response of the leadership in Peking to outside
pressure has been to seek to alleviate it by improved relations with
the United States. In 1978, improvement is the stated policy of the U.S.
Government, and has been since the signing of the Shanghai com-
munique in 1972. 17
It goes without saying that the events of 25 years ago cannot be
uncritically resurrected today. Further, in 1955-56, as in 1978,
Peking was very clear on the issue of "sovereignty" over Taiwan.
Premier Chou's offers were carefully couched to clearly separate United
States- People's Republic of China from United States-Republic of
China (Taiwan) and Peking-Taipei relations.
The point here is that indications of possible openings on Taiwan
during the delegation's August visit — friendly references bo Chiang
Ching-Kuo, and talk of past cooperation with the KMT — came in
the context of meeting with an official U.S. congressional delegation.
While clinging to the "soverignty" issue as a shield against specific
Statements OD a peaceful settlement on Taiwan, the fact remains that
key PKT leaders told the delegation "we will do our best to create
conditions to solve this question by peaceful means." There was obvious
recognition by the Chinese of the domestic United States and inter-
national "audience" which would receive the delegation's report.
Education, Foreign Trade, And Domestic Growth
The delegation's general perception of China's "new reality" was
reinforced by visits to educational facilities, cultural events and
w For contemporary dliciiiiion of the 1958 •"»<". Chinese »>flr<>r, see "Toward Slno-Amerlcan
Reconciliation" i»y it. Robert o. Sutter, Johni Hopklni (Jnirenlty Preu, i'jts.
institutions, and factories. At locations ranging from Peking Univer-
sity to a technical university in rural Shensi Province, teachers and
officials repeated the same themes; that the damage done by 10
years of stag-nation during the cultural revolution, and solidified by
the extremes of the "Gang of Four," had set China back years in
scientific and technical education and research, and seriously retarded
industrial production, modernization, and economic growth.
The principal difference between 1976 and 1978 is that now the
Chinese have recognized that placing ideology ahead of practice has
retarded progress. They were frank in their willingness to open up to
Western scientific technology and training to enhance, if not replace,
TRUTH IX FACTS
This does not to imply that ideology has been abandoned. But the
Chinese made it clear that a return to practice, a return to profession-
alism, will be the key determining factor in determining who is "red
and expert." They now want to "seek truth in facts," a well-known
saying of Vice Premier Teng aimed directly at what the Chinese press
calls "whateverism," a wry swipe at proponents of the view that
"whatever Mao said or wrote is correct."
That there is an emerging Chinese pragmatism, particularly in the
field of education, would seem to be clear. In January, for example,
Dr. Chou Pei-yuan, vice president of the Academy of Science and
president of Peking University, told the Cranston- Whalen delegation
that there would be no possibility of United States-China exchanges
until after normalization.
But in March, Dr. Chou joined with Vice Premier Teng in announc-
ing the 1985 goal of training 800,000 new research personnel. Surely
it was no accident that the President's White House science advisers
were in Peking at the same time as the Wolff delegation, or that Dr.
Chou and other officials subsequently announced an extensive, new
student exchange program.
Dr. Chou was very frank in his conversation with the delegation on
the need to upgrade China's educational system from top to bottom.
Clearly, the Chinese realize they cannot hope to achieve these goals
without cooperation from the West.
At the university level, ranks for professors, grades for students,
and entrance exams for prospective students have already been
restored, although only in the past 6 months. The Chinese were open
in their hopeful, if not skeptical appraisal of the benefits of the "new
realism" for China's renewed progress.
The Chinese are now instituting wage incentives, restoring rank in
the military, and using other methods to spur discipline, efficiency,
and greater production.
It is precisely changes of this nature which were advocated by Teng
Hsiao-ping and his followers prior to their purge by the "Gang of
Four." The future of these changes is still not certain.
While the role of ideology and rhetoric should not be underplayed,
the only rhetoric heard consistently throughout the visit was the old
injunction of Chairman Mao to "Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100
schools of thought contend." This mild-sounding exhortation, if
allowed to flourish, contains the seeds for a far-reaching revolu-
tion in China's administrative style and policy. The delegation was
consistently told that this old rallying call of the 1950's had been
resurrected to permit constructive expression of thought and ideas in
order to stimulate the progress which the Chinese frankly admit
they must make. (The fate of the 1950's campaign, sometimes char-
acterized as China's "Prague Spring," was not discussed.)
The Chinese now state that foreign trade is an important part
of the domestic expansion program which they have adopted for
the future. Wang Jun-sheng, Vice Minister for Foreign Trade, made
clear his government's desire that obstacles to export licenses for
certain types of U.S. technology be removed "in the spirit of the
Shanghai Communique." The Minister dismissed as "not an im-
portant problem" the longstanding issue of frozen assets, and pre-
dicted that after a 2-year decline, United States-China trade would
increase this year. However, the Minister stressed repeatedly that
trade restrictions exist in the form of the CoCom agreements, 18 and
certain export license denials on technology with potential military
applications. China would look elsewhere for trade if U.S. restrictions
are not lifted, he added.
U.S. TRADE MISSION
In return, the delegation suggested that the time was ripe for
greater official U.S. trade consultations with China, and discussed
the need for sending a trade mission equivalent to the White House
science adviser's group which was in Peking at the same time as
Subcommittee Chairman Wolff raised the possibility of joint ven-
tures between Chinese and American companies which could employ
the technology and expertise which are presently blocked by export
license restrictions not necessarily aimed at China in the first place.
Minister Wang candidly stated the new Chinese policy to pursue
modernization with outside help, "to learn from foreign friends."
where necessary. He then added the thought, "It is certain that a
powerful China will be of benefit to the United States in a threat.
This is in your strategic interest."
The discussion then focused on oil exploration, and the Minister
noted that "a number of U.S. companies have (recently) come to
China to exchange views." It should be noted that while our delega-
tion's conversation with the Minister was similar in tone to that held
by the Cranston-Whalen mission in January; namely, that trade
would have to wait for normalization — the fact was that the Chinese
had spent the past (> months seeking U.S. technology, particularly
in the oil and energy field.
Staying in the Peking Hotel at the same time as the delegation
were representatives from several major U.S. oil companies. The de-
tails of (heir- plans for mutual cooperation with China Subsequently
for "coordinating committee," is ;i forma] procedure designed t<>
oxjM.rt of strategic technology to a Communist nation without the approval of all of the 15
members 'ii<> United states. Japan, and the NATO nations excluding Iceland. France is
not a member of CoCom, and in October. :i proposer] $350 million sale of antiaircraft and
antitank weapons from Franec to the PEC wai revealed.
appeared in the press. 19 Of particular interest to the delegation was the
indication that the Chinese were now prepared to enter into produc-
tion-sharing agreements with the U.S. companies, and that the con-
cept of profit-sharing has apparently not been ruled out.
While in Peking, delegation members and staff met informally with
U.S. business executives. These conversations reinforced the percep-
tion of China's new pragmatism. The businessmen reported that 18
months ago their contact with midlevel Chinese officials had produced
only generalities, and discussion of technical manuals or prototype-.
But this year, said the businessmen, the same midlevel officials
were authorized to engage in price negotiations on packages of equip-
ment with potential sales in the millions of dollars.
The businessmen reported discussions involving agricultural train-
ing programs in which U.S. technicians would be supplied for a fee,
and in what may represent a major shift from past policy, the Chinese
indicated an appreciation of cost and profit centers in negotiating
with the foreign companies.
In the delegation's meeting with Vice Foreign Trade Minister
Wang, the Minister said that since the signing of the Shanghai com-
munique in 1972, China's policy has been to develop trade "on the
basis of equality and mutual benefit." Conceding that the "Gang of
Four" hindered implementation of this policy, Minister Wang said
"we have now entered into a new epoch of construction, and we have
a greater need to develop international trade and to expand trade.
We need to import commodities in large quantities, and at the same
time we need to increase our exports."
Citing "consumer goods" and "light industrial products" as im-
mediate possibilities, Minister Wang added "* * * some minerals
and metals. Also, if we develop our oil production, we could possibly
supply some oil to you."
It seemed to some members of the delegation that China had
embarked on a policy of using oil exploration as a pilot project in
cooperation with foreign business firms, as well as international
In the interval since our mission, the trends we perceived have
solidified into a solid stream of hard policy being implemented by
Peking, ranging from oil and arms deals, to massive tourist hotel
Supplemental Statement of Representative L. H. Fountain
While I am in general agreement with the recommendations of the
delegation, I want to take this opportunity also to reaffirm my long-
st am ting interest in maintaining cordial relations with our historic
friend and ally, the Republic of China. As I have stated on past oc-
casions, 1 favor continued diplomatic recognition of the Republic of
China and preservation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. I oppose
sacrificing Taiwan as the price of achieving normalization with Peking,
and hope that it will be possible to move toward full diplomatic rela-
tions with the PRC without impairing our historical friendship with
19 Washington Post article "China's Oil" by Hobart Rowen, Aug. 11, 197S.
CONVERSATIONS WITH PRC OFFICIALS
Meeting With Senior PRC Officials Including Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jun, and
Ambassador Hao Teh-ching, Peking, Great Hall of the
People, Sunday, July 9, 1978, 10 a.m.
The l-hour-and-45-minute conference opened with Chairman Wolff
and Vice Premier Teng discussing the 1976 visit to Peking by Mr.
Wolff and Representative Burke, and the differences between that
visit and the present.
On the Chinese side, the thought was expressed that such visits
were useful and that an exchange of views, even where they differed,
was important. "Mutual understanding between us is better than no
understanding at all," commented one participant.
The cordial nature of the delegation's discussions were reflected
in an exchange between Chairman Wolff, Representative Rangel, and
the Chinese officials present. One official commented on his own
military experience, and noted that delegation members had also
seen military service.
Representative Rangel said "Some of us prefer to forget our mili-
tary experience, such as in Korea." The response, amid laughter,
came back, "You should not forget completely." Representative
Rangel, noting he had been wounded and sent back to the United
States shortly after reaching the Yalu River, said "Completely for-
getting is impossible." The Chinese response, bantering in nature,
was "It is better to forget certain matters like the advance of U.S.
troops to the Yalu River. These matters are better to forget. But,"
the reply took on an earnest tone, "the military question is still a
very real one."
Discussion moved swiftly to the military situation in Asia, and a
discussion of the two administration visits to Peking, that of Secre-
tary Vance in August 1977, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski
Representative Wolff said "We came here to help find ways and
means of how we, as nations and people, can come together. I think
there are more areas we can agree upon than there are areas of dis-
agreements." Turning to the issue of PRC criticism of Secretary
Vance following post-mission reports of Chinese flexibility on the
Taiwan question, Representative Wolff noted that Mr. Brzezinski's
visit produced no such negative appraisal on the part of the PRC.
"Do you think that the Brzezinski visit represented progress in our
relations which exceeded that of the visit by Secretary Vance? What
are the areas we can pursue more closely as a result of our trip?"
During the discussion of these questions, the Chinese side expressed
the view that the results of both the Vance and Brzezinski vists
were the same in terms of the U.S. commitment to normalization
within the framework of the Shanghai communique. The thought
was expressed that normalization depends on efforts by both sides.
The only area of disagreement from Secretary Vance's visit was de-
scribed by Chinese officials as stemming from statements on "flexi-
bility" regarding the principles of the Shanghai communique. These
statements, according to the Chinese, were "incorrect."
The only difference between China and the United States, the con-
versation indicated, was the question of Taiwan. While the officials
indicated that the firm Peking position on sovereignty remains China's
policy, the comment was made that despite the difficulties of the
Taiwan question, it remains a question which can be "talked out"
between China and the United States.
The discussion shifted to the interests seen by the Chinese as com-
mon in United States-China relations, specifically, coordinating action
to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union. "I believe we as well as
you will have a more active attitude toward settling the question of
normalization of relations. There is a need for this because there
nre compelling circumstances," commented one official.
The Chinese officials indicated that the Soviet Union constitutes the
compelling issue in United States-People's Republic of China pursuit
of normalization. Soviet activity in Africa, the Middle East, the
subcontinent and in Southeast Asia was mentioned as posing a
common threat to both Chinese and United States interests.
The Chinese indicated that conversations with Dr. Brzezinski and
Secretary Vance had discussed this view.
The then-pending Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China
and Japan was noted as a key part of the anti-Soviet effort. Normaliza-
tion with the United States was jointly mentioned as an important
step in this regard.
It was noted that Foreign Minister Huang Hua had intended to
discuss these issues with President Carter at the United Nations
earlier this year. The officials indicated that they had planned to stress
that they see normalization primarily as a political issue, rather than
a question of diplomacy. The normalization question must be handled
"in light of the overall international situation and in a strategic
perspective," the Chinese indicated.
The comment was made that despite the areas of agreement ex-
plored in the Yanee-Brzezinski visits, and the mutual desire for
progress toward normalization, "there was no substantial result of
Representative Wolff asked, "I wonder if you could tell us how you
distinguish between the 'political' and 'diplomatic'; does it mean
that we can proceed immediately to political normalization, and allow
diplomatic normalization to proceed at its own pace?"
The Chinese replied that they wanted the United States 'Mo take
actual action" on normalization, but did not specifically respond to
the difference between "politics" and "diplomacy," other than to say
that "in diplomacy there is a lot of empty talk." They said that they
saw "action" as the key to differentiating political from diplomatic
activity, but did not indicate whether they saw political normalization
as being separable from diplomatic normalization.
Representative Wolff noted the apparent contradiction raised by
the fact that both China and the United States have full diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union, but not with each other. Further,
the paradox is deepened by the fact that both China and the United
States share the Soviet Union as a common adversary.
In reply, the idea was raised that the two actions "the Russians fear
the most are normalization between China and the United States,
and successful conclusion to the Chinese-Japanese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship. They are doing their utmost to obstruct these two things."
On Taiwan, the discussion repeated the consistent theme that "there
is no room for flexibility" on the principle of Chinese sovereignty, but
added the contention that the "specific modalities" of the Taiwan
question can be matters for United States-Chinese consultation. "The
only obstacle between us is the issue of Taiwan."
Representative Wolff indicated that the discussion was following the
line already agreed upon in the Shanghai communique regarding
"internal affairs," and asked the officials if they had any comment on
the realistic application of the so-called "Japanese Formula" to any
projected U.S. relationship with Taiwan after normalization with
Peking. He also indicated that many Americans feel the "Japanese
Formula" does not really cover the reality of U.S. interests in Taiwan.
In the discussion which followed, the Chinese officials indicated that
they felt the "Japanese Formula" represented a major concession by
them in terms of the sovereignty issue, but that it was a concession
they were willing to make in light of the common interest in meeting
the Soviet threat. "If you look at the question from the political and
strategic point of view, it is in the great interest of us both in dealing
with the Soviet Union if we can normalize relations," an official said.
Representative de la Garza then asked if "there is any effort being
made by your government, aside from the question of relations with
the United States, any effort of a non-military nature to unify Taiwan
with the mainland? Do you have any direct contacts with the people of
In the discussion which followed, Chinese officials indicated that
"so far there are no official contacts," but that longstanding personal
or private acquaintanceships exist. "In fact," said one official, "Chiang
Ching-kuo was my classmate."
Representative de la Garza followed with the question "Wouldn't
it be easier if brothers on Taiwan and on the Mainland could get
together themselves and not depend on the attitude of the United
Discussion of this question centered on two points: The historical
fact was raised that twice in the past the Kuomintang and the Com-
munist Party had cooperated, first under Dr. Sun Yat-sen against the
northern warlords, and second against the Japanese in World War II.
"Since there has already been cooperation with the Kuomintang
twice, can you rule it out the third time?", replied one official.
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
The second major point raised during: the discussion of Mr. de la
Garza's query centered on the role of the United States in the Taiwan
question. "We have often said to Americans that in our efforts to
reunify the Motherland, we will respect realities, and that we can be
flexible in the means of settlement. In this context, I am sure that it
will be possible to find a settlement satisfactory to all," commented
Representative Fountain discussed the nature of the U.S. system of
checks and balances between the executive and the legislative branches,
adding that both branches represent the American people. "I hope you
understand that while we are moving toward normalization, we would
like to move at the same time in other areas such as the exchange of
visits. You said that the one thing 'the Polar Bear' feared most was
normalization. What would be the impact on Russia of normalization
between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and
signing of a treaty of mutual friendship and solidarity between us?"
In the discussion which followed, it was indicated that the Chinese
feel that normalizaton would cause the Soviet Union to move more
cautiously in world affairs. The official added the thought that "if
relations between our two countries are normalized the Soviet Union
must be more cautious strategically."
'The formalities of normalization are not important, whether to
have a treaty or not. The realities of normalization will speak loudly."
However, the officials indicated, China had no desire to be "played"
as an anti-Soviet pawn. The Soviet interest was seen as separating
China from the United States so as to allow Russia to deal separately
with Europe, Japan, and the United States.
In this regard, the officials indicated that the possibility of Sino-
Soviet reconciliation was simply a "bluff" on the part of the Soviets,
and that the United States should be on guard in the wake of
heightened Soviet activity in Afghanistan and Vietnam. In particular,
it was indicated, the Soviet's suggested "collective security" plan for
Asia is a tipoff to their intentions. The Chinese indicated their feeling
that the nations of South East Asia, particularly the ASEAN economic
grouping, were wary of this Soviet activity, and that they shared the
Chinese perception of Vietnam as a stalking horse for the Soviet
In enlarging on this theme, discussion indicated that the Chinese
perceive the Soviet activity, particularly in Asia, as pant of an "en-
circlement" campaign aimed at them. However, the officials indicated
confidence that any such encirclement could be broken. A warning to
the United States was added, particularly regarding what the officials
saw ae Increased Soviet military activity within Vietnam.
Representative Wolff noted that Vietnam represented a potential
threat to the region, as well as to China.
In the discussion which followed, the Chinese indicated they view
Vietnam, "the Cuba of the KaM," as a potential threat to more than
just Southeast Asia., because of the Soviets' worldwide activity and
plans and Vietnam's strategic position. Regarding the current crisis
in Chinese-Vietnamese relations, it was indicated that the Chinese
officials felt their country had shown great restraint prior to the
eventual breakdown. "Only after' Vietnam took 10 steps, when it
was taking the 11th step, then China began to take its first step."
Mr. Burke brought the discussion back to the question of Taiwan:
"] accept the fact that both countries are interested in normalization
of relations. T would like to ask three questions: First, if the Taiwan
question remains unresolved, how long will it be before you take action
to reunify Taiwan with China? Second', if we withdraw our troops,
what is the future for the anti-PRC people who live on Taiwan?
Third, if we withdraw our commitments, wouldn't the anti-PRC
people negotiate with the Soviet Union, and thus create an even
greater problem for all of us than if we negotiate normalization of
relations, and work out our differences later?"
In the discussion which followed, the commitment of the PRC to
the "three conditions" was restated, as was the history of two past
instances of cooperation between the Communist Party and Ivuomin-
tahg. Also restated was the recognition by the PRC of the "realities"
of the Taiwan question. "We believe that we Chinese can find a way
to realize reunification of the island. In seeking ways to solve the
question we will face realities."
Discussion of the issue of Chinese renunciation of the use of force
repeated the impossibility of sueh a commitment, from the Peking-
standpoint, because of the sovereicm^ issue. The added thought
was raised that, paradoxically, such a commitment mi^'ht actually
make a peaceful settlement more difficult. On China's part, it was
said, "we cannot undertake any commitment as to how to achieve
the liberation of Taiwan, but we will do our best to create conditions
to solve this question by peaceful means."
JET FIGHTER SALE
In this regard, officials indicated pleasure at what they interpreted
to be a U.S. decision not to sell sophisticated jet-fighters to Taiwan.
The thought was raised that such a sale could inhibit development of
peaceful conditions which might lead to a settlement. 1 "If such action
(sales) is taken, it will obstruct reunification negotiations and settle-
ment bj peaceful means. If peaceful means are impossible, then
armed force will have to be used."
On the possibility of Soviet intervention on Taiwan, the consensus
was that normalization under the "Japanese Formula," whereby
nongovernmental relations between Taiwan and the United States
are maintained, would preclude Soviet entry into the equation even
assuming the KMT reversed its historical anti-Communist policies.
The thought was added that Chinese leaders doubted the United
States would oppose the use of force by the PRC in the event of
what was termed "a Soviet presence on Taiwan."
: It should be noted that no statement was made concerning thiptl-part.v sales r.> the
ROC. nor did the discussion cover any weapons Other than the jets. On Oet; 24. it \v ; is
i iinonneed that President Carter had rejected an ROC request for advanced fighter planes.
The ROC had previously indicated unwillingness to accept Israeli Kfir jets as a substitute
for the P— 5— G, and had been pressing tor sales of F-4's. and other sophisticated jets to re-
place the present force in the 1980's. (Associated Press item in Baltimore Sun, Oct. 25,
Mr. Guyer concluded the conversation with the thought that; "We
have been very impressed with the vitality of the Chinese people
and their spirit of unity. It will be a tragedy if we do not find a way
to bridge the gap between us and to cement our relations because I
think we both have a great future."
TRANSCRIPTS OF CONVERSATIONS
The following three conversations between the delegation and offi-
cials of the People's Republic of China were "on the record." Tape
recordings, still and motion picture film, and extensive notes by
CODEL staff members Palmer and Nelson were taken throughout
the meetings. The following transcripts, while unofficial, represent
as accurately as possible the complete conversations held by the
delegation in Peking.
Meeting With Hao Teh-ching, President of the Chinese
People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, July 7, 4 p.m.,
at the People's Institute
Ambassador Hao. We met before in the United States. Do you
remember the question you asked me at that time?
Representative Wolff. If you remember, then you have a very good
memory! Thank you for inviting us to China. There have been many
changes since my last visit. My question to you during your visit to the
United States was related to this. The purpose of our visit is to find
ways and means not to negotiate (we are not negotiators), but to make
progress in normalization based on our committee's shared responsibil-
ity with the Executive for matters dealing with normalization.
Ambassador Hao. We can exchange opinions. You are the represent-
atives of the people and therefore, like me, a commoner. Chinese
Communists are all interested in politics and discussion of policies.
Let us discuss questions of mutual interest. I have a question for you.
Is the arrogance of the "Polar Bear" in carrying out expansion be-
coming more restrained or more rampant? Why is he so aggressive,
carrying out expansion from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, from
North Africa to South Africa, from Europe to Asia — everywhere
becoming more rampant? What do you think?
Representative Wolff. This has been a continued plan of the
Russians for a long time — to seek world domination, China and the
United States as well. I think however, it is a misconception spread by
i he pre-- to say t lint the United States is not remaining strong in its de-
tei -ruination to stop Soviet expansion. Sometimes there are press stories
related to individual weapons systems that some Members of Congress
have opposed, but OUT det cnumat.ion to continue to remain strong
against our adversaries is evidenced by the fact that we have here
members of both the "liberal" and "conservative" elements of Con-
. As a result of our difficulties with Vietnam, the United States
bakes the position of not wanting to interfere in the internal affairs of
other nations, just, like the position China has taken for a long tune.
We arc well aware that the Soviets are now moving into new areas.
They have been in the Middle East for a long time. Now they are in
Afghanistan and South Yemen openly. They are also in Angola, where
they use the Cubans as surrogates.
Ambassador Hao. Also Ethiopia.
Representative Wolff. And Vietnam.
Ambassador Hao. You are right.
Representative Wolff. So they are moving all over the world and
we now face a common adversary. I would like to ask the other
members to comment.
Representative de la Garza. I have my own opinion why the
Russians are in so many places, but I wonder if the President would
give his opinion to see if they match.
Ambassador Hao. About the Russians?
Representative de la Garza. Yes.
Ambassador Hao. The "Polar Bear" has a wild ambition to expand
outward and dominate the world. This was decided a long time ago and
will not change. We have known this for a long time. He has a big
appetite but lacks strength so he invariably displays one characteristic :
He bullies the weak but fears the tough. If you wage struggle with him
he is restrained but if you connive with him, his arrogance soars. Now
he uses Western Europe as a focus and carries on unbridled expansion
throughout the world. Recently, after succeeding in Ethiopia, the
Soviet Union has continued its interference in the Arab Peninsula.
Where next? Perhaps the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea area and southern
Africa are the most dangerous. It has also stepped up expansion in
Asia. This was manifested recently in Vietnam. Vietnam wants to be a
First it wants to dominate Indochina, then all of Southeast Asia. A
small superpower needs to find its supporter. The superpower and the
small superpower share the same design, so they work together to
seize Southeast Asia. In this way they can block the sealanes in the
Western Pacific and encircle China from south to north.
Representative Wolff. Including the Indian Ocean.
CHINESE IN VIETNAM
Ambassador Hao. Of course. Just now I mentioned the essence of
the matter. Its manifestation is in the persecution and ostracism of the
Chinese residents (of Vietnam). In this way, Vietnam wishes to curry
favor with the superpower. So recently, some friends have said that
Vietnam is the Cuba of Asia. Now there are so many Cubas. One is
in Latin America, one in Asia. Now I am afraid there may be one in
the Arab Peninsula — South Yemen. So I say the present international
situation is very tense. Some people talk of detente. I don't see even
its shadow. I say get rid of "Detente!"
Representative Wolff. We no longer use the word.
Ambassador Hao. Just now you said some of the press underrate
your strength. We say the United States has powerful economic and
military strength. In the present world there are only two countries
capable of fighting a world war. How can China fight a world war?
Only you and Russia can. So we don't underrate your strength. Please
do not have any misconception on that. But with your powerful
strength you can only play your proper role when guided by a correct
policy and correct principles. Otherwise, your strength cannot play its
proper role. I mean that in deciding on a polity toward the Polar Bear
you should not be afraid. If you are not afraid you will not adopt
policies which show fear of it. If you are afraid, unrealistic delusions
may crop up in your mind. I mean when you adopt an approach in
which you first of all try not to irritate the Polar Bear. Second, the
Polar Bear is fond of chocolates. You supply it with advanced tech-
nology and trade to pacify it. Also you try to get concessions from it
by making big concessions. In the final analysis, fear will make you
adopt an appeasement policy which will lead to serious consequences,
and your powerful strength will play no role. That is my opinion.
Representative Wolff. We are not dealing on the basis of fear.
Make no mistake about that. It may sometimes appear that way
because we use methods which try to avoid war, but it is not based
Representative de la Garza. Our ideas basically coincide. I agree
with the chairman. I am sure you are aware of President Carter's
recent speech in* Annapolis.
Representative Fountain. I'd like to echo Congressman Wolff's
remarks. I think your comments reflect some of your concerns about
what we have said and what our President has done. About 2 years
ago I sat in the Shah of Iran's office for about 1% hours. He expressed
concerns similar to yours. He said that United States is the last
bastion of freedom left on the Earth, the only one strong enough to
defend the free world by taking strong positions against the Polar
Bear, not necessarily by fighting. I argee with him. I come from a
section of the United States which produced our President. He is a
soft spoken southern gentleman who is attempting to handle both
domestic and international problems. Some of his statements and
some of the positions taken in SALT negotiations may have left the
impression that we in the United States are not concerned about
the Polar Bear. But the majority of Americans and a majority
in the Congress understand Soviet expansionism. I assure you that
we are determined to keep ourselves militarily strong enough to pre-
vent the Polar Bear from taking over the world, even if we some-
times speak softly. Notwithstanding these appearances, there is a
recognition that Rus>ia and the United States have enough nuclear
power to destroy each other, and we have a desire to prevent the
outbreak of war. When the President said to the Russians that it is
either cooperation or confrontation, he spoke for the American people,
and he meant what lie said.
Ambassador Hao. With respect to the concern about U.S. attitudes
toward the Soviet Union, the Shah's concern is not accidental or
unique. Many Western European countries share that concern.
You know tins better than T. One should judge whether or not a
policy is correct, not l>y words hut by actions.
Representative Wolff. We know the "Polar Bear's" embrace can
sometimes love you to death.
Representative Ranosl. If in the course of American efforts to top
Russian expansion, this leads to military confrontation, to what
extent could we count on the help of our friends in the PKC?
Ambassador Hao. I think that surely you would not be isolated.
The Polar Bear is not only the most dangerous enemy of the United
States but is also the most dangerous enemy of China, Western
Europe, Japan, and the entire Third World. This is not the time for
the United States to anticipate how to act in the time of war. We
should take effective measures so the Polar Bear will be afraid to
launch a world war and will not launch it. We must postpone such a
war. There are three methods:
First, make concrete preparations against war. One should not have
Second, wherever the Polar Bear is engaged in strategic deploy-
ments you must find every means to upset it.
Third, don't adopt an appeasement policy in the face of your people
or of the people of the world.
Then the people of your country and the whole world will be men-
tally prepared. Only by adopting these three methods can we insure
that the Polar Bear won't treat you lightly and launch a world war.
If it launches one, the people of the world will defeat it quickly.
If we do not adopt these three methods the danger of war will ap-
proach. We Chinese adopt these three methods. Of course, you know
we are a developing country; that is, we are a poor country. But
although we are poor, we are not afraid because we adopt these three
Representative Wolff. I served at the United Nations and you
have been an ambassador. During the course of your U.N. session,
China has many times joined the Third World countries, often led by
Cuba, in opposing U.S. bases in many parts of the world. This goes
against our joint interest. You said that we should use actions to oppose
the Soviet Union. I want to give you an example. There are questions
on, for example, Diego Garcia and our bases on Guam, as well as our
troop deployments in Asia. If China supports our efforts in maintain-
ing strong positions throughout the world, then these (your delega-
tion's) U.N. actions are opposed to your position. As an example,
there is the Guam "Resolution." Even though the people of Guam
want the United States to remain, the resolution says that the United
States should withdraw its troops, and this resolution was proposed
by Cuba. In view of Soviet efforts to move into various areas of the
world such as the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and Korea, has there been
any change in Chinese policy, or is there a possibility of working
together on these matters?
Ambassador Hao. I would cite your relations with Japan as an
example. You have a security treaty and you have military bases.
Since the Japanese are willing to let you stay and since you wish to
stay, we do not wish to comment. Another example: You have 300.000
troops in Western Europe, and you have military bases there. You
have organized NATO. Since you are willing and they are willing, we
don't want to comment. Concerning your troops in South Korea,
the people of North Korea do not agree to their presence there. In
South Korea, only President Park Chung Hee agrees, not the people.
So we support North Korea. The United States should withdraw
all its troops and equipment from Korea and let the people of Korea
Representative Wolff. What is the present situation in
Ambassador Hao. We believe that the 6 million people of Cam-
bodia will not submit to the 50 million Vietnamese.
Representative Wolff. Do you think they can stand up to Vietnam
without outside help?
Ambassador Hao. The Cambodians can stand up. They are not
isolated because they have the support of the people of the world.
It is an unjust cause for Vietnam to invade Cambodia while it is a
just cause for Cambodia to fight against invasion, and thus they
will gain the sympathy of the world. In the end they will succeed.
Representative Wolff. We are attempting to help the refugees
from Cambodia and Vietnam. We are trying to get Asian countries
to take them and we are also accepting quite a few ourselves. Can we
cooperate on this question?
Ambassador Hao. We have not considered this.
Representative Wolff. Is there something we can consider?
Ambassador Hao. We don't want to now.
Representative Wolff. When Congressman Burke and I were here
2 years ago and spoke to Chang Chun-Chiao, we talked about the
possibility of the sale of military equipment to your government. He
replied there was no interest on his government's side. What is your
Ambassador Hao. Is it the policy of your government to sell this
type of equipment to us?
Representative Wolff. I am just asking if there might be the possi-
bility that your country has an interest?
Ambassador Hao. Some years ago we wanted to buy computers
with a capability of 10 million bits. The businessmen wanted to sell it,
but your government would not approve the sale. You say that you
want to sell military equipment to us, but aren't you afraid of ir-
ritating the "Polar Bear?"
Representative Wolff. Perhaps there has been a misinterpretation.
1 asked whether China was interested now in military equipment. As
to the question of computers, I believe that as our relations change
there will bo a greater possibility of making such sales.
Representative Fountain. We won't sell it to the Russians.
Ambassador Hao. Now if you want to sell this type of computer,
we won't buy it because we can make them. We don't have 100-million-
l>it computers hut we don't need the first type. It seems that it bene-
fited us that you didn't sell it because we can now produce it oui>elves.
Representative Wolff. Then we, by inaction, provided cooperation,
hut we have advanced beyond that.
Ambassador Hao. Thank you.
Representative De La Garza. I would like to say something. We
spoke of the Polar Bear, of how they come into countries for aggres-
sive purposes, sometimes through the Cubans. But 10-12 years ago,
I visited Africa and I saw China helping Africa, not promoting aggres-
sion. An example was in Tanzania where you were helping build a
railroad. I would like to remind you of this and commend you because
of what I saw.
Ambassador Hao. Thank you for your commendation.
Representative Rangel. When I was a young man I had the op-
portunity to find myself in the northern part of North Korea. Thanks
for making it possible for me to make a speedy return to the United
Ambassador Hao. Did you reach the Yalu River?
Representative Rangel. Yes; but only for a very short time.
Representative Wolff. You say the people of South Korea don't
want us. That is not true. That is not what they tell us. The North
Korean people may not want us, but North Korea was brought into
the war by the Russians.
Ambassador Hao. You say the South Koreans want you to be there.
Your information comes from Park Chung Hee. Our information
comes from the people. Our sources are different so our views are
Representative Wolff. That doesn't cover Guam. And what about
Vietnam? We were there; now the Russians use Vietnam to threaten
the peace of Southeast Asia.
Ambassador Hao. It is true that it threatens the peace of Southeast
Asia. There are three elements there: Southeast Asia, the United
States, and China. Is it frightening? It is not.
Representative Wolff. It is bad but not frightening.
Ambassador Hao. It is not so serious but we must deal with it.
Representative Wolff. We have talked about our differences.
Let's talk about how we can work together. How can we get together
on such matters as trade, economics, and military affairs?
Ambassador Hao. The Shanghai communique opened a new
chapter in the relationship between our two countries. It has ex-
panded contacts between our peoples. For example, you are now in
China. Could you have come 6 years ago? You wouldn't have gotten
visas. Now you want to come, we want you, and you are here. There
are also trade relations between our two countries. Also cultural
relations, scientific and technological contacts. The problem is that
after 6 years, our relations are still not normalized. If normalization
had been achieved, relations would develop even faster. Since there is
no normalization, the development of our relations is necessarily
affected. Didn't you ask last year whether we could just develop
trade and put aside normalization? Do you remember?
Representative Wolff. Wiry did I ask the question?
Ambassador Hao. I don't know.
Representative Wolff. Because I understand that you were the
hardest liner on Taiwan. [Laughter.]
ACTIONS IX VIETNAM
Representative Winn. You have suggested that the United States
should try to upset the Polar Bear around the world. Are you your-
selves trying to upset the Polar Bear by your actions in Vietnam
in the last few days?
Ambassador Hao. Of course. Wherever it takes action we exert our
efforts to upset it. Since you are in Peking, you can see from broad-
casts and newspapers that the struggle is intense. Who do we fight?
On the surface we are struggling against the small hegemonist power,
Vietnam, but in reality we are struggling against the big hegemonist
Representative Winn. Would you like the United States to help you
upset the Polar Bear around the world even without normalization?
Ambassador Hao. We don't need that. Each of us can act according
to our own way. We do ours and you do yours. There is a Chinese
saying that different paths lead to the same goal. By taking different
roads our actions in essence are coordinated. Take the second Zaire
invasion as an example. In the first invasion the United States did
nothing. In the second one you did something; we did more and the
invasion was defeated.
Representative Wolff. The relations between our two countries
should not be based solely on the existence of a common adversary,
but also on a common mutual interest in world peace.
Ambassador Hao. We share your aspiration. If relations are normal-
ized there will be more opportunities for this.
Representative Wolff. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to
visit China and to meet you. Do the other members have any more
Representative Burke. Last time I was here your leaders said that
there was a similarity between the Soviet buildup and what Hitler did.
Like Hitler, the Soviets would eventually have to commit troops to
Eastern Europe and then to attack all of Europe. One of your am-
bassadors overseas also recently said the same thing. Do you have
similar views? Will the use of troops in Europe occur, and if so, when?
Ambassador Hao. At present the Soviet strategic focus is in Western
Europe, because Western Europe is an area with powerful military
strength; it is also an area with a high level of science and technology
and occupies an important strategic position in the world. So in order
to dominate the whole world they must first seize Western Europe.
The Soviet Union has concentrated its troops in Eastern Europe and
m the European part of Russia and has trained them in Western
Europe. Although three-quarters of its troops are in Europe, the time
is not ripe for world war. It uses its troops for bullying and sows
dissension in order to force U.S. troops out of Europe. In this way it
ran win without a fight. At the same time it. also carries out strategic
deployments in North Africa, the Middle East, and Africa in order
to encircle Western Europe from the flanks. Imagine when it seizes
strategic materials from Africa and the Middle East, especially oil,
and cuts off sealanes, it will then be easy to seize Western Europe.
That is its strategic design. Some people say it is aimed at the East.
We say no. It pretends to be about to fight in the East, it feints to
the East but attacks in the West. It wants to divert attention. Jt is nol
possible to succeed in the East. Also the East does not cany t In-
st rategic significance of the West. Will it launch a war against Western
Europe soon? The factors for war are growing, but war is not likely to
break out in the next 'A to 5 years, it is difficult to say after that.
It will depend on the efforts of all of us. It is possible to postpone
it for 20-25 years. We Chinese are peaceloving. We don't want to
fight wars. But it is not up to us. We are not Moscow's Chief of
General Staff. We must beware of this danger.
Representative Fountain. In view of this situation what do you
think the United States ought to do?
Ambassador Had. You ought to apply the three methods which I
mentioned earlier: To make preparations against war; to attempt to
upset Soviet strategic deployments; and to bury your appeasement
Representative Wolff. I have one final point: There are a number
of unsettled questions on the China boundary. Some islands are in
dispute; the question of Hong Kong is not pursued very actively
because the situation is satisfactory to your country. We haven't
spoken of Taiwan today. Isn't there a similarity here? Is this not
another boundary question?
Ambassador Hao. You switched the subject. Do you have any
ideas on Taiwan?
Representative Wolff. I would like to find a way to talk about
boundary questions. I think that perhaps Taiwan can be placed in
a boundary context, rather than the way it has been treated before.
Ambassador Hao. I don't want to discuss it as a boundary question.
Taiwan is Chinese territory. Even though we explore this question
today in a friendly atmosphere I'm afraid we might get emotionally
excited, but since we are old friends I would like to say that you owe
us a debt. I don't mean those of a century ago. W T e don't want to settle
those. We are looking toward the future. But now we are in the 1970's
and you are still interfering in the internal affairs of China. You
don't respect our sovereignty. Don't you owe us a debt? We don't
want to settle old debts, but on Taiwan it is more beneficial to the
United States to settle it sooner, rather than later; faster, rather than
slower. We think that the five principles of coexistence should guide
international relations. This was recognized by both sides in the
Shanghai communique. By this principle, who owes whom debts?
Of course you owe us. Take the first principle. It says that one should
respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. You enjoy territorial
integrity; we do not. The second principle is mutual nonaggression.
Does China have troops in the United States? No, but you have them
in our country. The third principle is noninterference in the internal
affairs of others. Taiwan is ours and you are interfering in our internal
affairs. Some people even try to create "Two Chinas." So we are not
going to settle old accounts but you are incurring new debts. The more
you incur them the worse it is. I said the same thing at the breakfast
meeting in the House of Representatives and at lunch in the Senate.
Representative Wolff. I recall.
Ambassador Hao. Our two peoples are friendly to one another.
The Chinese people are friendly to the United States, and in my own
experience the American people are friendly to China. In my opinion
the American people's view is that normalization can be realized
very quickly. In the international world, the earlier the normalization
of our relations, the better. This will be more beneficial to you than to
us. I want to stop here. I don't want to settle accounts between us
VISITS AND DISCUSSIONS
Representative Fountain. I have one observation. I am not
familiar with the computer problem you mentioned. Maybe we made
a mistake. It is like when we turned down Nasser on the Aswan Dam.
Now Egypt knows the true nature of the Soviet Union and so do other
countries in that area. I think that on normalization, we can further
this by promoting other types of relations. The process can be con-
tinued through more visits and discussions such as this. I know the
Chinese are a proud people and do not want to ask, but if there is
something that China needs, you should ask us. Maybe not that
computer, but something else. I agree — I think the American people
are friendly to China.
Representative Guyer. I would like to invite you and your col-
leagues to visit the United States.
Ambassador Hao. Thank you. I will go there when there is an op-
Representative Guyer. Perhaps we should convey that to our
Government and work out an invitation.
Ambassador Hao. Not the Government. I am just a common citizen.
Representative Guyer. Our subcommittee might work out an
Representative Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Meeting with Wang Jux-shexg, Vice Minister for Foreign
Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade, July 7, 1978, 9 a.m.
After exchanging opening pleasantries, Congressman TVoliT began
the conversation by noting that both countries had a common objec-
tive to work together to promote closer cooperation between our two
Minister Wang. I am delighted to meet all of you and to have
this opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest. I believe
this is your second visit to China?
Representative Wolff. Yes, for me and for Congressman Burke.
Minister Wang. Since it is your second visit you now have a better
understanding of conditions in China,
presentative Wolff; Yes, you can say I am an old friend of
Minister Wang. Friends who visit us several times we consider
old friends, hut even those who come here for the first time are
friends because they have made a contribution to mutual
Representative Wolff. I believe it is important to strengthen our
relationships so that we can move toward normalization, especially in
the trade areas. That is why we requested a meeting with you today,
to discuss problems which exist between our two countries and to
see how we can help to solve them. In some areas there are still
difficulties that stand in the way of increased trade. One of tin
the question of frozen assets. I would like to ask what progress can
be made in solving this question? I believe that until this question is
cleared up it will be difficult for both countries to conclude such
agreements as aviation agreements, banking arrangements, and other
Minister Wang. The question of frozen assets is not an important
problem. Both our governments have already exchanged views on
this question in the past few years. We do not think it will be difficult
to solve. In previous years, trade between our two countries has
reached a fairly high level, then in some years it has dropped. This
year it will be up again. Lack of normalization affects the level of
trade and the export controls imposed by your country also affect
the development of trade. Sometimes our groups sign contracts but
your government authorities do not approve the export licenses.
Representative Rangel. What areas in particular do you have in
Minister Wang. I think you are very clear about this. One example
is in the field of electronics.
Representative Wolff. Electronics and computers.
Minister Wang. Also when we want to import a company plant,
sometimes there is one component in this plant whose export is not
allowed. This then affects the whole sale.
Representative Rangel. Specifically what type of components
have you found this to be a problem with?
Minister Wang. It occurs not only in electronics but also in
other areas. This is a manmade obstacle to trade.
Representative Rangel. In America, business and government
operate on two different levels. We Members of Congress would like
to find ways of removing these obstacles. It would be helpful if you
could tell us what types of difficulties you have so that we could try
to make it easier to develop trade between our two countries.
Minister Wang. We hope that the U.S. Government will provide
facilities for trade with China in the spirit of the Shanghai com-
munique. Whenever we sign contracts to import goods frorn America,
American authorities should approve these exports. You should export
what commodities you can.
Representative Wolff. One obstacle in the past has been export
licenses for highly sophisticated electronic equipment and components.
With changing circumstances I think there is a greater opportunity to
lift some of these restrictions so that we can be helpful to each other.
Minister Wang. The U.S. Government has set obstacles not only
on goods produced in the United States but also on some from other
Representative Wolff. You mean licensing?
Minister Wang. The American Government creates obstacles under
the provisions of the so-called CoCom. CoCom is difficult for us to
Representative Wolff. This was originally an effort to see that
sophisticated technology was restricted to our closest allies. We are
now moving toward a policy of friendlier trade which will lead to
lifting controls on a wide variety of items. This question should be
discussed at the highest levels between officials who understand these
problems. Discussion should be not only with businessmen but also
high-level trade negotiators. Perhaps we ought to recommend that
Robert Strauss come here, since there is now a high-level American
science mission in Peking. There should also be a trade mission to dis-
cuss these difficulties.
REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES
Minister Wang. In order to solve this problem one should take the
Shanghai communique as a basis. As long as both sides follow the
provisions of the Shanghai communique, trade can develop. We would
like to see the removal of those obstacles which stand in the way of
trade. Efforts of the business community have already helped to
remove some of these.
Representative Wolff. You mean the Deadalus case?
Minister Wang. Yes; but the export was delayed, which caused us
difficulties. Sometimes a business signs a contract but we are not sure
whether your Government will approve. Some U.S. trade organiza-
tions invite us to visit the United States for a technical exchange, but
the U.S. Government then does not approve the export of that tech-
nology to China.
Representative Wolff. We should explain to you that these pro-
visions are not directed against China. The American policy is to
restrict certain types of equipment and prohibit export of these types
to all countries.
Representative Burke. For security reasons.
Representative Winn. Since we are talking about trade missions I
would like to say that I hope that in the future, Chinese trade missions
to the United States could include a visit to Kansas, my home State,
because it is the center of food production. They should also go to
Oklahoma and Texas, which are neighboring States, in order to look
into oil production, I think both of these missions could accomplish
quite a bit, and I would like to extend an invitation for a mission to
Representative Wolff. Concerning oil exploration, I wonder if the
Government of the PRC is interested in joint ventures with American
companies using high technology and American expertise as a method
of getting around the export License problem?
Minister WANG. I have often heard that the United States practices
export controls because of security reasons but our import of American
technology will not affect your security. If you think it will, you over-
eat iniate OUT abilit v.
Representative Rangel. Tell them these are not directed
Representative Wolff. I'd like to reiterate that these controls are
not meant directly against China. They are part of a worldwide
policy of our Government. We are now changing our relationships
with the PRC as a result of our policy on moving toward normalization.
OBSTACLES TO TRADE
Minister Wang. We hope you will continue to make efforts and
that the U.S. Government will act to remove these obstacles to trade.
In our policy of striving to achieve the four modernizations, we rely
mainly on our own efforts but for the most advanced technology,
this comes mainly from imports. It is certain that a powerful China
will be of benefit to the United States in a threat. This is in your
strategic interest. As for oil exploration, a number of U.S. companies
have come to China to exchange views on this and others will follow.
This proves that we are interested in exchanging views on matters of
Representative Fountain. Some export controls are prompted by
complaints from other countries who are afraid of U.S. exports
flooding their markets. We also occasionally have this fear; for instance,
in the field of textile imports. This is where someone like Bob Strauss
can help through negotiations by equalizing these problems. I would
like to refer to a document I just received from the National Council
on United States-China trade which presents a comprehensive picture
of China's 10-year plan and of the prospects of the China market. It
talks about the Chinese economy and your economic plans and is
encouraging to those of us who wish to trade with China. Its conclu-
sion is as follows, and I am paraphrasing:
A HUGE MARKET
China represents a huge market. It is following a pragmatic policy toward foreign
trade questions. There is a great opportunity but U.S. companies are not trying
hard enough. Most of our exports to the PRC are still agricultural. U.S. firms must
be more aggressive in seeking to sell to China. Some, for instance, hear that thrv
have competition from a Japanese company and simply give up. Normalization
will help in the development of our trade with China but there are many things
short of normalization which can be done and American firms will have to work
harder in order to increase our trade.
Would you care to comment on this document?
Minister Wang. The Council has given you a true picture of China.
Trade will develop in order to help develop our national economy.
Since our relations with the United States are not yet normalized
there are still some obstacles but this does not mean that we cannot
develop trade. Recently we signed a long-term trade agreement
with Japan. We also have a trade agreement with the Common
Market. Both of these will be conducive to the development of our
foreign trade. From our side we can import a number of commodities
from the United States, mainly industrial. This does not, of course,
exclude the possibility of some agricultural imports.
Representative Wolff. Isn't this a change in your position?
Minister Wang. No, our policy is unchanged. We have consistently
stood for the development of trade on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit. As a result of the signing of the Shanghai communique
in 1972 we have developed trade with the United States in the spirit
of that communique. Of course, in recent years we have been pre-
occupied with domestic developments and particularly during the
Cultural Revolution we stressed the problems we have at home.
The Cultural Revolution won some achievements but it was even-
tually sabotaged by the Gang of Four. They also sabotaged our rela-
tions with other countries and thus affected some implementation of
our consistent policy. Since the smashing of the Gang of Four we are
now able to apply more smoothly our consistent policy but that policy
has not changed. We now just act on it better. We have now entered
into a new epoch of construction and we have a greater need to develop
international trade and to expand trade. We need to import commodi-
ties in large quantities and at the same time we need to increase our
Representative Wolff. What types of exports can you send to the
Minister Wang. There are quite a number of things. For instance,
items of daily use, consumer goods, light industrial products and some
minerals and metals. Also, if we develop our oil production we could
possibly supply some oil to you.
Representative Wolff. That's very important.
Representative de la Garza. You seem very concerned about
advanced technology but as far as I know, the only controls we have
are on three things: military items, computers with dual civilian-
military use, and nuclear equipment. Other technology such as medical
technology, agricultural machinery, and so forth, are not controlled;
only those three items.
Minister Wang. It is very difficult to distinguish between military
and civilian use. For example, we can import grain and if the people
eat it it is civilian. If the army eats it then it is military.
Representative de la Garza. That is not the problem. There is no
control over any but those three items.
Representative Wolff. But there is sometimes some question over
the ultimate use of equipment like trucks and aircraft.
Representative Guyer. I think there are certain ideological goals
that our two countries could share, not only trade. There are positions
we could agree upon. As for trade, I wonder if we could have a list of
some areas where you could invite companies to come to China to
help out like you have with Pullman. My congressional district has a
great deal of agribusiness. If we could have an invitation list to take
home to our people this could speed up the process of the develop-
ment of trade.
Minister Wang, We share your desire to develop trade with the
United States. We hope we can remove the obstacles in the way of
trade. We also hope that visits between our two countries will be more
frequent than they have been before. In the future we will speed this
Representative Wolff. Do you feel it would be possible to have un
exchange of landing rights for airlines in each country so as to help
Minister Wang. This will be difficult because of the lack of normal-
ization. We do not preclude the possibility of individual pianos coming
to our country or going to yours. For instance, you came here on an
American plane but this could not be a regularly scheduled service.
Representative Wolff. I want to thank you for receiving us. I
think our visit here served a useful purpose. Our wish is to increase the
possibilities of cooperation between our countries in all fields. Most
of the members of this delegation are on the International Relations
Committee and we include chairmen of individual subcommittees.
Mr. Rangel is also on the Ways and Means Committee which deals
with the question of "most favored nation." We proposed to do what
we can to advance normalization. The question of political normaliza-
tion must go through the committee as well as through the Executive.
We share authority with the Executive and our objective is to seek
means to advance the process of normalization. We think this will be in
the best interest of both countries.
Minister Wang. I am very happy to have been able to exchange
views with our American friends. This will contribute to advancing
mutual understanding. I think that the development of relations be-
tween our two countries is in the interest of our two peoples. It is
better for you to come to China to see things with your own eyes.
Some views may not be acceptable to the other side but we do have
some points in common. For instance, both sides desire to develop
trade and both sides wish to remove obstacles to trade. We are willing
to develop trade and if there are obstacles they must be removed. If
they are not then we will go ahead and develop our trade with other
countries because we will be forced to do so. We hope that you will
use your influence to work toward improving our relations.
Representative Fouxtaix. We also hope that in the future repre-
sentatives of China will come to the United States to talk to people
engaged in trade and get a clearer picture of our side. I note that your
leaders have recently been traveling more and I hope that some of
them come to the United States. Your leaders could gain better
understanding of those problems and help to resolve these obstacles.
In fact, the United States does not have very many restrictions on
Minister Waxg. Quite a few of us have gone to the United States
already. Most have been specialists but they included some senior
officials. We hope to increase this type of visit.
Representative Wolff. I hope that as a result of this trip and know-
ing more about some of these problems and your desires that we in
Congress can eliminate some of the obstacles to trade between our two
Meeting With Dr. Chou Pei-Yuan, Vice President, Academy
of Sciences; President, Peking University (at Academy of
Sciences) July 8, 1978—9:30 a.m.
Representative Wolff. Congressman Winn from Kansas is not only
a member of the International Relations Committee, but is one of
the ranking members of the Committee on Science and Technology
of the Congress.
Before, when I first came to Congress, I was a member of the Science
and Technology Committee. And Mr. Winn also serves on the Space
Science and Application Subcommittee.
Dr. Chou. We welcome Congressmen who are doing political
work as well as Congressmen doing scientific work. To use our way of
saying things, the science and technology in our country serve the
needs of proletariat politics. By politics we mean we must build the
socialism, we must criticize the Gang of Four and we must pursue the
philosophy of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung's thought to
guide our work, so science and technology cannot be separated from
politics and philosophy. So if you have any questions in this respect,
we will be glad to answer.
Representative Winn. I would like to ask the professor what part,
if any, he is playing in the meetings with our scientific advisers?
Dr. Chou. Dr. Frank Press is an old friend of mine. The first time
he visited China in 1973, he led a seismological delegation. I was
working in Peking University. 1 received him there. In 1975, a dele-
gation of the Scientific and Technical Association visited the United
States. It was received by Prof. Frank Press and also the Academic
Exchange Committee. You see Frank Press was the head of the Com-
mittee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of
China. There were 14 others — we were staying with different scientists
of the United States. I had the privilege of staying with Prof. Frank
Press in Boston.
Representative Winn. Have you seen Frank Press and his group
since they've been here?
Dr. Chou. Yes; I had the honor of greeting him at the airport when
he arrived in Peking. I also attended the banquet given by Comrade
Fung Li, Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Commission of
Representative Wixx. Can you give us your opinion of how the
scientific talks are going between the PRC and the United States at
the present tune?
Dr. Chou. I didn't join these discussions. I am doing scientific work
at the moment and the delegation led by Professor Press is invited by
the Scientific and Technical Commission. On the Chinese side, the
discussion is presided by the Scientific and Technical Commission. Of
course ^here are some leaders of the different scientific departments who
also take part. From the academy, some other comrades are taking
pari m the discussion, so I am not joining them.
Representative \Vi\\. Can the Professor tell us, If he would, what
scientific work he's involved in at the present time?
Dr. ('nor. Recently, theoretical physics; in the past I was involved
in general relativity. Foe many years I've been involved in the study
of fluid mechanics. I came to Peking University only very recently.
J came to the Science Academy very recently.
Representative Winn. Lester Wolff and 1 formerly served as mem-
bers of the Science and Astronautics ( Ynnmit tee, the Space ( Jommittee.
But 4 years ago we changed the name to the Science and Technology
Committee. And at the present time, hall* of our jurisdiction deals with
energy, that's where the technology comes in. Instead of the astro-
nautics, we still have the space program.
Dr. Chotj. I think I can give you a brief introduction about the
development of China's science and technology of the future, in the
near future. Just now, you talk about the space science, and we are
also attaching great attention to this subject. This year, the 5th
National People's Congress was held, and at that Congress the general
task for the new period was decided. That is, we should realize the four
modernizations by the end of the century. The four modernizations
are: industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense.
After the completion of the 5th National People's Congress, the
National Science Conference was held, about 6,000 people took part
in the conference. At the National Science Conference, we discussed
the important thing, that is the plan for the years 1978-1985, for the
development of science and technology in 8 years. We have set some
goals in a plan. By 1985, we need to build a contingent of 800,000
scientific and technological research workers. According to our knowl-
edge (this knowledge may not be correct) there are 1 .2 million scientific
and technological research workers in the United States. Since you're
working on the Science and Technology Committee, you may tell
us whether this is correct or not.
Representative Wolff. It depends entirely upon how you interpret
science and technology; whether you're talking about pure scientists or
Dr. Chou. If you count these together?
Representative Wolff. It is very difficult to say because so much
of the research in applied science is being done by individual firms
rather than by the Government itself. Therefore it is hard for us to
make any assessment of the numbers, but I would say that your figures
are perhaps very conservative in the amount. There are more today
in applied technology for example. We have a great number of people
working in that area which would expand that figure many times.
NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS
Dr. Chou. We have a pretty accurate figure of the numbers of
Ph. D.'s who are trained in science, engineering, and medicine. It is
a fairly good estimate. But still, there are many people working in
industry who do not have a Ph. D. According to our information, the
Soviet Union has 900,000 research workers. Even if we have trained
820,000 research workers by 1985, we are still lagging far behind, com-
pared with you, because you have only a population" of 200 million
while we have a population of 800 million.
Representative Winn. What about the facilities to train that many
Dr. Chou. Now we have better industrial bases than we had in the
early days after our liberation. And our Government is going to make
big investments with regards to facilities. We are going to supply the
main universities with more equipment.
Representative Wolff. When I visited here in 1975, I went to
Peking University. At the time there was a question as to whether or
not the political activity overshadowed the scientific. We have always
had a great question in our own country of academic freedom; how
does the situation stand today? I know that in your opening comment
you did make the relationship between politics and science. Yet to
operate most efficiently in the scientific field you have to have the
freedom to develop your techniques and the application of those
Dr. Chou. In which month did you go to the Peking University in
Representative Wolff. April.
Dr. Chou. It was a dark period for the Peking University at that
time. It was under the rule of the Gang of Four. Because at that time
the Gang of Four was on the loose. It was attacking the party relent-
lessly. The Gang of Four wanted to seize the stage and party in power.
It used Peking University for the bridgehead. By a bridgehead, I mean
they used the Peking University and also the Ching Y University.
They set up a joint criticism group from both universities and used
this group as a basis to propagate the public opinion they had prepared :
Anti-party, anti-Mao Tse-tung, anti-Chairman Mao's revolutionary
line public opinion. The criticism group of Ching Y and Peking
University confused the minds of the people, which was very serious.
With regard to the academic freedom mentioned by Mr. Wolff, I
would like to comment on it later. In our plan for the development of
science and technology we are also going to fulfill our task in the 27
spheres and we are going to undertake more than 100 programs. The 27
spheres include the basic science and also applied science. Among the
over 100 programs, 8 programs are vital. They have a vital bearing on
the development of our national economy. The 8 program^ are: (1)
The research of agriculture; (2) material science; (3) energy; (4)
computer science and technology; (5) space science and technology;
(6) laser; (7) high energy of physics; and (8) genetic engineering.
The science and technology of space is listed as one of the major
programs in the near future. We can also divide these eight programs
into different groups. 1 think agriculture, materials, and energies have
vital values on the national economy. Another three programs are
advanced technology. They are the elect rocomputers, laser, and space
science and technology. The remaining two, that is the high energy
physics and genetic engineering, are basic sciences. You can see that
we have a comprehensive plan for the development of science and
technology. After the plan is drawn, the scientific and technical or-
ganizations, also the universities and schools of higher learning, the
enterprises and also the local scientific and technical organizations
undertake the task and they are t rving every method to fill fill oar plan.
In our country we have research institutes which belong to the
Science Academy. Then we have research institutes and research
groups which belong to the university and institutes of higher learning.
We have research institutes attached to the various ministries of
•production, like agriculture, machinery and so forth. Then we have
research institutes which belong to the provincial governments, like
Peking, the city of Peking, the city of Shanghai, and also the provinces.
You see all these are a network, so far as scientific research is con-
cerned, it's under the leadership of the State Commission for Scien-
Representative Winn. It still is a very ambitious program.
Dr. Chou. It is. This isn't the first time we drew up a plan. Actually,
in 1956, we drew a 12-year plan for the years 1956-67, under the
direct leadership of the late Chairman Mao. We fulfilled this plan 5
years ahead of schedule, in 1962. That was the first plan for the
development of science and technology in China's history, for a
country which has 600 million people.
With regard to academic freedom we are acting according to the
principles made up by Chairman Mao. That is "let 100 flowers bloom
and 100 schools of thought contend." After the plan is drawn, we
don't mean we will carry it to the letter. When a situation changes and
when there is a need to make alterations these will be allowed. Because
we can't know everything at the moment. We_must enhance under-
standing through practice.
Representative Wixx. Would the professor care to touch a little
bit on the direction China is going on the energy problem?
Dr. Chou. Of course, I'm engaged in the basic science research. I'm
not very familiar with this subject, but I will give you my opinions.
Representative Wixx. According to the information we have re-
ceived, China has reached petroleum, coal, water resources, and water
Dr. Chou. Our American friends know a lot about our petroleum
resources because much has been quoted about the reserves in China
and we're not very clear about it. We have already set high goals for
ourselves. We are going to build 10 major oilfields.
I think we have rich petroleum fields and our friends know this. I
think we have natural oil resources and the Japanese industrialists are
very much interested in it because they import oil from the Arab
Representative Wolff. So do we.
Dr. Chou. So there is a wide prospect for trade in this respect. Of
course we will make economical use of the oil resources, we will not
waste the resources.
Representative Wolff. One of the points I think is quite important
in all of the exploitation of fossil fuel is that these are exhaustible
supplies; they are not inexhaustible, and they can be used up. I noticed
you did not mention any work in solar energy or nuclear and the like.
Nuclear energy is exhaustible unless you use a breeder reactor which
produces its own fuel. The importance, it seems to me, is that you
have the attributes of a desert (which is something nobody considers
an attribute) and you get a lot of sun. Combining work with us in
spare and the utilization of your desert to farm energy seems to me
to be a field for the future that China could establish great leader-
Dr. Chotj. Of course with these fossil oils and fuels, for instance
the petro and the coal, we should make economic use of these resources.
If you waste them, they would be exhausted very quickly. According
to my knowledge, I think in China we've not yet developed the pri-
vate ownership of automobiles. We are going to develop public
Just now you mentioned solar energy, there is also thermoenergy.
Our country is also researching this subject. For instance, the
Research Institute of Physics is undertaking this subject — plasma
physics and thermonuclear control and fusion energy.
WATER POWER RESOURCES
We attach great importance to these subjects and we are going to
explore the water power resources. We have been talking about build-
ing a reservoir in the gorge of the Yangtze River. We have been
making studies for over 20 years. I myself attended water conserva-
tion conferences twice, in 1958 and 1959. If a dike is built on the gorge
of the Yangtze, 30-40 million kilowatts of electricity can be produced.
After the construction is completed there, amanmade "Mediterranean
Sea" will be created in China. And the climate in that area will be
changed. Also navigation and fishing are involved in this respect. So
many aspects are involved, we have been undertaking this study for
Representative Wolff. One of my first exposures, some 14 years
ago, in the Science and Technology Committee was experimental work
in what we called "moving the weather" — of moving the climatology
from one area to another.
You did mention genetic engineering. I'm wondering why the em-
phasis on genetic engineering? What is the ultimate purpose?
Dr. Chou. Genetic engineering will play a very favorable role
in the development of our agricultural production. It will improve
the strains. About the energy problem, 1 would like to add one more
word. Although China has rich energy resources, we still need to
develop energy. We are still in great need of energy. In the country-
side, we are still lacking many fuels. In the country we are now using
Datura] gas for fuel which can produce electricity.
Representative Wolff. We have of recent years been doing the
same as you know. In fact, today we have almost a greater need for
Datura] gas than we do have for oil.
Dr. Chou* We have very much enjoyed our discussion, but since
time is limited, may we stop here?
Representative WOLFF. One final point. Do you foresee mutual
cooperation in the scientific area where we can piofii from your activity
in research and development and you can profit from ours?
Dr. Chou. Yes; the Chinese people very much support scientific
exchanges. This is the very first item listed in the Shanghai communi-
que, and we have made some progress in this in the past 2 years.
We have some limits at the moment because there is no normaliza-
tion of relations between our two countries. But if relations are normal-
ized between our countries, then we can make bigger strides. I agree
with you that exchanges are beneficial to both sides. The machinations
of the Gang of Four unfortunately widened the gap between our two
countries, so we welcome you now.
Representative Wolff. Thank you, Dr. Chou.
A complete listing of the delegation's itinerary is presented as the
first item in the appendix. The purpose of this section will be to discuss
briefly some of the highlights of the itinerary, and to note some of the
themes currently motivating China which the itineraiy seemed to
Each of the cities visited — Shanghai, Peking, Sian, and Canton —
provided the Delegation with a varied "mix" of Chinese industry,
culture, and social activity in what might be termed "post-Gang of
Four" China. If there was a predominant theme in virtually every
stop we made, it was the difference between life under the "Gang of
Four," and during the Cultural Revolution, and what things were
like — and likely to be — under Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng
The first 3 days were spent in Shanghai, one of China's most
Westernized cities, built originally as a trading port for the Europeans,
and retaining a physical veneer of modernity, vintage 1935. As befits
a major city, the people of Shanghai moved with the bustle of their
compatriots in any society, on any continent.
Four events in Shanghai stand out: The visit to the Shanghai gen-
eral Petrochemical Complex, a tour of the Shanghai Dance Institute,
the "July 1" commune, and a concert by the Shanghai Philharmonic
While the petrochemical complex might at first glance seem the
key to understanding China's modernization program, the cultural
aspects of the dance institute and the concert also played an important
part in the tapestry woven by our 10 days in the People's Republic.
All three had this in common — their activities have been greatly
affected by the shift in power.
Petrochemical Complex Director Kung Chao-juan made clear
China's interest in Western involvement in development, and in
Japan's role in developing the complex to its present state. Equally,
however, the director was proud of the work by ordinary Chinese in
constructing the basic site. Prior to the fall of the "Gang of Four,"
only the theme of self-reliance would have been discussed — rather than
the contributions of Japan, and the need for future foreign involve-
ment. The delegation received the standard tour; briefing by the
director and his colleagues, a walkthrough of a section of the plant
and its production line, a visit to the kindergarten for worker's chil-
dren, typical worker's housing where we talked with a "model family,"
and a stop at the complex hospital for a talk with doctors and staff —
and, of course, an acupuncture demonstration.
The importance of the tour was that the delegation could see first
hand what China considers to be a prototype for its petrochemical
development, and for industrial complexes in the years ahead. An
immediate impression of the delegation was that standards of environ-
mental protection for workers needed to be greatly increased. Raw,
unfilterecl acrylic fibers floated free throughout the plant, and a steady
ingestion of such particles will surely lead to severe health complica-
tions in a few years. This was discussed frankly with the medical staff
of the hospital, who said they were aware of the potential, and were
testing workers on a regular basis.
But the petrochemical complex, and for the same reasons, the
''July 1" Commune, were basically what the delegation expected to
see — and was expected to see by its hosts. In this respect, the itinerary
differed only in location from that of most other congressional visits
before, during, or after the 'Gang of Four."
The visits to the Dance Institute, to the Yu Gardens, and the
Philharmonic were of a different order, however. At these three stops,
arranged at the delegation's request, our hosts made clear to us that
what we were seeing would have been impossible just 18 months
earlier. The gardens had been closed to all but senior cadres. The
Philharmonic could never had played the Western pieces (New World
Symphony, among others) nor many of the Chinese works we heard.
And the Dance Institute drama students performed a scene from the
play, "The Dying Tree Comes to Life," banned by the leader of the
"Gang of Four" Mao's widow, Chiang Ching.
These cultural events, and the history of the recent years conveyed
by individuals at each visit, brought home to us a sense of the
pervasive and paralyzing influence of rigid adherence to strict ideology
developed during the Cultural Revolution, taken to its logical
extreme by the "Gang," and which is now being rapidly undone
by Premier II ua and Vice Premier Teng.
Our hosts seemed to be showing us that if the petrochemical com-
plex, and the "July 1" Commune, are to play their role in modernizing
and feeding China, then the intellectual flexibility and creativeness
symbolized by the young dancers, writers, and actors must likewise
be harnessed. It was particularly on such occasions as the visit to
the institute that the theme of "Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools
of thought contend" was cited as the new rallying cry for China's
renewed development plans.
In Peking, the importance of the delegation's talks with Vice
Premier Teng and his associates obviously formed the major highlights
of the mission to the People's Republic of China. But in Peking as
well, the cultural messages members had been almost subconsciously
y* Again, the delegation was taken to an area closed under the "Gang
of Four" and reserved only for senior cadres — Pei Ilai Park — now
thronging with ordinary Chinese citizens. Similarly, a musical per-
formance, this time a vocal conceit at the Nationalities Palace of
Culture, featured artists, and music, banned by Chiang Ching and
Some of the cultural activities remained constant with China of any
period, of course. Xo amount of ideology could prevent the Chinese
or foreign friend alike from being impressed by the Great Wall, nor
moved by the great human effort the Wall represents. Similarly, the
Forbidden City preaches the message that the conspicuous wealth
of China's pre-20th century rulers stemmed from the strength of the
people — a message which both Chiang Ching and Teng Hsiao-ping
would agree upon.
Two events in Peking stand out for their symbolic value, however.
The first, more mundane, was the by now standard visit to an under-
ground air raid shelter, perhaps "the" underground shelter, since
no foreign visitor has ever been taken to any in Peking but the Ta
Sha Lan Street shelter under the tailor shop. 1 There, Mr. Kao, Chair-
man of the Air Defense Works of the area, explained how the series
of cold, damp and still unequipped or stocked tunnels had been dug,
starting in 1969, by volunteer labor by the residents of the street. 2
Members expressed doubt that the tunnel complex, presumably
a prototype for similar tunnels throughout Peking and other Chinese
cities, could actually withstand nuclear attack, or a sustained seige,
Mr. Kao made the interesting point that the tunnel systems have been
specifically designed to safeguard local populations for 1 or 2 days
in the initial stages of an emergency, then to facilitate their evaculation
to the countryside.
Whether or not the tunnel system could actually withstand an
attack did not seem to be as important as the simple fact of the tunnel's
existence within the context of the Chinese foreign policy line. At
least on Ta Sha Lan Street, the message was loud and clear: "We are
preparing, we are taking action to defend ourselves."
Another example of the hard work of the Chinese people being
melded with a message — this time a message as close to the spiritual
one is likely to find in China — came on the delegation's Sunday
morning visit to the tomb of Chairman Mao.
Mao lies in state in a huge building itself dwarfed by Tienamin
Square in Peking, site of the riots following Chou En-lai's death
which led to Teng Hsiao-ping's purge by the "Gang of Four." Visitors
and ordinary Chinese alike join separate but very long lines to enter
the building, which greatly resembles the Kennedy Center in Washing-
ton. Entering the large receiving chamber, the stream of visitors
divides to pass through doors on either side of a massive statue of Mao
seated in a pose familiar to Americans from the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington. Chairman Mao's remains lie in a glass coffin in the center
of the main chamber, a velvet rope separating the uniformed honor
guard from the viewers passing steadily by. Mao is dressed in a light
grey tunic, with the flag of his nation draped over his legs and lower
torso. The atmosphere in the huge room is quiet, respectful, even
reverential. It is a moving experience.
- During Representative Wolff's 1076 mission, the delation made an onsitf Inspec-
tion of an extensive tnnnel complex in Dairen. Manchuria, near the Sino-Soviet border.
- By implication, the Chinese confirm suspicions that the tunnel program has not been
n* vigorously pursued as the Ta Sha Lan tour miffht indicate. In the defense '"white paper"
in the appendix, the author urges a renewed tunnel digging effort to create a modern
'Underground Great Wall."
Viewing the physical proof of Mao's passing brought home to the
delegation that- fact the while the late Chairman's picture remains
ubiquitous, he now shares billing with Premier Hua whose face also
gazes down from the wall of every school and meeting room. Further,
the ! 'little red book" was no longer in evidence, except under glass in
the hotel souvenir shops.
While in Peking, an important stop was the delegation visit with
Chou Pei-yuan, President of Peking University, and an afternoon
visit to the University itself. The delegation also toured a rural techni-
cal university in Sian, and discussion of the university visits will be
combined at the close of this section.
Sian, the major city of Shensi Province, and site of the assembly
plant for the British Spey jet engine, seemed a rural and dusty back
country place after the cosmopolitan bustle of Shanghai and Peking.
While the people still looked adequately housed, clothed, and fed,
they and their area seemed very much closer to the earth than their
more eastern cousins. They were also clearly more surprised to see
foreign visitors, and at once more friendly and more shy than the
people of cities more often on the foreigner's itinerary.
The visit to the Big Goose Pagoda, and the now world famous
archeological dig at the tomb of China's first emperor, the builder of
the Great Wall, Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, had the same theme as similar
sites throughout the People's Republic: it was through the hard work,
skill, and wisdom of the people that such treasures were gathered, and
such wonders constructed, they survive as monuments to the Chinese
people. The site of the Emperor's tomb is presently filled-in while the
Chinese construct a building (large enough to enclose several football
fields) over the estimated 6,000 ceramic warriors still guarding what-
ever remains of the body and treasure of the man who first unified
China 2,200 years ago.
A relatively more recent cultural monument, reaching back only
several hundred years, also had a modern message for the delegation,
and that was the hot baths of the Dowager Empress. The famous
"Sian Incident," where the Kuomintang's internal rivalries produced
the kidnapping at the baths of Chiang Kai-chek by one of his own
generals, is faithfully retold by Communist hosts. Experts in the dele-
gat ion noted some slight historical editing, but the fact remained that
after Chiang was detained, the KMT and the Communist Party
joined in a more vigorous prosecution of the war against the invading
The delegation only spent an afternoon and evening in Canton, but
was able to tour the old waterfront area, site of the preliberation
European "concessions." As our hosts stressed, Canton's importance
to the modernization of China is underlined by the trade fairs held
during the year fairs which even the "Gang of Four" did not halt —
at winch Chinese economic and industrial experts and officials mingle
with representatives of Western and Japanese enterprises.
Peking University and Chiaotung University, Sian
The visits to these two universities have been saved for last in this
brief survey of the itinerary because the importance of education in
China's quest for modernization deserves the extended treatment
which foreign policy and other modernization factors receive in
sections following this.
Prior to visiting the campus of Peking University, the delegation met
Avith university president Dr. Chou Pei-yuan, who greeted the mem-
bers in his dual capacity as Vice Chairman of the Academy of Sciences.
Dr. Chou stressed the difficult times recently ended with the fall of
the "Gang of Four," and went into some detail on how the life of the
scientific and academic community had been disrupted during the
entire period of the Cultural Revolution. Under the new leadership
of Premier Hua and Vice Premier Teng, however, Dr. Chou expressed
confidence that modernization plans would go forward
Crucial to China's goal will be development of 800,000 new "scien-
tific workers" by 1985, Dr. Chou said. (The Soviet Union now has
some 900,000 such workers, and the United States 1.2 million, he said.)
The Maoist injunction of "Let 100 flowers bloom. Let 100 schools of
thought contend" would be the guiding rhetorical principle of the
increased and improved research programs now being instituted. How-
ever, Dr. Chou said, primary emphasis will be on projects with imme-
diate use to the agricultural and industrial community, rather than
on more esoteric subjects.
As an example of the scope of programs China is developing, Dr.
Chou mentioned the Yangtze River irrigation project under consid-
eration for 20 years. The Yangtze project is so vast that the man-made
lake which would be created by it was compared to the Mediterranean
Sea by Dr. Chou. He said its size would be sufficient to produce actual
climatological changes, as well as changes in the physical environment
and local wildlife and fish population.
The visit to the Peking University campus was hosted by Professor
Chang Lung-hsiang, a biochemist, several staff members, and a group
of English language students. The students noted that English is now
the primary "second language" being taught, rather than Russian.
Professor Chang gave the delegation an introduction similar in tone
to that of Dr. Chou earlier in the day, stressing the difficulties imposed
by the "Gang of Four" and the Cultural Revolution on the university
as an institution, on the professors and the students.
Now the university is engaged in a rebuilding program, and has
defined its tasks into four major areas:
(1) Improve the quality of education. This will be accomplished
through remstitution of the entrance examination, as well as
strengthening the theoretical side of instruction in basic sciences
and increasing lab work.
(2) Strengthen scientific research in the university. In connec-
tion with this, a 3-year graduate study prog-ram has been restored.
(3) Mobilize the teachers' initiative by applying the party's
policy toward intellectuals. As an example, professorial titles have
(4) Administration is to be a combination of the party's leader-
ship and the University President's responsibility.
Professor Chans; said that at present there are 2,800 teachers and
staff and 6,400 students. Xext fall, student enrollment will increase
to over 8,000. It will rise to about 10,000 in 3 or 4 years, and eventu-
ally to 20,000. There will be 350-400 graduate students by late 1978.
The number of day students is currently 200, and may be increased.
There are over 160 foreign students from 36 countries, most of whom
come to China under bilateral exchange agreements.
The curriculum consists of a required course of study for the first
3 years, with electives possible in the 4th year. All students, regardless
of field of study, must take courses in philosophy, political economy.
the history of the Chinese Communist Party, and a foreign language,
which is usually English. Physical education is taken for 2 years. Each
year a student will spend about 1 month in industrial work, agricul-
ture, or military training — stints in all three are normally accomplished
during a 4-year course of study.
Asked if any courses had been introduced or reintroduced into the
curriculum since the fall of the "Gang of Four," one professor said
there were many such courses, but named only psychology.
Asked about the present view of Confucius, Professor Chang an-
swered that he had been "a reactionary." Another professor, however,
broke in to'explain that while Confucius' thinking had been reaction-
ary, there were many who held that he had made contributions in
education and culture. This professor noted that the whole question
was currently beimr discussed. 3
Professor Chiang was asked what, if anything, was being done about
the many college graduates from the postcultural revolution era
whose educational qualifications were deficient, lie replied that many
educational qualifications were deficient. He replied that many
measures were being taken. Those now on Peking University's teach-
ing staff, for instance, are «-iven only light teaching loads and are given
the opportunity to restud}'. Remedial English classes are stressed.
Also, more of these graduates have been hired by the university in
Given an opportunity to ask questions, one professor asked how
the United States had managed to accommodate the large increase in
student enrollment after World War II. It appeared the Chinese felt
they were faced with (he same task.
The delegation visited Sinn's Chiaqtung University on duly 11. Our
host was ( Inuang Li-ting, vice president of the university. He explained
that his school was an offshoot of Shanghai's Nanyang University,
■ exchange was noteworthy m nn Illustration <-f thr difficulty even vwr sonh ••
cated Chinese t have bad following tii«> latest "line" handed down onder tin- "6a uc
"f Pour, or during the Cultural Revolution. Criticism of Confucius \\;is begun :'.s « wht
ni criticising Chou Bn-lal, Teng Hsiao-ping's patron, nmi a would-be moderniser. Tim*
today, the criticism of Confucius implies criticism of Teng,
which had later had 'tis name changed to Chiaotung. Part of it was
moved to Sia.n in 1956. A polytechnic oniversity, it has departments
of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, radio engineering and
power engineering. It is one of the 8£ "key" universities under tip-
direct authority of the Ministry of Education.
The school has a library of 900,000 volumes, which was in heavy use
on the day of our visit, since it was the week before final exam-.
The university has 1,400 teachers and 3,400 students, down from
the precultural revolution student peak of 8,000. The present plan
is to increase enrollment by 1,000 a year until total enrollment reaches
10,000. Of last year's intake of 1,000 new students, about half were
from Shensi Province and half from elsewhere.
In Shensi Province, 200,000 applicants took last year's college
entrance examination. Of these, only a little over 10,000 succeeded in
gaining admission to some university.
Professor Chuang mentioned that it was still possible to enter the
university without taking the examination. For instance, someone in
his thirties, too old to qualify for the examination, might gain entry
by writing a type, of dissertation to prove his intellectual rbilities.
The graduate student program at Chiaotung is just beginning. The
school will take in about 100 such students this year. Admission is
through a series of examinations, administered directly by the
Professor Chuang mentioned that the size of many classes was
rather large, because they were being taught by the most experienced
teachers. In previous years there had been a sort of "track" system,
since the backgrounds of the students were very uneven and some could
study faster than others. Now that enrollment is based on standard
examinations, Chuang felt that such a system may no longer be
necessary. Language instruction, however, still required differing
levels of courses.
Professor Chuang stated that most of the teachers had been trained
before the cultural revolution, had a good academic background,
but were now growing old. They also feel they have not been able to
keep up their scholastic credentials in the past 12 years. The uni-
versity is now providing teaching assistants to the older professors
to ease their load. Supplementary training is being given to teachers
of the middle generation. There is a particular emphasis on language
training, since Russian is the most common foreign language among
the older generation and there is a need for competence in English,
Japanese, German, and French.
In addition to these problems, Professor Chuang mentioned that
two areas where improvements were needed were the modernization
of facilities and reform of the education system itself. The school's
electronic instruments, computers, and so on, were all old and largely
out of date, and needed to be replaced or supplemented. While he
did not explain what he meant by educational reform, he stated that
they were currently studying foreign models to see how they might
organize themselves differently. One thought, for instance, was that
they should reduce the number of specialties offered at the school.
There are presently no foreign teachers at the university. They
would be interested in visiting American professors, however. In fact,
this question has already been proposed to the Ministry of Education,
which is responsible for such arrangements.
In a subsequent private conversation with one of the university
officials, Congressman Winn asked what was the advantage for the
United States if we started student exchanges with Chinese univer-
sities. The official replied that the Chinese were not really interested
in student exchanges as such, but in getting U.S. professors to teach
The delegation noted, however, that university officials in both
Peking and Sian were much more open in discussing the possibilities
of cooperation with, and learning from, foreign countries than had
been the case on previous visits, as indicated by the official mission
reports. As this report was in preparation, the United States and the
Peoples' Republic of China announced a student exchange program
which will send 500 Chinese students to the United States as the
first part of what may eventually be a 20,000 student "delegation"
throughout the West, with 5,000 to the United States, and 2,000 to
Japan and Britain. 4
4 Article "Replacing a Lost Generation" by Melinda Liu, Far Eastern Economic Review,
Sept. 15, 1978.
PRC Fokeign Policy
While exports may differ on the degree to which China's domestic
policies reflect concern over the Soviet Union, the Soviet basis for
China's foreign policy is clear. The delegation was repeatedly told
that combating what the Chinese see as the worldwide aggressive aims
of the U.S.S.R. must be the common foreign policy aim of the PRC,
the United States and our various friends and allies.
In recent months, Chinese foreign policy initiatives and accomplish-
(1) Premier Hua Kuo-feng's tour along- the southern border of the
Soviet Union, with stops in Romania, a Warsaw Pact member,
Yugoslavia, long at odds with Moscow as a "nonalined" Communist
nation, and Iran, an arch-foe of Soviet aims in the oil-rich Middle
East, and on the subcontinent.
(2) Signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in
several months of concentrated effort, after 6 years of difficult talks.
The treaty includes the clause demanded by China opposing "hegem-
onism," the code word for Soviet influence in Asia and elsewhere.
(3) The announcement by Vice Premier Teng that China would
not renew the 1950 Sino-Soviet pact when it comes up in 1979 (a move
related to the Sino-Japanese treaty because of anti-Japanese sections
of the 1950 treaty).
(4) Strengthened efforts in African affairs, reaching up to improved
relations in North Africa and the Middle East. Diplomatic relations
were opened with Libya, a longtime Soviet ally, and Oman, a Persian
Gulf state previously branded a "reactionary" regime.
(5) Improved ties with the Western European nations, particularly
in trade areas, but also through military missions to the NATO
(6) A visit by Premier Hua to North Korea prior to his European
(7) As the delegation's report has indicated, a renewed Chinese
effort at improving the substance of relations with the United States
through trade, exchanges and strategic consultations is well underway
despite the absence of formal relations.
The importance placed by China on signing the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship with Japan has been frequently noted in this report. To
date, no active Soviet response against either China or Japan has
occurred. Moscow has limited itself to harsh rhetorical comment in
print, and over the airwaves.
The Japanese treaty, one of two events the delegation was in-
formed were "the two things Moscow fears most," left the formal
normalization of relations with the United States as the remaining
35-200— 7 S 5
major foreign policy goal discussed with the delegation. As indicated
in the delegation's conversations with Chinese leaders, normalization
was consistently described as a key to resisting Soviet activities
against China and the United States.
"With or without normalization, however, China has made it clear
that it desires U.S. support through parallel actions in the world
arena such as the NATO alliance. China sees competition against the
Soviet Union, despite Western pursuit of detente, the SALT talks, and
extensive trade and technological exchange, as perhaps the key ele-
ment in any potential relationship between China and a third party.
For the United States, Chinese leaders repeatedly warn against
being misled by "detente," predict no useful, and many dangerous
results from the SALT talks, and even inveigh heavily against the
utility of trade and exchange with Russia.
In his conversation with the delegation, Ambassador Hao Teh-
ching, President of the People's Insitute of Foreign Affairs, articulated
a theme (repeated in other meetings) that the United States should
adopt China's "three methods" in dealing with the Soviets:
(1) Have no illusions, make concrete preparations against war:
(2) Move to upset all Soviet strategic deployments;
(3) Do not adopt a policy of "appeasement" which neutralizes
military and strategic strength.
Ambassador Hao frankly stated that China's policy toward Vietnam
was designed to "upset" the Soviet Union, on the theory that Vietnam,
for all of its traditional interests in the region, is now basica% a client
of the Soviet Union.
Vietnam is Russia's "Asian Cuba," the delegation was repeatedly
told. "Of course" China's Vietnam policy is aimed at Russia, Ambas-
sador Hao said: "On the surface we are struggling against the small
hegemonist power, Vietnam, but in reality we are struggling against
the bigger hegemonist power."
Facing the "reality" of the struggle against Soviet policy prompted
Chinese officials to recite a litany on how they viewed Soviet activity
around the globe. Beginning with Cuba itself, "right under your nose,"
Chinese officials cited Africa, particularly Zaire and Ethiopia, the
Middle East, focusing on South Yemen, and exhibited great concern
over the coup in Afghanistan. Vietnam was portrayed as an active
Soviet base threatening Western trade and military communications
in Southeast Asia, as well as with Japan and the Pacific.
While the delegation meetings stressed the need for parallel action
by the United States, in recenl months, the PRC has actively pursued
a pattern o!' diplomatic initiatives which would appear to be unparalled
in her history.
A- one senior ( Chinese official put it, "There is some talk in the world
that the Soviet QnioD is encircling China, but (lima is not afraid of
encirclement. When you look at the history of the Chinese revolution
we have grown in periods of encirclement, and have broken a lot of
This theme of "breaking encirclements" would seem to provide the
best framework for charting the series of moves including diplomatic
missions culminating, to date, in Premier II ua Kuo-feng's "campaign
swing" along Russia's southern flanks.
Premier Hua's stops in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran were till
punctuated by anti-Soviet speeches of varying degree, and calls for
recognition of common interests in resisting "hegemonism," the well-
known key to the Sino-Japanese peace treaty.
However, while Premier Hua's visits received worldwide publicity,
they were only the latest in an ongoing series of personal diplomatic
initiatives by senior PRO officials. Among the more significant were:
(1) Foreign Minister Huang-hua visited Zaire for conferences with
President Mobutu in June, c en as France and Belgium were moving
to counter Cuban-Soviet military ventures in Shaba Province. The
Foreign Minister also visited Belgium, Turkey, and Iran, making
speeches identical in tone to those heard by the delegation, and those
delivered by Premier Hua on his August mission.
(2) Vice Chairman Chi Peng-fei of the National People's Con-
ference visited South America in June, one of the only such Chinese
visits on record. Before journeying north to Canada, Chi spent a week
(3) Vice Foreign Minister Ho-ying toured Kuwait, Jordan, and
Syria in late June.
(4) Vice Premier Kane,- Piao, a Politburo member, spent 2% weeks
in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in June-July. In late July, he left for a
15-day Caribbean tour of Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana.
Xo Chinese Vice Premier and ever visited this region.
(5) Vice Premier Chen Mu-hua, a foreign trade expert and head of
Peking's foreign aid program, was in the midst of an African mission
as this report was in preparation. Stops at that time included Somalia,
Cameroun; and Gabon. Expected stops included Senegal and
Chinese diplomatic missions scheduled as this report was being
prepared included stops in Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Ghana, and Guinea.
In addition, Vice Premier Teng was scheduled to visit Japan during
October, and Premier Hua to visit Western Europe in 1979.
The policy lines expressed to the delegation, and confirmed by
Chinese actions in 1978, would seem to be signaling a modification, if
not a shift away from what had been presumed to be a cornerstone of
Maoist Chinese foreign policy — the so-called "three world's theory."
The delegation has expressed its conclusion that the current under-
pinning of PRC foreign policy is what the Chinese see as the need to
combat the Soviet Union on a worldwide basis.
But under Mao's "Theory of the Three Worlds" the Soviet Union
is not the sole target of Chinese activity. According to Mao, the world
is divided into three competing "worlds," or categories: The first world
of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States; the
second world of the remaining industrialized nations; and the third
world, including China, comprised of all the developing nations. While
Mao saw the United States as the more "benign" of the two super-
powers, with the Soviets characterized as "arch social-imperialists,"
the task of Maoist foreign policy was primarily to rally second world
nations into an alliance with the third world against the superpowers,
even though the second world nations themselves "exploit" the third
While Mao felt the United States might be "enlisted" in the
struggle against the Soviets, the foreign policy trend perceived by the
delegation — when coupled with the trade and economic initiatives now
being pursued by China — would seem to signal a potentially much
more positive Chinese view of the Western nations.
Some experts have commented 1 that to date, PRC diplomatic mis-
sions have concentrated on the "third world" nations; thus, the
1978 initiatives may represent as much an effort to enhance Chinese
political and economic influence in its own right as they signify an
In this sense, experts note, Western decisions to help meet what are
perceived as common foreign policy aims by selling arms or sophis-
ticated technology to China will serve a dual function, despite the
West's purpose. Soviet response to Chinese initiatives and possible
Western responses have so far been largely rhetorical, and have sought
to stress the idea that helping China is a double-edged sword. A
Pravda editorial has warned:
All those who help China to arm itself are acting contrary to the striving of
peoples toward detente and toward strengthening peace on earth. 2
The editorial was not simply concerned with prospective European
arms sales, as it made clear by adding:
Hardly a month passes without another Chinese emissary appearing in the
capital of one or another country, whether belonging to NATO or not.
It is within the context of the Sino-Soviet struggle as manifested in
the ideological debate over Mao's "Three World's" theory that
China's break with Albania — once its only European ally — can be
Exactly 1 year prior to China's July 7, 1978, announcement that all
aid to Albania would be ended, the leaders of the small, Adriatic Sea
state between Greece and Yugoslavia called the "Three World's"
theory a cover for Chinese "hegemonism," and Chinese plans to
become a "superpower."
Even worse, according to the Albanians, the "Three World's"
theory was designed to cover a Chinese plot to ally with the "U.S.
imperialists am! the monopolists of Europe, with fascists and racists,
kings and feudal lords, most rabid militarists and warmongers * * *" 3
The Albanian charges, coupled with Soviet reaction to Premier
Jinn's European mission, showed the depth of displeasure motivating
political leaders and strategic planners in Moscow, if not elsewhere.
Jt should be borne in mind that the Sino-Soviet "war of words''
cannot be brushed aside as mere rhetoric For example, as noted, the
laweek of Dec. .".<). iott and Aug. 25, i!)7s.
" Baltimore Sun article by Henry Trewhitt, Aug. 25, u»7.^.
■ Taken from a letter circulated in foreign capitals by Albanian diplomats with the date
Jills •_".», 1078, as quoted l).\' Asiaweek of Sept. 1, 1!)7S.
Chinese consistently warned the delegation against the pursuit of
definitive SALT talks with the Soviet Union. The Soviet-, too, have
cited SALT as a factor in United States-China relations, although
from a reverse perspective. On August 26, a statement from the
Politburo called China a "serious threat" to peace, and hinted that a
SALT agreement could be washed away by Western military sales
to China. 4
As of this writing, Chinese military missions to Europe and the
NATO countries have reportedly concluded agreements with France
for antitank and antiaircraft missiles, Germany for helicopters, and
Britain for jet engines. PRC missions have reportedly expressed
interest in the West German Leopard tank, Italian rapid-fire artillery
systems, the British Harrier vertical-takeofT jet, and British transport
aircraft with military capacities.
The French purchase is the largest reported to date, covering per-
haps as much as $700 million. 5 The French deal, negotiated despite
reported Soviet ''pressure," was noteworthy because of public French
statements that France would sell arms according to its own policies,
regardless of outside pressure. The same report, however, also noted
that the French apparently plan to sell only what they feel are de-
fensive weapons, and that no deal was made on the sophisticated
Mirage F-l jet fighter precisely because of concern over Franco-
Soviet relations. 6
While the United States is reported as having "quietly made it
clear it will not oppose such sales to China by European countries,"
the nations of Europe have yet to develop, or at least announce, a
clear policy on the sales. 7
No such indecision is reflected in Moscow. In expressing displeasure
as of August 26, well before the announcement of the French sales,
the Politburo reversed the language of the PRC to the delegation.
Arms sales discussions, the Sino-Japanese treaty, and Premier Hua's
Eastern European mission prompted this from Moscow:
The Politburo underscores the serious threat presented to the cause of peace
and socialism by the action of the current leaders of China. In pursuing their
great power, hegemonic course, Peking openly places stake on the increase of
international tension and is using all means to undermine the position of the
socialist community. 8
As noted, Ambassador Hao freely admitted to the delegation that
China's Vietnam policy is anti-Soviet. The Politburo statement from
Moscow linking the future of SALT to Western arms for China also
called China's Vietnam policy "direct expansionist action."
Thus, the delegation and Western decisionmakers face a situation
where each side in the Sino-Soviet dispute makes similar charges about
the other and demands potentially contradictory actions by the West
as the price of friendship.
* Washington Post article bv Dusko Doder. Aug. 27, 1978.
5 Reuter's item in Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1978.
6 Christian Science Monitor article "France Moves Ahead on China Arms Sales'' by Jim
Browning, Oct. 24, 1978.
7 Oct. 24 article in Cbristian Science Monitor.
8 Aug. 27, 1978, Washington Post article by Dusko Doder.
Normalization : PRC and the ROC
The delegation has sought to stress its perception of a "new realism'
in the People's Republic of China regarding the issue of American
concerns and interests with the Republic of China (Taiwan). Dis-
cussion of the fact that the Kuomintang and the Communists twice
in their history had cooperated was clearly intended to make an
impression on the delegation.
In its report, the delegation has also sought to make its own
historical reference to the dispute over the Republic of China, par-
ticularly the 1955-56 offer by the PRC to negotiate a treaty with the
United States which would include a clause on peaceful settlement
of the Taiwan issue.
As we have said, the 1955-56 offer and negotiations made it clear
that while the PRC might be prepared to renounce the use of force
vis-a-vis formal U.S. interests, their position in 1955-56 and 197S on
Peking-Taipei relations is identical; namely, that "sovereignty"
prevents any pledge of nonviolence.
As stated, the delegation is under no illusions as to the continuing
strong line in Peking regarding the legal form of normalization between
the United States and China — as seen by Peking. However, the
delegation has sought to emphasize why it feels that even though
the PRC indicates its "three points" (involving formal U.S. with-
drawal from diplomatic and military agreements with the Republic
of China) are nonnegotiable, in practical fact, the substance of normal-
ization — the "realities" and "modalities" discussed in Peking — may
hold promise of flexibility, and should be explored.
A joint appearance by representatives of the PRC and ROC at
a scientific conference in Tokyo took place on August 24. This is the
firsl <uch recorded occurrence of its type. In the past, even if both the
PRC and ROC had accepted invitations, one or the other had
cancelled in order to avoid just such a joint appearance as occurred
Recently, a solid economic indicator of pragmatism, at least on the
pari of the PRC 1 has come to light. According to official trade
statistics released by Hong Kong, pro-Peking businessmen in the
British colony have been encouraged to reexport goods to Taiwan.
Figures for January to May 1978 show $16.1 million in goods reaching
Taiwan from the PRC, via Hong Kong. Experts have noted that these
figures do not reflect the "substantial" amount of PRC goods
gled into Taiwan. 9
delegation has noted, an emerging pattern of more pragmatic,
more realistic approaches and actions py the PRC, not just in foreign
policy, but in all areas would seem to be underway. Further, this
pattern has historical precedent.
A for i he ROC, v uch pattern can be discerned at present
• official vcl, the fad remains that her delegates were not
recalled from Tokyo, ll is (rue that when the delegation's initial
conferences suggested a possible willingness on the part of
Peking to negotiate with the Kuomintang, negotiations were rejected
outright by officials in Taipei. Tins is consistent with policy in Taipei
since L949. But it is also true that despite the often harsh rhetoric
i:i the Economist, "Velvet Glovery," Sept. L6. nu^: Par Eastern Economic
Review, "Taiwan's Secrel 'Peace' With the Mainland," by Mellnda Liu, Oct <*», 1078; and
Asiaweek, "Autumn Fever," Oct 18, r.»Ts.
still employed by both sides in the Chinese Civil War, no serious
military action between the two has occurred for 20 years, pris<
exchanges have taken place, and informal recognition of each other's
airspace for military and commercial flights clearly exists.
In the following section, a review of the respective positions of
leaders in the PRC and the ROC on the normalization issue since
1971-72 may help those attempting to analyze the events o!" the
]) resent day.
As noted, in 1956, Peking suggested a bilateral agreement with the
United States specifically renouncing- the use of force in the Taiwan
area. While such action in 1978 apparently cannot be expected, if the
tone and content of the delegation's conversations in Peking continue
to represent Chinese policy regarding the use of force, the historical
fact remains that at least once, Chairman Mao and his associates
were willing to explore such a proposal.
PRE-1972 PRC VIEWS ON NORMALIZATION
During the period prior to President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972,
PRC spokesmen had remained rigidly uncompromising on the subject
of normalization and had refused to ease tensions with the United
States unless the United States first withdrew its forces from Taiwan
and ended official ties with the Taipei Government.
Since the signing of the Shanghai communique during President
Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972, PRC spokesmen have reaffirmed their
demand that the United States must withdraw all forces and break
official ties with Taiwan before full United States-Peoples Republic
of China diplomatic relations can be established. But Peking's sense
of urgency over the normalization question, and its concern over the
related issue of the "liberation" of Taiwan, have varied widely over
the past 6 years. 10
During 1972 and 1973, PRC spokesmen adopted a low-keyed ap-
proach on normalization. Despite continued active U.S. official
relations with Taipei, Chinese leaders agreed with the United States
to increase bilateral exchanges and to establish official liaison offices in
Washington and Peking staffed by senior diplomats. Peking media
avoided criticism of the United States over the normalization issue,
and they softened past rhetoric regarding Taiwan. In particular,
Peking comment encouraged "people-to-people" contacts between the
mainland and Taiwan, sharply reduced criticism of the Nationalist
administration, and — for the first time in two decades — called for
peace talks with the Nationalists and the "peaceful" liberation of
China's approach hardened in 1974 and 1975. Some experts feel this
reflected Chinese impatience with the lack of forward movement in
Sino-United States relations during that period. However, China's
posture} also appeared to have been influenced by PRC domestic
politics, as leftist Chinese leaders — the now smashed "Gang of Four" —
fomented major domestic ideological campaigns which led to a harder
line in Peking in foreign policy. During this time, Peking spokesmen
occasionally criticized the United States for not living up to the
"spirit" of the Shanghai communique. They also put aside their
10 For background on these issues, see Dr. Robert G. Sutter, "Chinese Foreign Policy
After the Cultural Revolution, 19G6-77," Westview Press 1978, pp. 94-113.
previous, relatively mild approach on Taiwan's liberation, and began
to warn that Chinese Armed Forces were ready to attack the island.
Peking's policy appeared to shift again in the latter part of 1975,
when spokesmen reverted to a more low-keyed approach regarding
Taiwan. Chinese leaders at the same time showed great concern over
what they saw as a decline in U.S. strategic resolve to resist Soviet
"expansionism" in international affairs. They saw the decline as re-
sulting from American domestic and foreign difficulties such as the
U.S. Watergate crisis, the 1974-75 economic recession, and the collapse
of the U.S. -supported governments in Indochina in 1975. Accordingly,
Chinese spokesmen took pains to emphasize their interest in a more
resolute U.S. policy against the U.S.S.R., while they "softpedaled"
past expressions of concern over the normalization of United States-
Peoples Republic of China diplomatic relations.
TENG IN 1975
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping was unusually explicit about Peking's
priorities during a December 1, 1975, banquet address for President
Ford. While Teng devoted only routine attention to United States-
People's Republic of China normalization, expressing confidence that
diplomatic relations would be established "eventually," he devoted
unusual stress to what he called "a more important question" involving
the need for greater U.S. vigilance against Soviet "expansion." He
said that "the crucial point is what line or policy" the United States
and China would pursue in the face of this mutual threat. He exhorted
the United States to follow Peking's example, not to fear Soviet
"hegemonism," but to form a broad international front against it and
to wage "tit-for-tat struggle." "
Teng was demoted in early 1976, leading to the temporary rise to
power of the leftist "Gang of Four" — a development which apparently
lead to a hardening of Peking's line on normalization. Thus, for ex-
ample, Senator Hugh Scott was strongly impressed with the virulence
of Chinese discussions on normalization and the liberation of Taiwan
dining his July 1976 talks in Peking with Vice Premier Chang Chun-
chiao, a prominent member of the "gang." 12 Chairman Wolff and
Representative Burke, during their April, 1976 mission, received what
may have been the "dress rehearsal" for Senator Scott. 13
The purge of the "Gang of Four" and other leftists in October 1976
resulted in a return to a more moderate approach toward the United
Si ales. For several months in early 1977, Chinese spokesmen repeatedly
made statements underlining Peking's firm commitment to the three
conditions for United States-People's Republic of China normali-
zation—statements which were perhaps prompted by the repeated
suggestions then emanating from Washington regarding possible
compromise formulas for United States-People's Republic of China
'v China News Agency, Dec. 1, 1975.
Normalisation <»(' Relation! with the PRC: Practical Implications." Hearings before
tii*- Subcommittee on Asian ;i n » t Pacific Affairs of 1 1 « < - House Committee on international
Relations. D.S. Qovernmenl Printing Office, n»77. pp. :;-^2 340.
» See "United states china : Future Foreign Policy Directions, 1070." Subcommittee on
Future Foreign Policy, DSOPO.
Since the middle of 1977, Peking lias avoided criticism of the United
States concerning the normalization issue and has repeatedly expresse< I
understanding and patience over the difficulty the United States Paces
in breaking its ties with Taiwan. 14 A high-level Chinese leader this
year went so far as to alert the Chinese people that he judges that
normalization may be delayed. Yeh Chien-ying — the second most
important leader in the Chinese Communist Tarty — capped an effu-
sive welcome for a group of U.S. visitors on May 19, 1978, by remarking
in a straightforward passage that "it requires great exertion and time
to realize the normalization of relations between China and the United
States." Yen's remarks — the most explicit Chinese official statement
of the potential delaying effect of U.S. domestic political concerns
were widely broadcast to Chinese and foreign audiences by Peking's
New China News Agency. 15 At the same time, Chinese leaders have
used private meetings with U.S. visitors in recent months to reaffirm
repeatedly Teng Hsiao-ping's admonition to the United States in 1975:
They have noted that the formal establishment of United States-
People's Republic of China diplomatic relations is less important to
China than the development of a common Sino-American strategy
against the U.S.S.R. 16
THE REPUBLIC OF CHIXA (TAIWAN) AND NORMALIZATION
ROC leaders have also adopted various approaches to the issue
of United States-People's Republic of China normalization in recent
years. 17 Some officials have expressed confidence that the United States
would soon perceive the alleged "futility" of trying to normalize
relations with Peking, and would halt the process before it seriously
compromised United States relations with Taiwan.
Other officials of the ROC have been less sanguine about future
developments, and have shown serious anxiety over the possibility
of the United States accepting Peking's three conditions. They have
warned that U.S. support for Peking's terms would result in major
political and economic crisis on Taiwan. They judge in that United
States-People's Republic of China normalization would lead to a
collapse of the Republic of China's political institutions,fand would
prompt the Nationalist authorities to adopt strong authoritarian
measures in order to maintain order and unity on the island in the face
of "threat" from the mainland. As mirrored by some witnesses before
the subcommittee, these officials also warned that following an official
U.S. break with Taipei, businessmen on Taiwan would withdraw from
the island, leading to a major economic collapse|there.
Still other leaders on Taiwan think that normalization is likely to
occur in the near future, but judge that it would not have serious
adverse eil'ects on Taiwan's well-being, provided there were no im-
mediate likelihood of a PRC military attack against the ROC. These
spokesmen point to the recent record of Taiwan's economic develop-
ment; they note in particular that the econonry grew substantially
14 On the latter point. sep Senator Cranston and Representative Whalen, the United
States and the People's Republic of China. Report of the Sixteenth Congressional Delega-
tion to the PRC. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 13.
• NONA, May 19, 1978.
16 See in particular the Cranston-Whalen report.
:: See "Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China : Practical Impli-
cntions." hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Government
Printing Office. 1977.
during the early 1970's, even though the Taipei Government had
suffered numerous serious political and diplomatic setbacks during
that period. They believe that Taiwan's economy would probably
continue to prosper, even after United States-People's Republic of
In regard to political stability, these spokesmen point out that the
political setbacks Taipei suffered earlier in the 1970's can be viewed
as having had an overall positive effect on internal political stability
in the ROC. The reversals caused the dominant group of Chinese
leaders on the island, who came to Taiwan from the mainland in 1949,
to open some higher government positions to Taiwanese. These moves
they claim, have helped ease the political discontent of the Taiwanese
natives, who make up about 85 percent of the island's population and
have been particularly resentful over their past inability to play a
major role in national governmental affairs.
Trade and Economic Development in the PRC
Even as our delegation met with the PRC's leadership in Peking,
lower ranking bureaucrats were engaged in detailed negotiations with
trade and business representatives from Japan, the United States, and
The Vice Trade Minister made clear to the delegation what has
become strikingly evident in the weeks since our visit — China plans
to substantially increase her imports and exports, with equally sub-
stantial implications for China domestically, as well as for world
According to statistics released as this report was in preparation, 18
United States-China two-way trade increased 175 percent in the firsl
9 months of 1978, compared to a similar period in 1977. In absolute
terms, the sums involved — $441.4 million in 1978 versus $249.4 million
in 1977 — are not substantial. As with other Asian nations, the United
States ran a trade deficit with China for the first hall' of 1978, with
U.S. imports of Chinese goods totaling $246.9 million.
The initial phases of the 1978 increase are attributed to the fact that
for the third year in a row, China in 1977 experienced a bad harvest.
Consequently, the Chinese have reentered the U.S. grain market for
the first time in 4 years, purchasing $280 million in shipments to be
spread out over 1978-79. Another bad harvest has been announced
this year, and further grain purchases were being discussed as this
report was in preparation. Funds for these grain purchases extend into
China's hard currency pool, and may affect the PRC's ability to pay
cash for development programs beyond the immediate future.
Foreign analysis of China's economy indicates that the PRC's
worldwide trade for January to June 1978, reached $19 billion, a 30-
percent increase over the 1977 totals. For the first half of 1978, ( Chinese
economic officials did not issue absolute figures, but indicate a per-
centage increase in exports of 28.5 percent, and a 60-percent import
w Statistics through September 1078, compiled by the National Council for United
State China Trade.
» Washington Posl article "China Double! Trade with United states. Considers Foreign
Capital," by Jay Mathews, Sept 10, 1078, article in Asiaweek, Oct 18, 1878.
A comparative note of caution: While the "China trade" dollar
amounts are relatively large, and will grow Larger, tli<» fact ren as
that in 1977, Japan, for example, still exported more to the Republic
of China (Taiwan) than it did to the PRC.
But if current PRC plans take firm root, foreign trade will inci
rapidly both in percentages and absolute dollar amounts. At a con-
ference on finance and trade in Peking shortly after the de
departed, Vice Premier Yu Chiu-li, Chairman of the State Plat)
Commission, announced that special factories and industrial i
wouid be set aside to produce export goods. In a significant break with
past PRC policy, it was announced that these plants would import
basic technology and equipment. Of perhaps more interest at the ; ime
of the announcement, it was noted that among the devices planned
to finance the plant would be so-called "payback" schemes modeled
on development policies carried out by Lenin and Stalin in 19
"Paybacks," in which the plant's products are used to pay off
development costs, seemed earlier this year to be an emerging Chinese
preference to financing industrial modernization and expansion through
direct loans. In that way, it was thought, China hoped to avoid the
economic graveyard inhabited by so many other developing nations.
Chinese leaders were obviously mindful of the Russian experience of
recent years, where despite rhetorical or ideological inhibitions, the
Soviet Union managed to run up a foreign debt of some $17 billion.
But if China remains committed to pay for most of its short-term
imports in cash or "payback" agreements, the ambitious development
plans now being announced in response to the strategic challenge of
the Soviet Union have clearly prompted a reassessment of how be.^t to
generate long-term development capital.
Expert observers had estimated that with hard currency reserves
of between $3 billion and $4 billion, the PRC would be able to
finance its presently announced development plans without any loans
for 1 to 2 years. 20
Events since the delegation's visit moved more rapidly than any
of the experts had predicted, however, and it is now a matter of record
that the PRC has decided to explore direct loans to finance those
development plans which cannot be funded by paybacks, or other
methods. In retrospect, it can now be seen that this decision, which
became public during September negotiations with the Japanese,
had been publicly anticipated by PRC' leaders. 1 ' 1
Vice Premier Yu Chin-li, at the Peking Conference on Finance and
Trade, noted the need to "receive and use foreign deposits in a planned
way." 22 An explicit statement on China's willingness to accept private
bank loans was attributed to Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. 23 Earlier
sources indicated Chinese willingness to accept private bank loans
through the Japanese Export-Import Bank, although not official
^Washington Post article "China Doubles Trade With United States," by Jay Mathewg,
Sept. 10, 1978.
12 Oct. 13. 1078 article "Peking's Yen for the U.S. Dollar." in Par Eastern Economic
Review ; in a perhaps ironic footnote, the PRC reportedly has asked that the Japanese
loan be made in U.S. dollars, even though the interest rate would be higher, because of
the difficulty of meeting payments in yen over the years.
~ Wall Street Journal article bv Frank Ching, "China Hints at Economic Policy Change,"
Ausr. 25. 1978.
23 Wall Street Journal article by Frank Ching.
Japanese Government loans through Japan's Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund. 24
In any event, a lon°'-term trade agreement between Japan and the
PRO announced in February has been consistently estimated to in-
volve $20 billion.
While loan negotiations with the Japanese were still being carried
out, British banks had already established a $100 million deposit,
called by some observers "akin to a line of credit," to finance British
exports to China. 25
This device of allowing buyers and suppliers export credits is also
new for PRC policymakers, one which allows them the benefits of
direct loans without undue ideological risks to a development policy
which has by no means rejected all aspects of independence and
To show the level of commitment already undertaken by China in
the last few months, a quick survey of three basic industries — steel,
petrochemicals, and oil is instructive:
(1) Steel. — Of China's planned 120 major new industrial projects by
1985, 10 will be steel mills large enough to process raw ore into finished
products. The Chinese plan to nearly triple the 1978 output of 26
million tons. Without commenting on the feasibility of this plan,
experts estimate that it will cost China some $2 billion to upgrade
existing steel mills with techniques and equipment available in the
West. Further, anywhere from $20 billion to $40 billion may be nec-
essary to finance construction of the 10 new plants called for by 1985.
West German and Japanese firms are already in competition for the
first installments of this massive project. 26
(2) Petrochemicals. — As of January 1978, more than 30 petro-
chemical and fertilizer plants were being built in China by Western
contractors. Much of the expertise and technology involved in these
projects are under license by the major chemical manufacturers of the
Since the beginning of July alone, at the same time the delegation
was in the PRC, seven petrochemical or fertilizer projects have been
announced, with the total value of more than $300 million. Four of the
projects went to West German or Japanese firms.
Experts note that Chinese missions in Europe as this report was in
preparation were discussing short-run PRC needs for seven petro-
chemical or fertilizer plants, and longer range needs for six large
ethylene crackers (the base unit around which a petrochemical com-
plex can ho constructed). While the Chinese planned to do as much
of the basic site work as possible, each of the plants could cost up to
(3) Oil. -In the past several months, PRC representatives have
latcd with U.S. oil companies for up to a half-dozen offshore
drilling rigs. Prices per rig are in the $75 million range.
( 'lima now has an estimated offshore oil reserve of 45 billion barrels,
with a reserve on the mainland variously estimated at another 5 to 20
billion barrels. (Saudi reserves are estimated at 149 billion barrels.)
In 1977, the PRC exported some i:>0,000 barrels of crude oil a, <\;\y
to Japan. Shortly after our delegation returned to Washington, China
• v,.\v y,,rk Times n rt i<io hv u. Bcott-Stokes, "China Strengthens Tics With Japan,"
.Tuiv 28, 191
Economist, London, Aug. 19, 107s .
Article, "China: Oiling tin- Doors," in tin- EDconomlst, Aug. 19, 1978.
"Article in tin- Economist, "Oiling the Doors." Aug. 19, 1978.
and Japan announced an agreement on joint development of oil
resources in Pohai Bay, directly across from the Korean Peninsula.
The same announcement by the Japanese Government-owned Na-
tional Oil Corp. said agreement has also been reached to study
feasibility of joint development of oil resources at the month of the
Pearl River, which flows through Canton into the South China Sea.
The Chinese do not restrict their potential oil development to Japan.
As noted, while the delegation was in Peking, members and staff met
informally with representatives of several major U.S. oil companies
It was subsequently reported that on May 2, the Liaison Office of the
People's Republic of China in Washington, D.C., called Ambassador
Christopher Phillips, head of the National Council for United States-
China Trade, asking him to deliver official invitations to the heads of
Exxon, Pennzoil, Union Oil, and Phillips Petroleum. 28
In 1977, Peking purchased $150 million in onshore oil exploration
and development tools from U.S. companies for use without outside
help. The first half of 1978 saw $250 million purchased from U.S.
companies. Negotiations between the PRC and the four American
companies invited to Peking at the same time as the delegation were
still in progress as this report was being prepared. Results of the
negotiations should provide evidence for how much foreign participa-
tion the PRC plans to allow, as well as indicating how much
"prenormalization" trade the United States might expect to carry out
with China. 29
Modernization : The Workers and the Peasants
All of the PRC's ambitious development plans will come to naught,
of course, if China's urban workers and rural peasants cannot, or will
not, perform. This is not an idle question, and in the past few months,
policymakers in Peking have been addressing themselves to it. As
noted, the delegation heard discussion of a return to wage incentives,
among other inducements. The problems in urban areas are deeper
than that, as the experience of the Cultural Revolution illustrates.
Factories were among the hardest hit of China's institutions during
the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. For the same reasons that
China's universities and technical training centers were disrupted
by the primacy of ideology over practice, China's factories suffered
severe drops in efficiency and production. Experts attribute this to
low morale amongst workers as much as to any ideological commitment
on the part of the average worker.
Just as the general policy debate has shifted to favor the expert
and the pragmatist, so has the factory management policy shifted.
While many factory or industry heads rose to power during the
Cultural Revolution because of their political purity, rather than any
particular industrial expertise they might have possessed, likewise the
individual workers were encouraged to join Revolutionary Committees
to run the entire factory or industry, regardless of the worker's lack
of management or planning experience.
as Washington Post article "China's Oil" by Hobart Rowen, Aug. 11. 1978. Pennzoil
officials have been quoted as saying they were asked to draw up offshore exploration plans,
with the most likely target beinj; the South China Sea.
28 Article. "China's Tough Oil Bargain," in Far Eastern Economic Review, by James
Srodes, Sept. 1, 1978.
One of the first steps announced in early 1978 was the abolition of
the Revolutionary Committees in all aspects of China's professional
activities, from factories to universities. But persistent accounts
appear of committees in many regions clinging to at least a share of
Wages and wage incentives form another area where China's new
realism has produced new, and in this area, considerably revised
approaches to spurring production. Even prior to Teng Hsiao-ping's
return, China's wage scales left nothing to be desired from the bureau-
erotic standpoint, resembling in complexity, if not munificence, the
Civil Service charts in the United States. 30
Shortly after the delegation returned from China, it was reported
that So percent of China's factoiy workers had received small raises
of about $3 per month. 31
Among the dilemmas now being faced by Vice Premiers Teng, Yu,
and others involved in the modernization effort is how to use wage
hikes as production incentives without creating massive inflation.
As noted, the delegation was told that China planned to increase
production of consumer goods. Given the relatively low salaries and
high cost of those consumer goods normally available which are not
necessities such as bicycles, watches, cameras, radios, and those which
arc rationed, such as food and clothing, experts agree that there is
room to absorb pay hikes within the Chinese economy so long as
production keeps pace.
Since the government controls all aspects of the economy, an
obvious "anti-inflation" device would be to hike prices to keep pace
with wages, but the self-defeating nature of that measure would seem
obvious in view of the stated goal of the planners to increase produc-
tion through improved worker's morale.
Alter being discredited for radicalism during the hey-day of the
"Gang of Four," China's "unions" have been directed to reorganize
and aid in the campaign to improve production. Patterned primarily
on the Soviet model, the unions are organized on a factory by factory,
rather than industry-wide basis. While they on occasion can take up
dual worker grievances with "management," they are not
expected to engage in industrial action or strikes.
lericans and other foreigners who have worked in Chinese factories
during and after Cultural Revolution have noted that the work pace
Is very slow, the working conditions frequently inadequate by Western
standards, and the machinery in ill-repair, and out-dated. One observer
commented in 1977 "If the workers had been functioning at anything
resembling a reasonable work pace, the factoiy could probably have
doubled its output. Bui quotas were set so low, apparently so that
they could be filled without difficulty, and anyone who wanted to
speed things up risked being criticized by his workmates." 82
tlstlca] Information In this section conies primarily from articles in the Far Eastern
■ .v. principally t he Issue <»f Jan. -1 , 1978.
SVashinfirton Pos1 article. "Chinese Discipline," by Jay Mathews, July 28, 1978.
tern Economic Review, Jan. 27, 1978 and the Washington Post article by Jay
Mathews of July 28, 1978.
Instituted in 1956, modified in 1902 and 1966, and under scrutiny
at the present time, tin 4 wage scale for China's aonagricultural work
force (all are employed by the State) has three distinct categor
employees: workers, administrators, and technical personnel. Their
grades and salaries as of October 1977 were a> follows:
(1) Workers have eight grades, or steps, ranging from a low of '40
Rmb a month ($18) to a high of 100 Rmb (860).'
(2) Administrators have no less than 25 grades, with a monthly
low of 30 Rmb, and a peak of 450 Rmb (c $270).
(3) Technical personnel have 13 grades, from a low of 45 Rmb
(c. $27) to a monthly high of 340 Rmb (c. $204).
At the same time, Peking established 11 different wage regions
nationwide. Under this system, workers, administrators and technical
personnel in the same grade would receive slightly different salaries,
according- to where they happened to work. To further differentiate,
special bonuses were paid to workers assigned to remote locations,
such as Tibet or Sinkiang. Finally, specific occupations were granted
slightly higher compensation than others, for example, a highly skilled
artisan might make 3 Rmb (c. $2.40) more a month than a steelworker
in the same grade.
All wages prior to an announcement of a general hike in October,
1977, had been "frozen" at 1962 levels. In October, Vice Premier
Yu Chiu-li, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, announced
a general wage rise of one grade on the pay scale for 60 percent of
China's nonagricultural workers — some 40 million people. Yu said
that those affected were primarily on the low end of the wage scale.
Experts estimate that if a raise of just 10 Rmb (c. $6) a month is
involved for each individual an annual hike of some 4.8 billion Rmb
(c. $2.8 billion) would occur for the national money supply.
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS (THE PEASANTS)
Since SO percent of China's 900 million people still live in the coun-
tryside, it is axiomatic that the success of the PRC's modernization
programs will hinge on success in agriculture. Peasants, like everyone
else in China, work 6 days a week. While their educational and medi-
cal opportunities have vastly improved, in terms of their daily life,
the peasants perhaps more than any other group in China still live and
work much as they have since the earliest times.
The PRC is not self-sufficient in production of food — as noted,
repeated drought has forced massive foreign grain puchases — but
neither do the PRC's people find themselves subject to unrelieved
famine. While food is rationed, the allotments of staples would appear
ample by virtually any standard: peasants, intellectuals and cadres
receive some 30 pounds and workers 40 pounds per month. 33
It is in the area of "sideline production'' of nonstaples, such as meat,
fish, eggs, vegetables, sugar and cooking oils where rationing — and
underproduction — hits hardest. These are the areas where the peas-
ants' private plots are expected to take up the slack. Private plots,
while representing a threat to the traditional Maoist philosophy, are
an important factor in peasant morale, since they can eat, or sell what
they produce for profit. This contributes to the peasants' willingness
to cooperate in the government's modernization plans.
83 Article in Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr. 14, 1978.
To date, the administrators in Peking have addressed themselves
primarily to the goal of mechanization, and it is not clear that the
leadership (despite Premier Hua's expertise in rural administration)
has outlined an overall plan in any detail. The obstacles are
Ninety-six percent of China's population is crowded into only 36
percent of the land; only 10 to 11 percent of the land is cultivated (100
million hectares) and that percentage will decrease as the PRC experi-
ences the "urban sprawl" common to all developing and developed
As the delegation was able to observe during several tours of the
countryside in several regions, as well as during three daytime flights
over vast distances, productive land in China is extensively culti-
vated. Some 70 percent of the cultivatable land is double-cropped,
and in the southern provinces, triple cropped. So an immediate ad-
vantage of rapid mechanization would be increasing yield b} T reducing
the time between planting and harvesting, as well as in ploughing,
threshing and transplanting.
At present, though, the PRC's level of mechanization is very low;
only 10 percent of the farmland is ploughed b}^ tractors. As a result,
whereas an American farmer feeds 100 urban dwellers, the labor of 5
Chinese peasants is needed to feed just one urban resident. Onl} T one
household in 400 in the PRC even owns a tractor, compared with 80
percent of the agricultural households in Japan, for example.
In January 1978, Vice Premier Yu Chiu-li announced a national
goal of SO percent mechanization of all major agricultural operations
by 1980. Since the quality of the PRC's existing agricultural machin-
ery production has been criticized severely by the Chinese themselves,
and since the 1980 goal seems optimistic even by the often rhetorical
standards set by Peking, the field of agricultural mechanization would
appear to be ripe for foreign exports and expertise.
A month before the Delegation's visit to the PRC, a large U.S. agri-
cultural machinery delegation toured China. PRC officials were sub-
sequently quoted as predicting excellent sales prospects, and rapidly
concluded contracts. While experts feel that the PRC will follow its
traditional pattern of purchasing prototypes to copy in its own facto-
ries, one American firm, John Deere, Inc., has made more than$l mil-
bo sales lo China in recent months.
Even assuming that mechanization can proceed close to plan, how-
ever, success in the rural sector will depend as well on other, major,
For example, the present field pattern is geared to the traditional,
massive, individual effort by groups of peasants working by hand.
Consequently, crops with very different planting and maturation
periods ace grown side by side. Mechanization on a large scale will
mean that the very physical pattern of Chinese agriculture will have
to be changed entire held structures will have to he realined so
crops can he planted for simultaneous harvesting.
Even if the mechanical and structural problems are overcome
and 1 he fields realined (with the massive social problems entailed
M Oct. 8. 1'.j7>s article in I'm- Eastern Economic Review by John Carroll.
in persuading the peasants to risk changing the patterns of 1,000
years), farm mechanization will also hinge on other measures which
have traditionally plagued PRC planners: irrigation, seed develop-
ment, rural electrification, capital construction, pesl control, and the
all-important area of fertilizer development, production, and appli-
The PRC is presently the world's largest importer of nitrogenous
fertilizers, 70 percent coming from Japan. 35 The PRC's traditional
and highly organized system of locally produced fertilizer is well
known, but the rate of application of more efficient chemical fertilizer
is still very low — only 68 kilograms per hectare, compared with Japan's
rate of 400 kilograms per hectare.
The final area which must be integrated into the PRC's ambitious
agricultural mechanization plan is management of the individual
peasants themselves in work teams, production brigades, and com-
munes (in that order; the commune falls within the county, the county
within the province, and the province within the region).
The complex and highly stratified system of paying urban workers,
administrators, and technical personnel has been described. The
peasantry are compensated for their labor under an entirely different
system based on what the Chinese call "work points," but what in
economic terms is usually called "piecework," and in earlier times
could be compared with "sharecropping." The sj'stem has been
described by an expert:
The Government advances maintenances monthly to the peasants and
settles the accounts with the peasants at the end of every year. The yearly yield
of a production brigade is divided into two parts. One part is "public grain"
and belongs to the State. The other part constitutes the total income of the
brigade, but it has to be sold to the Government at a price set by the Government.
One part of the total income of a brigade is the collective reserve funds of the
brigade. Generally speaking, this part is used to buy farm machinery, chemical
fertilizers, insecticides, etc., for the brigade, and to support the administrative
service and welfare of the brigade. The other part is shared by the peasants
of the brigade. The result of dividing the total number of the work-points obtained
by the peasants of the brigade into the value of this part of the yield is the value
of every work-point. The product of the value of one work-point and the total
number of work-points which a peasant obtains a year is the practical income of
the peasant. The Government pajs the peasants in both grain, which is rationed,
If the result of the settlement at the end of a year is negative, which may
occur in some places where the land is too arid or sometimes when the weather is
bad, the peasants are in theory in debt. But in most cases they need not pay
back their debt to the Government. In other words, the income of a peasant is
decided by two factors: the value of one work-point which is based on the harvest,
and the number of his work-points which is decided by his work. Because of this
the peasants are quite concerned about the harvest and will wprk hard to get a
bumper harvest, though neither the land nor the yield belong to them. From
the viewpoint of the economy a production brigade ma}- be looked upon as a
corporation. In this corporation every peasant in the brigade is a director of the
board, and his work-points represent his stock. The Government is, in fact, no
more than a tax-gatherer, though in theory the boss. So the Chinese leaders
can have faith in the morale of the peasants. 36
While the obstacles to success discussed in this section on rural and
urban workers are obvious and formidible, the sheer magnitude of the
undertaking would appear on balance, to be a positive factor, rather
35 Oct. 6. 1978 article in the Far Eastern Economic Review.
88 Apr. 14, 1978 article by Ma Chu in Far Eastern Economic Review.
than a negative one. For as mechanization increases, thus freeing
hands presently needed just to keep the food supply roughly even with
population growth, those rural hands can be organized to construct
and work in the massive transportation, irrigation, fertilizer, and
production facilities needed to boost further mechanization.
China Sixce the Cultural Revolution
The following section was prepared at the subcommittee's request
by Dr. Robert Sutter, Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress.
The leaders currently governing the People's Republic of China have
been strongly influenced by the tumultuous domestic and foreign
policy developments China has experienced since the start of the
Cultural Revolution in 1966. Many of these leaders rose to high-level
positions, while others were demoted, purged and rehabilitated,
during this period. All of them have had to grapple with serious
domestic problems and complex international pressures which have
confronted China over the past decade.
This survey provides an overview of the domestic and foreign
policy developments of major importance to Chinese leaders since the
start of the Cultural Revolution. It shows that Chinese leaders in
recent years have been striving for internal political stability and
material progress following the turmoil and ideological excesses of the
Cultural Revolution. Their efforts have met with only partial success,
as the Chinese today still confront major problems in their drive to
unify their party and government apparatus, revitalize and modernize
their economy and national defense, and strengthen their educational,
rch, and cultural institutions. Peking's successes in foreign
affairs have been more pronounced, as China has emerged from its
diplomatic isolation during the Cultural Revolution to pursu ) b
flexible and pragmatic foreign policy which has enhanced PRC
international contacts and placed China among the major actors in
Asian and world affairs.
£< i ior Vice Premier TeDg Hsiao-ping and ether prcminent Chinese
ers have repeatedly stressed during conversations with Western
vis lets over the past year that China faces serious problems in its
efforts to modernize the economy, education system, and military
structure, to make PRC political and social organizations more eli*-
cient, and to improve Peking's standing in world affairs. Teng and
other leaders have claimed that Peking's current difficulties stem in
e measure from the disputive policies and actions over the p.- st
decade of the so-called "Gang of Four"- a group of leftist Chinese
Politburo Members who rose to prominence during the ( Cultural Revo-
lution and retained considerable influence in Chinese ruling councils
until they were arrested in October 1976. Western observers have
tended lo discount this personalized explanation for China's trouble
as too simple, but they have generally agreed with the view that China
has indeed gone through a trying period since the Cultural Revolution
and is still suffering from some of the negative aftereffects of that
IMPACT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, L966-69
During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung
and other Chinese leaders organized millions of Chinese youth into
Red Guard contingents, which they used to disrupt and ultimately
destroy the existing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and govern-
ment administrations. Some Ra\ Guard attacks on party and govern-
ment bureaucrats led to armed clashes between the youths and estab-
lishment forces. Schools were closed for several years to allow the
youths to participate in the Red Guard movements. Scientific and
cultural activities also were curtailed or halted.
Most rural areas were not directly affected by the disorder, bi
Chinese cities were seriously disrupted. Normal government actW
came to a halt in some places and production in many urban enter-
prises declined. Without an effective party or government organiza-
tion, Chinese leaders were forced to call in the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) to maintain law and order and to assure that production
would not decline further.
Opinions vary as to why Mao and his allies undertook such an
ultimately disruptive reformation of the Chinese party and govern-
ment. For one thing, Mao reportedly judged that leaders then in power
in the party and government were fostering political, social, and eco-
nomic programs that emphasized hierarchic organizations and material
incentives. He judged that these leaders were following a path similar
to the one followed by the "revisionist" post-Stalin leaders in the
Soviet Union, and he thought that radical steps were needed in order
to maintain progress in China toward the Maoist goal of an egalitarian
and ideologically motivated society.
At the same time, numerous Chinese leaders reportedly used the
opportunity of the Cultural Revolution to advance their careers and
to attain higher office at the expense of the thousands of veteran
cadre who were purged during this period. Prime examples of these
newly rising leaders were Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and other leftist
leaders who came to be known later as "the gang of four." Many
other Chinese leaders who still hold power in Peking — including the
present CCP Chairman Hua Kuo-feng — also rose to power in large
part because of their ability to advance during the political turmoil
of the Cultural Revolution.
PLA forces stationed throughout the Chinese provinces began strong
efforts to suppress Red Guard activists and to restore order in 1968.
Western analysts have offered differing explanations as to why Chinese
leaders, who launched the Red Guard movements 2 years earlier,
now were willing to go along with the suppression of the activists
and a return to more normal administrative practices. They frequently
have stressed that the vast majority of Chinese leaders seemed pre-
occupied with the host of problems China faced at this time including
" 7 Somp recent Western analyses of Chinese domestic affairs since the Cultural Revolution
include Parris Chang, "Power and Policy in China" ; Byung-Joon Aim, "Chinese Politics and
the Cultural Revolution" : Jurgen Domes, "China After the Cultural Revolution" ; aud
Maurice Meisner, "Mao's China."
the need to restore order, rebuild the party and government adminis-
trations, promote urban and rural production, revitalize national
defense, and reopen schools, universities, and scientific, cultural and
research establishments. Peking's success in solving these problems
over the next few years was limited, however, in part because of the
massive size of China's problems and the limited resources available
there, but also because of continuing sharp leadership conflicts.
THE LIX PIAO AFFAIR, 1969-71
As order was slowly restored in Chinese cities, and party and govern-
ment administration was gradually rebuilt during 1968 and 1969, it
became apparent that a group of Chinese military leaders headed by
Defense Minister Lin Piao were exerting unusually strong influence
in Chinese ruling councils. In particular, military leaders, who were
providing local law and order in the Chinese provinces, gradually
assumed important positions in the rebuilt party and government
organs there. Based on their local power, their traditionally important
positions in the Chinese central government in Peking, and the ap-
parent active support they received from some leftist Chinese political
leaders like Chiang Ching, PLA officers loyal to Lin Piao attained
verv strong political positions at the time of the 9th CCP Congress in
Their positions were not unchallenged, however. Over the next 2
years, Chines officials led by Chou En-lai and backed by such veteran
military and civilian cadre as Teh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien
worked to reduce the military's dominance m Chinese politics. Dis-
putes between the group around Lin and the officials allied with Chou
tended to impede proirre-s toward a resolution of China's serious
domestic problems. Thus, for example, the two sides differed on such
sensitive issues as:
(a) Rehabilitation of veteran cadre who had been discredited during
the Cultural Revolution. — Chou generally favored the rehabilitation
of these Leaders, reportedly in the hope of using their talents to get
( 'hina's administration and economy moving again and also to employ
their abilities to counter the influence of Lin Piao's group, whereas
Lin and his allies reportedly preferred the status quo;
(b) PLA influence in Chinese party and government affair*. — Chou's
group generally favored more separation of the military from civilian
political duties, whereas Lin and his colleagues supported the main-
tenance of the PFA's strong position in the party and government;
Military spending. — Chou's group reportedly favored a cutback
in military spending, hoping to focus China's scarce resources on
economic development, whereas Lin's followers favored continued high
military -pending, both for large armies and the acquisition of modern
Foreign affairs.— -Chou favored a differentiated posture toward
the two superpowers, hoping to use improved relations with the Unit *d
States in order to offset growing Soviet pressure on ( Jhina ; Lin, on the
other band, favored a continuation of strong Chinese opposition to
hot h superpower
Over the next 2 yea] . ( bou and his allies managed to use
successes they engineered in Chinese foreign policy and in their
programs for revitalizing the Chinese administration and economy to
challenge and ultimately to destroy the power of Lin Piao. Lin died,
reportedly in a plane crash, in September L971. Subsequently, the
power of PLA leaders in party and government affairs in China was
reduced; military spending was cut back; and the civilian leadership —
bolstered by the rehabilitation of such veteran cadre as Teng Ilsiao-
ping — was able to reassert its traditional dominance of Chinese
military affairs. The highlight of this effort came in late L973, when the
Chinese party completed a transfer of all the major military leaders
who had become entrenched in power in particular regions in China
during the Cultural Revolution.
REFORMS UNDER CHOU EX-LAI, 1971-74
Following- their success against Lin Piao, Chou and his colleagues
began programs designed to reduce China's Maoist ideological pre-
occupations during the Cultural Revolution and to advance Chinese
economic development and the material quality of life of the Chinese
people. They turned away from the ideological campaigns begun in the
Cultural Revolution which has diverted attention from more practical
problems of economic development. They attempted to revive the
use of certain kinds of material incentives in order to encourage workers
to work harder — practices which had been strongly criticized by
activists during the Cultural Revolution who judged that Maoist
ideological incentives would suffice to motivate workers to work hard.
They reopened universities and other institutes of higher learning and
research, reduced the amount of time teachers and students spend on
ideological studies, and revived standards which emphasized the
importance of academic achievement and downplayed ideological
criteria which had been prevalent during the Cultural Revolution.
These leaders supported programs which sent youth from the cities
to the countryside to work with peasants. Such programs served to
decimate the ranks of the increasingly moribund Red Guard organiza-
tions and to effectively reduce the likelihood of a repeat of the dis-
ruptive events of the late 1960's. At the same time, order and dis-
cipline were emphasized in urban factories, and managers were given
more disciplinary power over their subordinates — a change from the
practice during the Cultural Revolution when workers commonly
halted production in order to organize impromptu "struggle"
meetings designed to discredit managers in the eyes of the workers.
Chou's group also tried to revitalize China's economy by purchasing
foreign technology — including whole plants — and it attempted to gain
foreign exchange to pay for this technology by increasing Chinese
exports. This policy was in apparent opposition to the ideological
stress on self-reliance voiced by Chinese leaders during the Cultural
Revolution. At the same time, Chou's group tried to broaden China's
cultural life beyond the few selected "model works" fostered during the
Cultural Revolution, and it advocated greater cultural interchange
with foreign countries, including the ''bourgeois" nations of the West.
To manage all the^e changes — and presumably to strengthen their
own leadership position — Chou and his supporters advocated a re-
habilitation of hundreds of high-level Chinese leaders who had been
discredited during the Cultural Revolution.
CHALLENGES FROM THE "GANG OF FOUR," 1974-76
Some political leaders, whose careers had benefited from the Cul-
tural Revolution and who had become closely identified with the
ideological policies of that time, saw the return to pragmatism and the
rehabilitation of veteran cadre as a threat to their leadership positions.
These leftists — headed by the four Chinese Politburo Members now
know as the "Gang of Four" — resisted the new policies of Chou En-lai's
group in several ways. Their influence was felt in particular during
massive political campaigns which spread throughout China in 1974
and again in 1976.
The campaign in 1974 focused ostensibly on criticizing the historical
policies of Confucius, but in fact it was used by the leftists to attack
the current policies of Chou En-lai and his group. Employing their
control of some PRC propaganda media, the leftists made repeated
allusions which compared Chou's policies with those of Confucius and
denounced his programs stressing academic performance in education,
material incentives, increased foreign trade and cultural exchanges,
more social discipline and order, and the rehabilitation of veteran
Leftist attacks slowed the revitalization of China's material develop-
ment, although Chou was able to win national support for his programs
and to reassert China's primary goal of becoming a "modern Socialist
nation" by the end of the century, during the National People's
Congress of January 1975. But Chou's health worsened that }'ear and
his death in January 1976 prompted a revival of leftist efforts to curb
pragmatic policies. The "Gang of Four" launched a major political
campaign which succeeded in bringing down Chou's chief lieutenant,
Teng Hsiao-ping, and in seriously complicating plans at that time to
streamline and modernize the armed forces, increase foreign trade,
promote academic excellence, and rehabilitate veteran cadre.
The death of Mao in September 1976 resulted in an apparently
serious weakening of the political power of the "Gang of Four."
During the ensuing struggle for power, the "gang" members and some
of their followers were toppled from power by a diverse coalition of
( 'hinese leaders, including some veteran military and civilian followers
of Chou En-lai — like Yen Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien — and some
younger leaders who had risen to power since the Cultural Revolu-
tion — like Hua Kuo-feng.
Over the pas! 2 years, the PKC leaders have taken several major
steps forward in meeting China's developmental needs — they have
established the outlines of an economic plan for China's economic
development up to 1985, begun efforts to increase capital investment
apiculture, light industry, and heavy industry, authorized wage
increases for low paid workers, launched reforms in education and
research designed to improve China's level of technical competence,
restored discipline and fixed rules and procedures within ( Chinese party
and government organs and in major economic enterprises, and begun
a program to streamline and modernize Chinese fighting forces.
Most Western observers agree that China's prospects for successful
development have been enhanced following the purges of Lin Piao and
the "Gang of Four," but many add that numerous problems continue
to vex the PRO leadership and to complicate China's search lorn
rial progress. Indeed, the current Chinese leaders seem to remain far
from unified over how China should proceed. Thus, for example, there
is continuing division and antagonism between sonic officials who were
criticized during the Cultural Revolution and subsequently rehabili-
tated, and some whose careers benefited from close association with the
Cultural Revolution, Lin Pino, and or the "Gang of Four." There is also
strong disagreement between leaders who favor a continuing emphasis
on Maoist ideology, along with programs for material progress, and
those who judge that Maoist ideology is largely an impediment to
greater material progress. Perhaps of more importance, Ohm;! t<
remains a poor and still backward country with a massive populi
and only limited resources to spare in the drive for material prog
The PRO leaders are almost certain to have strong disagreements <
they decide which of China's major competing needs — such as
cultural mechanization, light industry, and consumer products, steel
production and transportation modernization, and military moderniza-
tion — will receive priority for future development.
The checkered development of Chinese domestic policy over the
past decade has been mirrored to some extent by Peking's approach
to foreign affairs during the period. The general trend in Ch
foreign policy has been to move away from the isolation and ideolo
self-righteousness which characterized Peking's posture during the
Cultural Revolution to a more pragmatic, conventional diplomatic
approach designed to strengthen and protect China's vital interest- in
Asian and world affairs. China's progress in foreign affairs has been
greater than its accomplishments in domestic policies, with a par-
ticularly crucial development being the Sino-American reconciliation
begun during President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China — the
most important breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy. How-
ever, progress toward pragmatism in foreign affairs has been periodi-
cally slowed and halted over the past decade by the same kind of
leadership disagreements and conflicting interests which have plagued
Chinese domestic affairs. 38
ISOLATION DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
In the mid 1960's, Chinese foreign policy was marked by acute
isolation, stemming in large part from the negative impact of the
Cultural Revolution on the conduct of Peking's foreign policy.
Provocative Chinese diplomatic behavior, particularly in 1967 and
1968, severely weakened China's international stature and isolate
from many of an already limited number of foreign friends. Toward
many neighboring states in Asia, for example, Peking adopted an
attitude of self-righteous hostilitv and disdain, and tberebv severely
alienated several previously friendly states including Cambodia,
s 8 Some recent Western analyses of Chinese foreicm policy since the Cultural Revolution
include A. Doak Barnett. China and the Major Towers in East Asia ; Harold Hinton, Three
and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia : John Gittinc-s. The World and China, and
Robert Sutter, China-Watch : Toward Sino-American Reconciliation.
Nepal, Ceylon, and Burma. Even Peking's Communist neighbors,
North Korea and North Vietnam, were cool toward the PRC, while
continued intense Chinese hostility toward both the United States
and the Soviet Union insured a persisting freeze in PRC relations with
the two superpowers. Prospects for an improvement in Chinese foreign
relations at this time appeared limited, inasmuch as Chinese leaders
showed little interest in foreign developments or even in the restarting
of the Chinese foreign ministry apparatus which had been decimated
by Red Guard attacks during the Cultural Revolution.
ORIGINS OF A NEW APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The August 1968 Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and Moscow's
concurrent formulation of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited
sovereignty demonstrated to the Chinese that Moscow might be pre-
pared to use its overwhelming military superiority in order to pressure,
and even to invade, the PRC. The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969
increased Peking's concern over the Soviet threat. In response, Chou
En-lai and his supporters made a major effort in 1969 to broaden
Peking's leverage against the Soviet Union by ending China's inter-
national isolation. In this pursuit they utilized conventional diplomacy
and softpedaled the ideological shrillness characteristic of Chinese
foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution.
Because of Moscow's massive power, Peking realized that improving
diplomatic relations with most countries would be of relatively minor
significance in helping China with its pressing need to offset the
Q.S.S.R. In East Asia, only the other superpower, the United States,
seemed to have sufficient strength to serve as an effective deterrent
to Soviet pressure. Moscow in the past had shown uneasiness over
signs of possible reconciliation between China and the United States.
Thus, the Chinese leaders were aware that they held an important
option: They could move closer to the United States in order to
readjust Sino-Soviet relations and form a new balance of power in
East Asia favorable t6 Chinese interests.
While the Chinese faced increasingly heavy Soviet pressure in 1969,
the newly installed Nixon administration was beginning policy
initiatives designed to pull back American military forces from Asia
and to reduce U.S. commitments along the periphery of China. It
was soon apparent that the so-called Nixon doctrine of gradual troop
withdrawal was perceived favorably by Peking. The Chinese leaders
saw the American pullback as solid evidence of the Nixon admin-
istration's avowed interest in improved relations with China. They
also viewed it as a major opportunity for China to free itself from the
burdensome task of maintaining an extensive defense network along
i- southern and eastern borders against possible U.S. -backed
ed incursions. Peking now saw greater opportunity for China to
spread its own influence in neighboring East Asia as the United
States gradually retreated. Primarily on the basis of these two fac-
aeed to use Sino-American rapproachement to offset Soviet
pressure on ( Jhina and a desire to take advantage of prospects opening
lor the PK( r under terms of the Nixon doctrine in Asia — Peking
agreed to receive President Nixon and to begin the process of nor-
zing Sino-American relations.
LEADERSHIP DIFFERENCES OVER FOREIGN POLICY
The logic of this new pragmat ic approach — which was to provide the
foundation of Chinese foreign policy in the L970's was not unive]
accepted by Chinese leaders. Lin riao and some of bis military allies
reportedly resisted Chou En-lai's initiatives in foreign affairs, in part
because the successful implementation of (lion's program would raise
the political stature of Chou and his supporters at the expense of Lin
and his group, and would also reduce the need for large-scale military
spending as the primary means to guarantee China's security. Lin's
group was joined for a time by leftist political leaders such as Chiang
Ching, who favored a stringent ideological posture in foreign affairs
and opposed in particular Peking's new flexibility toward its fo.>
main adversary, "'U.S. imperialism."
The effectiveness of Chou's program in offsetting the Soviet tin-eat
to China and in broadening Chinese international appeal served to
neutralize much of the opposition within the Chinese leadership. By
the early 1970's, Peking had rapidly expanded diplomatic contacts
and improved relations with many nations. The Chinese advance
was highlighted by Peking's entrance into the United Nations in
October 1971, President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972,
and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations during Prime
Minister Tanaka's trip to China in September 1972.
Lin Piao and his allies were removed in late 1971, but the leftist
Chinese politicians headed by the "Gang of Four" occasionally rose to
resist and reverse pragmatic programs in foreign affairs in general and
in Sino- American relations in particular. Most notably, as part of
their attack on Chou's policies during the anti-Confucius campaign
in 1974, the leftists harshly criticized — on ideological grounds — the
allegedly corrupting influence on Chinese society of foreign music,
films, and other cultural works. This served to curb what had been an
active Chinese interest in developing cultural exchange with foreign
countries, including the United States. They criticized Chinese trade
with capitalist countries, with propaganda claiming that such trade
would break the Maoist precept on Chinese economic self-reliance
and would make China dependent on "imperialism" — a line which
acted to dampen Peking's interest in increasing trade with the West.
The anti-Confucius campaign also led to an intensification of Sino-
Soviet hostility. Not only did Peking media greatly expand harsh
ideological polemics against the Soviet Union, but the Chinese — for
the first time since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 — publicized
the arrests of alleged Soviet "spies" in the PRC. Peking gave exten-
sive publicity to the arrest in January 1974 of Soviet diplomats in the
Chinese capital and the arrest in March of that year of a Soviet
helicopter crew which had landed in Sinkiang near the Sino-Soviet
border. The diplomats were promptly expelled from China, leading to
a quick close to that incident. But Peking decided to detain the Soviet
helicopter and its crew, resulting in an exchange of sharply worded
Sino-Soviet protests which marked a downturn in the already poor
Chinese relations with the United States fell prey to the anti-
Confucius campaign in various ways. Peking was obviously less inter-
ested in cultural exchange and trade with the United States. Polemical
Chinese media criticism of U.S. "oppression" at home and "imperial-
ism" abroad also increased sharply. Peking at the same time adopted
an unusually strong, militant stand on the sensitive Taiwan issue,
going so far as to warn in shrill language that China was prepared to
launch a military strike across the Taiwan Straits.
A similar ideological hardening in Chinese foreign policy took place
when the leftists briefly gained power in Peking in mid 1976, but since
the removal of the "Gang of Four'' late that year, Chinese officials
have been preoccupied largely with pragmatic efforts to protect
China's security interests in world affairs, especially against perceived
threats from the Soviet Union. Peking has worked to offset suspected
Soviet "expansion" in Asian and world affairs by fostering an "anti-
hegemony united front" led by China and other developing Third
World countries and including developed "Western countries — even the
United States, whose interests are directly threatened by Soviet
-\- was (1'scussed in detail in a previous section of this report, Chinese
leaders have shown special concern in recent years over U.S. ability
and willingness to work with China in offsetting what Peking sees as
jcow's growing ambition for world domination. Peking has noted
that the United States has tended to "apnease" rather than resist the
; LS.S.R. over such sensitive issues as SALT, disarmament in Europe,
East-West trade, and Soviet policy in Africa.
A perceived decline in U.S. strength, coupled with a growth in
Soviet power, has also intensified longstanding Chinese fears of Soviet
efforts to "encircle" China in Asia. Most recently, PRC leaders,
♦■specially Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping, have claimed to see Moscow
heavily involved in Vietnam's alleged efforts to dominate Indochina,
and they have accused the Soviets of having established military bases
in Vietnam for the purpose of "encircling" China and of controlling
anes important to the United States, Japan, and China.
Other difficulties in current Chinese foreign policy focus on conflict-
.oals in China's foreign plans and Peking's limited military and
economic power. Thus, for example, Peking on the one hand str<
that it wants the United States to remain strong against the Soviet
[J] m in East Asia, and yet on the other hand it continues to vocally
support North Korea's demands for a complete American military
withdrawal Prom the strategic Korean Peninsula. China exerts great
efforts to reassure its non-Communist neighbors, who have long been
suspicious of Chinese intentions, but it also continues to support
Maoist parties which lead aimed insurrections against some ol* those
governments, supports the rights of Overseas Chinese in these areas,
and reasserts territorial claims which infringe on the holdings of some
<i' tin se na1 olicies which clearly upset the non-Communist
ttes. China's current program for military modernization also
-•'"ins likely to alarm neighboring Asian stntes, who fear a major
nsion in Peking's heretofore limited ability to reach militarily
nd its borders.
In Africa and the Middle East, China's problems have focused on
it- inability to match me ot iet shipments of military and other
aid to the area — a development which 1ms made Peking all the more
vocal in urging the United Mates and other Western countri
actively compete with Moscow in these regions. China has also been
trying to persuade Western European nations and Japan to reduce
their trade with the U.S.S.IL, and has held out in tnis regard the
"China market" as a possible alternative to thai of the D.S.S.K. With
the exception of Japan, however, Peking has thus far avoid< d signing
trade contracts with these countries which could even come clos
compensating them for reductions in their trade with Moscow.
July 3, 1978— Shanghai
06:40 a.m.: Arrival at Shanghai International Airport. Met by Mr. Li Chu-wen,
Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Shanghai Municipal
20:00 p.m.: Banquet hosted by Deputy Director Li, accompanied by staff of
Foreign Affairs Bureau.
July 4, 1978— Shanghai
Visit to Shanghai General Petrochemical Complex, in suburl an
Chin Shan, on Hangchow Bay. Host: Kung Chao-juan, director.
Visits to: Kindergarten, No. 1 acrylic plant, workers housing
July 5, 1978— Shanghai
08:30 a.m.: Visits to the Yu Gardens. Host: Shih Chuang, leading member,
Revolutionary Committee of the Gardens.
14:30 p.m.: Shanghai Dance Institute. Host: Sun Kun, president.
— Dance exercises .
— Scene from the play, "The Dying Tree Comes to Life."
19:00 p.m.: Performance of Shanghai Philharmonic Orchestra.
July 6, 1978— Shanghai to Peking
08:30 a.m.: A. Visit to "July 1" Commune, suburb or Shanghai. Host: Ms. Rui,
Director of General Affairs.
B. Visit to Shanghai Arts and Handicrafts Research Institute. Host:
13:20 p.m.: Departure for Peking — Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC).
16:00 p.m.: Visit to Pei Hai Park.
July 7, 1978— Peking
09:00 a.m.: Meeting with Mr. Wang Jun-sheng, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade.
14:00 p.m.: Visit to the Forbidden City (Palace Museum).
16:00 p.m.: Meeting with Ambassador Hao Teh-ching, President of the People's
Institute of Foreign Affairs.
19:00 p.m.: Banquet hosted by Ambassador Hao and staff, including Chu Chi-
chen, Deputy Director of American and Oceanic Affairs.
July 8, 1978— Peking
07:30 a.m.: Breakfast briefing at U.S. Liaison Office, Ambassador's residence.
Ambassador and Mrs. Woodcock and staff: Bill Thomas, Economic
Counselor, Stapleton Roy, DCM, and Richard Bock, Counselor.
09:30 a.m.: Meeting with Dr. Chiu Pei-yuan, vice president of the Academy of
Sciences, current president of Peking University, acting president
of Science and Technology Association.
11:00 a.m.: Visit to underground shelter. Host: Mr. Kao, Chairman of the Air
Defense Works of Tah Sha Lan St.
14:00 p.m.: Visit to Peking University. Host Dr. Chang Lung-hsiang, professor
19:00 p.m.: Cultural performance, Nationalities Palace of Culture.
July 9, 1978— Peking
08:15 a.m.: Visit to Memorial Hall of Chairman Mao, Tienamin Square.
10:00 a.m.: Meeting with Senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping (Great Hall of
— Ambassador Hao Teh-ching.
— Mr. Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister, Foreign Affairs.
— Mr. Hsieh Li.
—Mr. Chu Chi-chen.
— Mr. Fan Kuo-hsiang, Deputy Division Chief.
13:00 p.m.: Visit t (heat Wall.
19:00 p.m.: Delegation banquet for Chinese hosts. Guests include: Ambassador
and Mrs. Woodcock, Ambassador Hao Teh- ching ami staff.
July 10, 1978— Peking to Sian
13:10 p.m.: Departure for Sian via CAAC flight.
17:00 p.m.: Visit to Wild Goose Pagoda (Ming dynasty).
19:00 p.m.: Banquest. Host: Mr. Chang-tse, vice chairman, Revolutionary
Commit! ee, Shensi Province, Mr. Lu Mai, Director, Foreign Affairs
Bureau, and Mr. An Wei, Foreign Affairs Bureau.
July 11, 1978— Sian
08:30 a.m.: Visit to Chiao Tung University (Communications). Host: Mr. Chuang
Li-ting, vice president of the university.
1"):00 p.m.: Visit temple baths and archoological site.
July 12, 1978— Sian to Canton
08:30 a.m.: Depart for airport, CAAC.
09:00 a.m.: Flight to Canton (1 stop) — lunch at Chairman Mao's birthplace.
14:30 p.m.: Arrive Cam on.
16:00 p.m.: Tour of Canton waterfront and financial district.
19:00 p.m.: Welcoming banquet. Host: Mr. Chu iShao-tien, Vice Chairman for
Foreign Affairs, Canton Province.
July 13, 1978— Canton to Hong Kong
08:30 a.m.: Train to Hong Kong border.
11 :00 a.m.: Cross Hong Kong border, Sum Chun Railroad Station. Met by:
Consul General Sh< esmith and staff.
12:07 p.m.: Arrive Hong Kong, Kowloon Station.
July 14, 1978— Hong Kong
08:30 a.m.: Debriefing at U.S. consulate by Consul General Shoesmith, D.C.G.
Burton Levin and staff.
13 :00 p.m. : Working luncheon at Government House. Host: Acting Governor
Sir Denys Roberts.
July 15, 1978— Hong Kong to Washington, D.C.
Breakfast with U.S. Chamber of Commerce,' Hong Kong. Host :
Mr. Michael Emmons, president (in absentia).
!'• i - confi rence.
Leave hotel for Kai-Tak Airport.
\\ iiceis up for Washington Andrews Aii Force Base.
Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.
Delegation Press Conference in Hong Kong
July 15, 197S
Mr. Phillips [Consul General's staff] Ladies and gentlemen, Welcome. I
apologise for cramming you in such a small room but, unfortunately, it's the only
one we could get. It's my pleasure this morning to introduce to you the Consul
General, Mr. Thomas Shoesmith.
Mr. Shoesmith [U.S. Consul Generall I'm sure that the Honorable Lester
Wolff needs no introduction to you all. He is a very familiar figure in this part
of the world — both as a businessman and as a member of our Congress — and
most particularly as Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee
of the House Committee on International Relations. In that capacity he and the
other members of his Committee are playing an increasingly important role in
the formulation of our foreign policy, most particularly in respect to Asia. Con-
gressman Lester Wolff is also, as you know, the Chairman of the House Seled
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. It's a pleasure for me to introduce
to you Congressman Lester Wolff, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Wolff. Thank you very much, Mr. Shoesmith. I should like to
first introduce the members of this mission — on my extreme right, Mr. Larry
Winn of Kansas; seated next to him is Congressman Eligio de la Garza of Texas;
seated over on the extreme left is Mr. Tennyson Guyer of Ohio; and seated next
to him, Mr. James Mann of South Carolina and next to him, Mr. Charles Rangel
of New York.
With the exception of Mr. Mann, all of us were on the recent mission to the
People's Republic of China. We've just returned from 10 days in the PRC. The
mission was most fascinating and we hope helpful in furthering mutual under-
standing on both sides.
Mr. Fountain, who will be with us shortly, was also a member of this group
as well as Mr. Burke. Mr. Fountain of North Carolina and Mr. Burke of Florida.
All of the members of this group are members of the International Relations
Committee, except Mr. Rangel, who is a member of the Ways and Means
You know — certainly no visit of 10 days or 11 days qualifies any group as
experts on the policies or events of another nation. Although our mission included
two members — Mr. Burke and myself — who first visited China two years ago,
which gave us an opportunity for comparison. I think we are all united in our
determination not to come out of China issuing any earth-shaking pronouncements.
However, I think we are equally united on a general sense of what our mission
perceived to be certain trends in China which will bear close study in the weeks
and months to come.
I refer specifically to what we feel can be called a sense of a "new realism" in
China — on the part of her people and on the part of their leadership — concerning
both domestic and foreign policy questions facing China at the present time.
While we discussed many issues with the Chinese, one area where we sensed a
potentially important example of the new realism would appear to be on the
question of Taiwan.
Let me state here very clearly that we do not feel that the basic Chinese position
on Taiwan has altered regarding their perception of the need for U.S. adherence
to the Shanghai Communique and the Three Points. Rather, our delegation sensed
a new realism in terms of an emerging Chinese emphasis on seeking ways to settle
the Taiwan question on a bilateral basis, between the Chinese themselves, in ways
that are acceptable to the parties involved.
In this regard, the delegation sensed a growing Chinese willingness to discuss
Taiwan's future with the Kuomintang on the basis of existing realities.
In our discussions on this issue, the historical fact was raised that twice in the
past the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang have come together and
cooperated when it was in their common interest — first, during the time of Dr.
Sun Yat Sen and the Northern Expedition, and again, toward liberation during
World War II.
When coupled with the repeated instances of our delegation being told that the
Chinese recognize what were termed the realities of the United States' involve-
with Taiwan, our delegation emerged from the People's Republic with a
definite sense of the sobering effects of the real, very real strategic and political
problems facing China in the form of the Soviet Union, which they term the "Polar
Bear", and what the Chinese as well call the Soviet Union's "Asian Cuba*' —
Our general perception of China's "new reality'' was reinforced by our visits to
educational facilities, cultural institutions and factories alike. At institutions
ranging from Peking University to a provincial technical university in Shensi
Province, we heard the same themes — that the damage done during the stagnation
of the cultural revolution, and solidified by the extremes of the "Gang of Four''
have set China back years in scientific and technical education and research, and
seriously retarded industrial production, modernization and growth.
Again and again, we heard the Chinese rightfully discuss their strengths, but
f lankly discuss their weaknesses, and indicate their desire for constructive sugges-
tions from the West, particularly from the United States.
Again and again, we saw evidence that the new realism is leading the Chinese to
be receptive to American technology and American expertise to help them over-
come the lost decade of the cultural revolution and the so-called "Gang of Four."
This emerging realism is the most striking contrast between China today and
that of two years ago, and is, we feel, a most favorable impulse- toward normaliza-
tion of relations between our two governments. While the Chinese remain deter-
mined to pursue self-reliance, they appear to be no longer adverse to making use
of the best from other nations — a policy rooted in the Chinese tradition and which
continued through the 1950's prior to the Sino-Soviet split.
In tnis respect, it is the delegation's opinion that the Chinese see their rela-
tionship with the United States as part of an overall strategic and political recog-
nition of the realities, which they see as an increasing pattern of Soviet activity
around the globe — from Angola to South Yemen, from Afghanistan to Ethiopia
and Vietnam. This conflict with the Soviets is seen not as just part of an ideological
battle with the Soviet Union but is perceived as an effort by the U.S.S.R. to
dominate the entire world.
Hence, the Chinese see an improved relationship with the United States as
being in the common interest of both countries.
< >'tr delegation sensed that the Chinese do not desire the United States to play
the normalization issue as just another "card" against the Soviets. Indeed, the
ese seemed to be going out of their way to stress the common strategic and
. n policy interests that we share in confronting Soviet actions in the entire
What we are calling a new sense of "realpolitik" was particularly present during
our discussions on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, and we saw very little of
the "Id rhetoric, despite what was basically a continued and very hard line con-
cerning the Soviets.
A final comment in this regard: the Chinese continually warned us not to fall
for what they termed a Soviet "bluff" on possible Sino-Soviet reconciliation, so
seriously do they view the practical political and strategic long-term threat posed
by the Soviets.
This apparent decline in ideological emphasis is, as I have noted, reflected in
Chinese domestic matters as well. Not only did we sense a very real revulsion
t the practices of the so-called "Gang of Four", which climaxed a decade of
an ideological blanket which threatened to smother China; I think we also per-
ceived :i growing appreciation of the linkage between helping to maintain interna-
tional peace, and the time China needs to grow internally.
Xo longer did we hear that war between the United States and the Soviet
Union is, and here I quote, "imminent" and "inevitable" :>s was the constanl
theme Borne two years ago when I visited last. But this time we heard that if the
United States maintains strong political and strategic posture in Asia, and Europe
and Africa as well, war is actually "postponable", perhaps for as much, they hope,
as 25 years.
While this may well fall into the good news/had d< ws category, the delegation
sensed that there, too, a sense of realism regarding China's interests and needs
for^the years ahead is beginning to emerge.
With this growing pragmatism, the delegation sensed that while Chairman
Mao is still the dominant figure, he is being studied anew — if not being re-inter-
preted — for support for the new pragmatism. As I have indicated, our mission
heard very little of the rhetoric which bo pervaded the visit 2 years ago.
This time the only saying of Chairman Mao which was constantly repeated
was Mao's injunction of "Let 100 flowers bloom, let 100 schools of thought
contend." We were repeatedly told that this new rallying call is designed to
permit constructive conflict of thought and ideas in order to stimulate the progress
which the Chinese now frankly admit they must make.
Our delegation feels that the implications of this theme for what we are calling
China's "new realism" should — if allowed to flourish — affect all aspects of China's
life and policy, and substitute a return to a discipline practised before the cultural
revolution for the anarchy of the Red Guards of recent years.
So to conclude this brief summary of our impressions, I would say that it is
our sense that a flourishing growth — under this strict control of the party, of
course — is precisely what the leaders of China hope for their people as this huge
and great nation moves to take its place in the world.
While in China, our delegation met with many officials, including Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-p'ing; Vice Foreign Minister. Wang Hai-jung; Mr. Wang Jun-sheng,
A'ice Minister of Foreign Trade; Ambassador Hao Teh-ch'ing, President of the
Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Chou P'ei-yuan, Vice Presi-
dent of the Academy of Science and President of Peking University; and many
other individuals and provincial authorities who gave graciously of their hospi-
tality, time and views.
Thank you, gentlemen. And now we should like to invite questions — we don't
claim to be China experts, we claim to be China students.
Question. Mr. Congressman, you said that China is willing to negotiate anew
with the KMT — have you got any substantial information on this?
Mr. Wolff. The statement that we made was that China has twice before come
together with the KMT and there is no reason to believe — they indicated — that
they could not come together once again.
Question. Mr. Congressman, did the Chinese raise — bring up — this history
of their previous cooperation with the KMT or did you bring it up in your
Mr. Wolff. They were the ones that introduced it.
Question. Mr. Congressman, did they sav they were willing to talk to the
Mr. Wolff. The only point that was made was that — the statement that I've
made before — that they have had a previous history and they see no reason why
this previous history could not be repeated.
Question. Mr. Congressman, which official made that statement?
Mr. Wolff. I would prefer not to identify the official, but to say that it is a
very high ranking official at the People's Republic of China.
Question. Have you got any indication that there's going to be negotiations
between the two parties?
Mr. Wolff. I have no indications of that at all. I will have to stand on the
statement that I've just made — I do not want to draw any implications from that.
Question. Mr. Congressman, you said that your delegation sensed the growing
willingness to discuss Taiwan's future with the KMT — is it just the fact that
they mentioned that they had spoken with the KMT twice before or was there
anything else that led to this reasoning?
Mr. Wolff. This was brought up several times during our discussions.
Question. They actually said that thev are willing in the future to discuss
the matter with the KMT?
Mr. de la Garza. I asked the question of one of the officials — why do you
not — the brothers on the Mainland and the brothers on the island of Taiwan —
settle the difference without involving us, the United States.? Why don't you
settle — if you say that this is an internal matter, why don't you handle that and
separate it from your normalization of relationship with us? His statement was —
among other things — twice before we have worked together, we have been ad-
versaries — haven't w T orked at times — but twice before w r e have worked together;
there is no official communication and there has been no official communication
with Taiwan, but you cannot rule out a third time. That was the statement.
Question. Would you like to see the United States Government encourage
Taiwan and its officials to carry out this discussion?
Mr. de la Garza. I accept the fact that this is an internal matter for them
Question. So the United States Government encourages Taiwan to participate?
Mr. de la Garza. I accept the fact that it's up to Taiwan and the Mainland
to decide whether they want to discuss or not.
Question. Mr. Congressman, last 3*ear you had the idea of a possible referendum
for residents on Taiwan — did you have this idea — or did the Chinese raise this
idea with you or did j t ou raise it with them?
Mr. Wolff. We did not raise it, but it has been the policy — the United States
policy — for a number of years for the people who are residents of a particular
area to make their own determination; we certainly do not want to interfere
in the internal affairs of another nation.
Question. Have you any reaction of the PRC in Washington to that idea?
Mr. Wolff. No. I have not.
Question. Mr. Congressman, } r ou said that it is a matter of possible negotiations
with Taiwan — Mr. de la Garza has just mentioned one instance — what was the
other instance — what was the nature of the other instance?
Mr. Wolff. It was volunteered by the people we spoke to at several points
in our discussions that this was — once in response to a question if I recall it, a
question as raised by Mr. de la Garza, but the other times it was raised volun-
tarily and independently.
Question. In the same form that you've talked to them before that they
might be able to talk to them again?
Mr. Wolff. Yes, I would say so — not only talk to them before
Question. In a single conversation or once in several conversations?
Mr. Wolff. It was raised several times in a single conversation.
Question. They never said anything that, well, we've talked to them before
but clearly ''those murderers on Taiwan," or something like that, to start in a
position to talk to us
Mr. Wolff. Not — to the contrary it was, as I indicated before, there was none
of the rhetoric that we heard before about the "murderers" and what-have-you.
In fact, it was mentioned that at the time they got together during the Japanese
occupation there had been a great amount of killing by the KMT, however, the —
some of the people of the KMT went to school with some of the leaders of China,
so the KMT was mentioned in a much more conciliatory frame. I would say
that they were harder on the "Gang of Four" than they were on the people of
Question. Did they actually express any willingness to conduct such talks with
Mr. Wolff. I'm sorry.
Question. Did they actually express any willingness to conduct such talks?
Mr. Wolff. I don't think we can go further than to repeat what has been said
on this in the fact that it was they who raised the point — we did not raise this
point with them; and regardless of how the question is framed, I can only give
you the answers they gave to us and that have already been indicated by several
of the members here.
Question. Mr. Chairman, what have you to say to the contention — we're out
of the way — with the three conditions that their job would be much easier for
thorn to handle?
Mr. Wolff. I must indicate that there was a very strong admonition and a
very strong statement that was made that does not rule out by any means the
ultimate use, if necessary, of force to reunite the Mainland and Taiwan. They
would not rule that out as an alternative.
Question. Did the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan come up? And in
Mr. Wolff. It did come Up and there was a statement made that if U.S. planes
were sold to Taiwan it would interfere with the negotiated settlement of the
QUESTION. They are balking about sales of U.S. planes to Taiwan now or after
Mr. Woi.i ■!••. Will, if they do not want it now, they surely would not want it
later on. But the fact st ill remains that t hey did make a point of the question of the
plane Bales that are talked about. They (lid not mention third party planes sales
at all, however.
Question. Did you people talk about Vietnam at all?
Mr. Wolff. Yes, we did talk about the question of Vietnam. Docs anyone here
want to address themselves to that? None of my colleagues will— I will try to.
They call Vietnam the "Asian Cuba". And indicated that Vietnam was strongly
controlled by the Soviets and that the Soviets were usin^ Vietnam defense facilities.
Question. Some of the local press here in Hong Kong suggested that if the
Soviets made missile bases in Vietnam, did the Chinese indicate to you whether
the Soviet military presence there was a threat?
Mr. Wolff. Thiey did not — the only thing they did indicate to us was that the
Soviets were making use of defense facilities in Vietnam — they did not elaborate,
however. Excuse me, I think the gentleman over there had a question.
Question. IIow r would you characterize the mood over Vietnam?
Mr. Wolff. Their mood over Vietnam? I think certainly not one of fear, but
one of great concern. In fact, it was in response to part of the discussions on Viet-
nam itself, a statement was made that so far as Vietnam is concerned, as part of a
Soviet encirclement plan, that the PRC — the People's Republic of China — was,
has been encircled many times, but they have always broken through the
Question. Some American diplomats have suggested the falling out between
China and Vietnam provides the U.S. with the golden opportunity to go ahead and
normalize relations with Vietnam. Did you sound out the Chinese how they feel
if they suddenly made up with Hanoi?
Mr. Wolff. We did not specifically ask that question because as we don't want
to interfere in their relations, we don't want them to interfere in our relations. But
I think that from the tone that was evidenced by their concern over Vietnam,
which they indicated was trying to creep into ASEAN and undermine ASEAN,
that it would at present time have an impact upon our relations with them.
Tenny, do you want to take that question?
Mr. Guyer. I think that in our conversations with various people even as late
as this morning before I came to breakfast, that they're very near to normalization
with us and they very dearly want to narrow that gap, but it's a matter of stale-
mate over the missing persons situation that really holds them back; and I think
it's almost like a change of prisoners if each would start to cross the bridge. It
might be accomplished, but there has to be evidence of goodwill or this will never
happen. I don't think that the United States Congress is going to approve stopping
the embargo until they make some other gestures to finalize and give a full and
accurate accounting of those who are still missing, which is now less than 500.
I think the last figure I saw was 487 — we still have as prisoners of war or missing
in action, and then there are 1,300 known dead but not recovered. Some gesture
of finalization in that area w r ould bring normalization very close.
Question. Congressman Guyer, could you give us a sense of whether normaliza-
tion in Vietnam might jeopardize normalization with China?
Mr. Guyer. No, I don't think that that kind of conclusion should be draw r n
because just as Mr. Wolff said they are very adamant about us staying out of
their other relationships and they do not pretend they're into ours.
Question. Congressman, did you get any sense what their attitude is at the
moment for us leaving a trade office, an official trade office in Taiwan after nor-
malization or else putting out a unilateral statement about the need of maintain-
ing peace in the Taiwan straits?
Mr. Wolff. Not as such except that with a peaceful transition that the United
States could, if we just look at the Japanese situation as an example, that the
United States could maintain its normal non-governmental relationships with
Question. Congressman, could you give an estimate or appraisal of the relative
degrees of Chinese concern with Vietnam, with regard to the Soviet Union, and
in regard to the problem of Vietnam/Chinese, with regard to Cambodia — sort of
evaluate the relative degrees?
Mr. Wolff. I think there is very serious concern over what is happening in
Vietnam and the Vietnam/Cambodian situation. But I think that the — both they
and the world are somewhat overreacting to the Vietnam/ Cambodian conflict be-
cause it is not anything that's new. This has gone on for centuries. A conflict
between Vietnam and Cambodia. The rivalries and the intense difficulties that
have existed, have existed now for centuries and the rage back and forth there
has always gone on. We in the Congress are very concerned with what's happen-
ing in Cambodia, the fratricide if you want to call it that, that has taken place,
the mass killings that have taken place there and Congress has expressed great
concern for the welfare of the people of Cambodia.
The Chinese — I do not think — feel the situation in Cambodia versus Vietnam
is as critical to them as the Soviet intrusion into Vietnam, which gives the Soviets
a base of operations, as they put it, for further activity in that area, and for the
Soviets to be able to maintain a position of being able to interfere with trade
through possible naval bases, and supply of energy to Japan as well. They voiced
serious concern over the pattern that is emerging of Soviet moves in various
places where coups have occurred and regimes that are favorable to the Soviet
Union have been set up.
Question. Congressman, did you ask them if the}'- are really serious about
evacuating Chinese from Vietnam and if so, how many people they estimate they
might take out of Vietnam?
Mr. Wolff. This question was not discussed.
Question. Mr. Wolff, did they betray any concern such as has been voiced by
the Left Wing Chinese press in Hong Kong, that Taiwan might in some future
situation seek an understanding with the Soviet Union?
Mr. Wolff. They indicated a contrary position. They indicated when one of
our members raised the question as to whether or not an accommodation or
actually a take-over or some sort of basing of Soviet facilities on Taiwan, they
said they are anti-Communist as well on Taiwan, therefore they could not see the
accommodation being reached by the Taiwan Government and the Soviets.
One final question.
Question. Congressman, did you discuss with official Americans in Taiwan or
here or Peking what you have been told what the Chinese have raised about their
past history of cooperation with Taiwan? And how significant did they take
what you have been told?
Mr. Wolff. First of all I can saj' that we did give them the same type of report
that we are giving to you. We gave them the report first however, instead of
coming to the press first, and I cannot speak for our China watchers except to
say that they were interested in what we found out.
Question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Teng Hsiao-ping Interview with Japanese Journalists
(By Correspondent Kondo)
Peking, Sept. 6. — Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, at a September meeting
with visiting Japanese senior editorial writers including Junndsuke Kishida of
Asahi Shimbun, expressed his frank views on the Japan-China relations and other
general international issues such as the Sino-U.S. normalization issue and the
worsening PRC-SRV relations, particularly noteworthy were his remarks which
seemed to verify recent exchanges between the United States and China on the
Vice Chairman Teng said that China is paying attention to the fact that the
United States lately has been taking a somewhat more positive attitude over the
normalization issue. However, he hinted that there is no clear prospect yet as to
the time of normalization. The reason is that the Taiwan issue still remains the
only major obstacle to the normalization of relations between the United States
and China. Concerning the liberation of Taiwan, China has consistently been taking
the position that it is "China's domestic affair and no foreign countries are allowed
to interfere. " It has been insisting that the method of Taiwan's liberation will
be determined by China, and that no third country should meddle in it.
In his remarks Teng disclosed that the United States had proposed that "China
pledge itself not to liberate Taiwan by force of arms in return for the U.S. ac-
ceptance" of the three-point Chinese demand for the normalization of the U.S.-
China relations — (1) abrogation of the U.S. -Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; (2)
withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from Taiwan; and (3) severance of the
U.S.-Taiwan relations. China, Teng disclosed, resolutely rejected the proposal
because the Taiwan issue is China's domestic problem and the method of itg
liberation will be decided by China.
He indicated that China has not given up the use of armed force as a means to
liberate Taiwan by saying that "if we should pledge not to use the force of arms,
it would become a major obstacle to the unification of our country. It would allow
Taiwan to behave more arrogantly. It would even make the unification by peace-
ful means — by talks — difficult."
At the same time, he said that "we let the United States know that we will
resolve the Taiwan issue by an appropriate formula based on realities." Thus,
it is noteworthy that while holding on to the use of military force as the last resort
for Taiwan's liberation, China actually desires the liberation by peaceful means.
Following is a summary of Vice Chairman Teng's remarks:
U.S. -China Relations
We are paying attention to the fact that the United States has been taking
a somewhat positive attitude but it is very difficult to say when (the normaliza-
tion) will be realized: Our position is clear, the Taiwan issue is the only obstacle.
In order to resolve the Taiwan issue, China made a three-point demand — that is, (1)
abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; (2) withdrawal of the U.S.
military forces from Taiwan; and (3) severance of the U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic re-
lations — while the United States has presented many formulas. One of them is the
"reverse liaison office formula" (calling for the establishment of liaison offices
in Taipei and Washington instead of the present system of the liaison offices in
Peking and Washington, and for embassies in Peking and Washington). Another
U.S. formula calls for a Chinese pledge not to liberate Taiwan by force of arms in
return for the U.S. acceptance of the three-point Chinese demand, China clearly
We let the United States know that when we resolve the Taiwan issue, "We will
resolve it by an appropriate formula based on Taiwan's realities." At my meeting
with a U.S. delegation which visited China recently, I said that "If we should
pledge ourselves not to use the force of arms to liberate Taiwan, it would become a
major obstacle to the unification of our country." Such a pledge would even make it
impossible to hold peaceful talks on the unification of the country. We want the
United States to consider this point.
How Taiwan should be liberated is China's domestic issue and no one is allowed
to interfere. However, we have told the United States that, in resolving the Taiwan
issue, we will use an appropriate method of agenda realities. For the U.S. -China
normalization, the Japanese formula is preferable. That is (the United States and
Taiwan) should cut off all "official" relations between them, leaving nongovern-
mental relations including private trade to continue.
ARMS BUILDUP AND DISARMAMENT
Following the U.S. signing of the third agreement (regarding the strategic arsm
limitation) with the Soviet Union in Vladivostok, then Secretary of State Kissin-
ger flew to Peking to brief us on the content of the U.S. -Soviet talks. He said that
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could restrain the other side. I
said to him: "Your two countries might as well continue the arms race." As
chairman Mao Tse-tung said. A future war will not necessarily be a nuclear war.
When nuclear weapons are available in large quantities, no one can recklessly
trigger a nuclear war. When a new war comes, it will problably be a war fought
with conventional arms, therefore, while the West has neglected conventional
arms, the Soviet union has carried out mass production of these weapons as well
as nuclear weapons. As a result, the Soviet Union now has more conventional
weapons than the United States and European countries combined. It is impossible
to cuib the arms race with the help of atmosphere (Funiki) or a disarmament
agreement. However, there is no thing like a buildup of one nation's self-defense
capabilities to arouse another country.
(Regarding China's participation in a reorganized world disarmament com-
mittee) China has yet to study the problem. If disarmament should occur, the
United States and Soviet Union should carry it out. It is not necessary for China
or Japan to do so, as for nuclear weapons, we do not need many — just enough to
return a strike, if money from the arms race is saved, it should be spent to improve
people's living standard.
THE VIETNAM ISSUE
China didn't drive Vietnam into the Soviet camp. We gave Vietnam S20
billion in aid; nevertheless, Vietnam joined the Soviet camp a long time ago.
The Soviet Union should now shoulder this burden (aid to Vietnam) alone.
Vietnam had effectively been utilizing Sino-Soviet relations; now that China has
quit Vietnam, Vietnam will have only the Soviet Union to depend upon and, the
longer it does so, the more problems it will have.
The Soviet Union ships military supplies to Vietnam but cannot afford to
give it enough daily necessities. Therefore, it made Vietnam join the CEMA
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) so as to put the economic burden on
other member nations. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. egged Vietnam on to beg things
from the United States, European nations and Japan.
There is a basic difference between the Soviet Union's unilateral discontinua-
tion of aid to and technical cooperation with China, and China's complete
tion of aid to Vietnam. While the Soviet loan to China was onerous, the Chinese
aid to Vietnam was mostly gratuitous — it had a low interest rate and we are not
even pressing Vietnam to pay the balance.
Regarding Japan's economic aid to Vietnam, Teng said: It is a waste of money,
if Japan is willing to spend money, well no one can keep it from doing so."
THE KOREAN QUESTION
The present tension on the Korean Penninsula is not very great. Peaceful,
independent unification is the reasonable formula for the reunification of Korea,
and we respect the Park position. Western media report that relations between
viet Union and North Korea are good, but I do not agree with th<
ports. Soviet influence over North Korea is limited. At present, the Soviet Union
18 attempting to make contacts with South Korea (the ROK), but China i- not
Considering it (any exchanges with the ROK).
The living standard of the people should be improved. Even if the living
standard improves in China, aborgeoisie will not be created because all individual
incomes are limited. There are no such things as privately owned cars or privately
owned dwellings in our society. Even if the four modernizations are completed,
it will not mean that China has become an affluent country, even when the modern-
ization programs have been completed at the end of this century, the living
standard of our people will still be lower than that of Japanese people because
China has such a large population. A larger population creates more problems.
Selected Press Clippings
[From the Washington Post, July 16, 1978]
Peking Willing To Talk With Taiwan
(By the Washington Post Foreign Service)
U.S. CONGRESSMEN TOLD OF SHIFT
Hong Kong. — In a major shift of tactics, China's senior Communist leaders
have told a group of visiting U.S. congressmen that they are willing to negotiate
directly with their Nationalist Chinese rivals over the future of Taiwan.
The statements made by Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping, the second ranking
member in Peking's hierarchy, and other top officials seem to be the most con-
ciliatory toward Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo's Nationalist government
in recent years.
They were reported by a U.S. congressional delegation, led by Representative
Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), which returned here from China yesterday.
Although negotiations between Taiwan and the Peking government remain
unlikely, the statements indicate a new Chinese willingness to moderate harsh
anti-Chiang public remarks of the past and try to swing American public opinion
in Peking's favor.
CHINESE SHIFT ON TAIWAN
Wolff said the Chinese reminded the nine visiting congressmen that the Com-
munist Party and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) had cooperated twice
before, during a campaign to defeat local warlords and unify the country in the
1920's and during the war against Japan in the 1930's and 1940's.
"There has been no official contact with Taiwan, but j-ou cannot rule out a
third time," Representative Eligio de la Garza (D-Tex.) quoted one high Chinese
official as saying.
At a press conference here, Wolff emphasized that the Chinese also made a
"strong statement" that did not "rule out by any means the use of force in liber-
ating Taiwan." The Peking officials also showed no sign of retreating from their
demand that Washington cut off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, end its mutual
defense treaty with the Chiang government and withdraw all remaining U.S.
military personnel from the offshore Chinese island.
The U.S. Congress and the Carter administration have been reluctant to take
such steps in order to bring full diplomatic relations with Peking without some
Chinese guarantee that Taiwan will not be taken by force. Peking has shown little
interest in making such a promise, but the statements to Wolff's group appear
designed to soften the image in American minds of warlike Chinese belligerence
toward the Taiwan government.
The conciliatory statements were "volunteered by the people we spoke to — at
several points in our discussions," said Wolff, chairman of the Asian and Pacific
Affairs Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee.
In the past, American visitors to China who asked about Peking's attitude
toward the Kuomintang have usually boon lectured on Nationalist crimes and
"blood debits," including the many massacres of Communist Party members
carried out by Chiang's late father, ( ieneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek. A Peking
commentary on Chiang's move from the Taiwan premiership to the presidency
in May said "he has continuously intensified his fascist rule and suppressed the
people. 1 '
But Wolff, who heard similar lectures when he visited China in early 197G,
said BUch rhetoric was largely absent this time. He said he sensed a "new realism
in terms of an emerging Chinese emphasis on seeking ways to settle the Taiwan
question on a bilateral basis, between the Chinese t hem-elves, in ways that are
acceptable to the parties involved."
He said he also found domestic policies more realistic, as the Chinese move
away from harsh domestic measures that had been pursued by the "Gang of
Four," a Peking clique led by Mao Tse-tung's wife Chiang ( thing that was purged
in late 1976.
"1 think it's safe to say they were harder on the Clang of Four than on the
people on Taiwan," said Representative Charles Range] (D-N.Y.) of the Chinese
officials they spoke to.
Peking's usual attitude toward Taiwan has heon a plea for people on the island
to admit their mistakes and come over to the mainland side, rather than a sugges-
tion of talks.
In a March 6 speech, Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng said he hoped
"military and administrative personnel of the Kuomintang" would "clearly see
the general trend of events and take the road of patriotism and unification of the
Peking's last apparent public call for negotiations came in February 1973,
when former Kuomintang Gen. Fu Tso-yi addressed a meeting in the Chinese
capital. "We are all Chinese * * * Let us come together and talk," he said in a
speech supposedly aimed at Kuomintang officials who had not yet come over to
the Communist side.
An analyst who has followed Chinese statements closely for the last three
years said he could not remember any Peking remarks similar to those made to
Wolff's group. One member of the group said the Chinese noted that earlier
efforts to cooperate with the Kuomintang had not worked well, but also observed
that many Communist leaders had attended school with Kuomintang officials.
Wolff said Peking officials told the group that further sales of U.S. warplanes
to Taiwan would interfere with negotiations over a solution to the Taiwan issue,
but the Chinese did not mention sales to Taiwan by other countries.
The Chinese expressed doubt that the Taiwan government would ever go to
the Soviet Union for help if the United States severed relations. Washington has
approved sale of Israeli-made fighters with U.S. -made components to Taiwan,
but Chiang's government has indicated it prefers to buy more effective U.S. -made
fighters. Chiang also does not want to hurt his close ties with Saudi Arabia by
dealing with Israel.
Taiwan officials have indicated they fear a sharp decline in investor confidence
in their booming economy if there is the least suggestion of talks with Peking. In
an interview published in the June Reader's Digest, Chiang called such negotia-
tions "totally impossible."
"Negotiation with the Communists is tantamount to suicide. Wliat free world
country has ever successfully done so?" he said.
W 7 olff declined to say which Chinese officials had made the suggestion of talks
with Taiwan, but Representative C. Tennyson Guyer (R-Ohio) said the idea
had been voiced by Teng, perhaps the most influential Chinese leader in foreign
policy as well as other areas. The delegation also saw Vice Foreign Minister Wang
Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Trade Minister Wang Jun-sheng, Foreign Affairs Insti-
tute President Hao Teh-ching and Peking University President Chou Pei-yuan.
Others in the delegation were: Representatives J. Herbert Burke (R-Fla.),
Billy Lee Evans (D-Ga.), L. H. Fountain (D-N.C), James R. Mann (D-S.C.)
and Larry Winn Jr. (R,- Kan.).
[From the Baltimore Sun, July 16, 1978]
"Realism" Rules in China, U.S. Congressman Says
(By Edward K. Wu, Hong Kong Bureau of the Sun)
Hong Kong. — A "new realism" about foreign affairs, including relations with
Taiwan and the United States, prevails in China today, according to the head of a
U.S. congressional delegation which has just concluded a 10-day visit to the
This "new realism" includes growing Chinese willingness to discuss Taiwan's
future with the Nationalists on the basis of existing realities, a greater eagerness to
seek American technology and expertise and a view of relations with the United
States as part of an overall strategic and political recognition of the realities of
Soviet expansionism, according to Representative Lester L. Wolff (D., N.Y.), the
head of the nine-member congressional group.
Mr. Wolff said in a news conference here yesterday that he and one of his col-
leagues found this emerging realism the most striking contrast between China
today and China two years ago.
Mr. Wolff, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
affairs, visited China in 1976 with Representative J. Herbert Burke (R., Fla.),
who is also a member of the present delegation.
While finding no alteration in China's basic position on Taiwan regarding the
need for the U.S. to withdraw diplomatic recognition and security ties from the
Nationalists and withdraw all troops from Taiwan, Mr. Wolff said:
"Our delegation sensed a new realism in terms of an emerging Chinese emphasis
on seeking ways to settle the Taiwan question on a bilateral basis, between the
Chinese themselves, in ways acceptable to the parties involved."
In the wide-ranging discussions with various Chinese officials, including Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, the congressmen were reminded that the Communist
Party and the Nationalists, now the ruling party on Taiwan, had twice in the past
come together, and their co-operation now for the third time could not be ruled out.
The Communists and Nationalists formed a united front under Sun Yat-sen's
leadership from 1924 to 1927 and again during the 1937-45 war with Japan.
The Chinese remarks were said to have come in response to a question by Repre-
sentative Eligio de la Garza (D., Texas) as to why the Chinese could not settle the
Taiwan issue among themselves without involving the U.S. and why the issue
could not be separated from the normalization of U.S. -Chinese relations.
Mr. Wolff declined to identify the official who made these statements, only
saying he was a very high official. It is believed he was Mr. Teng.
Recent press reports from China clearly indicated that united-front activities
among the Chinese, including those on Taiwan, have been renewed and
intensified. These overtures so far have been openly rebuffed by Taiwan's President
Chiang Ching-kuo, who has repeatedly declared that the Nationalists will never
negotiate with the Communists.
The delegation, Mr. Wolff said, heard the Chinese discuss their strengths,
frankly admit their weaknesses and indicate their desire for constructive sug-
gestions from the West, particular^ trom the U.S.
He added that it was the delegation's opinion that the Chinese see their im-
proved ties with the U.S. as being in both countries' interest.
[From the Baltimore Sun, July 20, 1978]
Congressmen Say China Is Eager To Better U.S. Ties, Contain Soviet
(By Henry L. Trewhitt, Washington Bureau of the Sun)
Washington. — Just back from China, a group of congressmen yesterday re-
ported dramatic acceleration in Chinese efforts to contain the Soviet Union
through closer ties to the United States.
Representative Lester L. Wolff (D., N.Y.) said the "new realism" could lead to
direct negotiations with Taiwan. At least, he judged, it represented greater toler-
ance for the "realities" of U.S. relations with the rival Republic of China there.
The findings of Mr. Wolff and his companions supported evidence of growing
interest in normal relations by both the United States and China. For weeks the
pattern has developed while world attention was focused on events in Africa and
the Middle East and more directly on worsening Soviet-American relations.
The change of climate has developed rapidly, as such things are measured, since
Cyrus R. Vance, the Secretary of State, was in Peking last August. Then, the
pragmatism of Teng Hsiao-Ping, freshly rehabiliated as deputy prime minister,
was just ro-emergin^.
Since then the United States and China have consulted in only slightly veiled
fashion about Soviet intervention in Africa. From time to time faint hints have sur-
faced that China, after all, would not try to unite Taiwan, which the United States
still protects, with the mainland, by force.
The number of semi-official exchanges between Washington and Peking is grow-
ing. A few weeks ago Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser,
pleased his host enormously by figuratively shaking his fist in the direction of
Moscow from the top of tin; Great Wall.
Air. Wolir said yesterday that "surely it was no accident" that President
Carter's science advisers were in Peking at the s:une time as the congressional
delegation. Han Hsu, chief of the Chinese liaison office here, recently visited theU.S
Americans who had pictured the Communist Chinese for a generation as humor-
less automatons suddenly are surrounded by gaily chattering visitors. A perform-
ing arts company is touring the nation. An agricultural delegation is inspecting the
soil of the corn belt.
Some analysts regard all this with wry cynicism. One remarks that "it is almost
as if we told them: 'You want normalization? Then you'll have to change the
There is no doubt that motives on both sides are heavy with global politics. In
fact, the cross-currents of relations involving China, Southeast Asia, the Soviet
Union, the United States and even Japan are becoming more complex daily. Tor
every possible benefit there is an offsetting risk.
But there is brisk new life in the process former President Nixon started by open-
ing the door to China in 1972. The United States is toning flown the relations
it will maintian with Taiwan, hoping for minimum damage to its reputation as an
ally. Without committing themselves, the Chinese appear to be relaxing their own
terms for normalization.
However it is not really changing those terms. China says the United States must
end diplomatic relations and its defense treaty with Taiwan, as well as remove its
remaining symbolic military presence.
Something like the so-called Japanese formula, the Chinese suggest, would be
fine. That means continuing, as Japan has done, vast economic relations — but not
political ones — with Taiwan while formally recognizing Peking. The understanding
of course, is that the economic ties themselves amount to a commitment of inter-
est the mainland would not threaten.
That still is not enough for the U.S. administration, even in its speculative mo-
ments. Besides economic commitments, for example, officials here say the United
States must be free to provide defense equipment to Taiwan as needed.
They also want more direct assurance that Peking will not try to reunite China
by force — one of the stickiest points. A solution still appears to be a considerable
distance in the future, but Mr. Wolff and six of his colleagues agreed that China is
ready to increase contacts greatly without a final political resolution.
Mr. Wolff reported evidence of "a growing Chinese willingness to discuss
Taiwan's future" with the present leaders of Taiwan. Not all members of his
delegation agreed with his analysis, however. American diplomats suggest that
direct discussions between the Chinese rivals are a remote possibility.
But most American specialists do agree that China is softening the edges of
its position. It needs technology and manufactured products. More important,
it is looking for a strategic relationship as protection against the Soviet Union.
"Our delegation emerged," Mr. Wolff said, "with a definite sense of the sober-
ing effects of the very real strategic and political problems facing China in the
form of the Soviet Union — the 'polar bear' — and what the Chinese call the, Soviet
Union's 'Asian Cuba,' Vietnam."
Soviet influence in Vietnam has grown steadily since the United States was
expelled and Hanoi came to rule the whole country. Chinese relations with Vietnam
have eroded to the point that China ended all aid to its former client. China now
is confronted with a classic danger of strategic encirclement.
But these very issues are forcing the United States to move slowdy. It hopes to
improve relations with Vietnam, diluting Soviet influence, in a way that China
will not only accept but applaud. At the same time it has enough problems with
Moscow already on other issues.
President Carter's reaction to the changing pattern still is not clear. Official
language remains several stages short of obvious actual positions in the strategic
tangle. In fact, official U.S. public positions call simply for even-handed develop-
ment of relations with all the countries involved.
Yet by most private assessments, difficult decisions are ahead for Mr. Carter.
Vietnam appears to be discarding claims for reparations as a precondition for
formal relations. China is knocking the rough edges from its arguments. The
Russians mutter ominously about the intentions of China and all who encourage
"I wonder what we would do," an American diplomat says, "if the Chinese
suddenly made us an offer that was obviously within our terms."
Nothing so precise seems likely. But to Mr. Wolff and others who have talked
politics with Chinese officials recently, their interest in rapid movement is genuine.
"Our delegation emerged," Mr. Wolff said, "with the clear sense that Peking
sees a climate of understanding and co-operation with the U.S. as the best path
to normalization, and that normalization is a key strategic and political move for
China in the world arena, specifically against the Soviet Union."
Repeatedly, he said, Chinese leaders argued that Moscow fears two actions by
China: formal ties with the United States and a treaty of peace and friendship
with Japan. They warned equally against appeasement either by providing
technology to the Soviet Union or by failing to counter Moscow's strategic moves
around the world.
The Chinese call appeasement "feeding the polar bear chocolates." It is a
curiously innocent phrase to apply to some of the most critical decisions before
the most powerful nations in the world.
[From Business Times (Malaysia), July 28, 19781
The Impasse Over Taiwan
(By Harvey Stockwin in Hong Kong)
Taiwan is the joker in the high-stakes card game among the three superpowers .
While relations between the U.S. and Russia worsen, the island hampers closer ties
between America and the Chinese mainland.
As Soviet-American relations deteriorate, and Sino-Soviet hostility increases,
relations between China and the U.S. are slowly improving. But the long-awaited
normalisation of Washington-Peking ties still awaits resolution of the impasse over
Taiwan, with the Nationalist and Communist Chinese still far removed from
creating their own "one China" solution.
"Our friendship with Chiang Kai-Shek," Chairman Mao Tse-tung told former
President Nixon in 1972, "is much longer than the history of j-our friendship with
him." This Mao thought was taken a step further recently as the latest Congres-
sional delegation, led by Mr. Lester Wolff, chairman of the House of Representa-
tives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited the People's Republic.
The delegation detected "a new realism" in Chinese official attitudes, notably
towards Taiwan. In 1972, Mr. Nixon and Chairman Mao joked about Mao and
Chiang calling each other "bandits." The latest American visitors did not even
hear such epithets. "They were harder on the Gang of Four than they were on
the People of Taiwan," one Congressman recalled.
Along with the absence of abuse, Chinese officials several times volunteered the
thought that the Communists were willing to discuss Taiwan's future with the
Nationalists "on the basis of existing realities." According to Mr. Lester Wolff,
"our delegation sensed * * * an emerging Chinese emphasis on seeking ways to
settle the Taiwan question on a bilateral basis between the Chinese themselves
in ways acceptable to the parties involved. * * *"
"The historical fact was raised twice in the past the Chinese Communist Party
and the Kuomintang have come together and cooperated when it was in their
common interest — first during the time of Doctor Sun Yat-Sen and the northern
expedition, and again toward liberation during World War Two."
Since Chinese officials often prefer to talk to foreign delegations on a non-
attributable basis, Mr. Wolff did not say who particularly stressed these points.
The Congressional delegation had however a lengthy interview with Chinese Vice-
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, as well as Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Hai Jun and
Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade Wang Jun Sheng among others.
Mention of the possibility of Peking-Taiwan negotiations is interesting, since it
comes at a time when there is some movement in Sino-American relations, after
a period when normalisation appeared as far off as ever. The critical unresolved
problem is twofold. Internationally, the United States cannot be seeD to be merely
giving in to China's three demands (the abrogation of the United States-Republic
of China mutual security treaty, the removal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and the
breaking of diplomatic relations with Taiwan) without making some provision
for the continued security and well-being of Taiwan.
Domestically, neither President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, nor any other
administration spokesman has yet tried to create a consensus within the United
[States on the issue. Opinion polls continue to show a U.S. majority favouring
normalisation, but this majority evaporates if normalisation carries the price
Peking consistently attaches to it.
President Carter himself straddled but did not resolve the dichotomy during
his campaign, when be pledged thai he "would never let friendship with the
People's Republic of China stand in the way of t he preservation of the independ-
ence and the freedom of the people of Taiwan.''
In 1977 there was no basic change in the Sino-American status quo. Secretary of
State Vance went to Peking in August to try out various formulas for bridging
the gap. Mr. Carter hailed progress, but Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping denounced the visit
as a "set-back."
This year, as American-Soviet relations deteriorated, Washington has tried
other tracks. National securit}^ adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Peking in
May to discuss broad strategy but not to negotiate normalisation. China has
responded by making it clear to the Wolff group that it does not want to be merely
a card played against the Russians. Similarly, President Brezhnev, a month ago
in a speech at Minsk, warned the United States against playing the China card in
relation to Russia.
Nevertheless, there would seem to have been some Sino-American card-playing,
with Mr. Brzezinski making some direct — many diplomats would say clumsy —
anti-Soviet remarks on the Great Wall of China. Mr. Brzezinski's visit has been
followed up by a high level U.S. scientific and technological mission, accompanied
by two top foreign policy officials to Peking — the same kind of delegation that
would have gone to Russia, except that it was cancelled, due to the Soviet trials
Meanwhile, the Carter administration has inched toward normalisation with-
out talking any decisive steps. Two American libraries have been closed in Taiwan,
ostensibly for budgetary reasons.
U.S. military forces have been further reduced on Taiwan from 1,500 at the end
of the Ford administration, to 1,000 todaj-, and they will be down to 400 by the
end of the year.
Reports from Washington indicate that residual military and economic aid to
Taiwan will be absent from the Carter budget for the next financial year. The
Carter administration has approved the sale of Israeli-made Kfir jet fighters to
Taiwan — the planes have U.S. engines. The Kfir carries less payload, and has less
range, but is faster than the Phantom F4 jets which Taipeh has been trying to
purchase for several years.
Significantly, Chinese officials told Mr. Wolff that American jet sales to Taiwan
would complicate a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem and hinder normalisa-
tion — "but they raised no specific objection to third country sales."
So the Taiwan government of President Chaing Ching-kuo can be forgiven for
calculating that the Americans are moving towards Peking, and getting ready to
abandon Taiwan by stealth. Aid cuts, library closures, and military reductions,
while not critical in themselves, are resented as unnecessary concessions, even if
they leave Taiwan no weaker than before.
Taiwan is busy developing a substantial relationship with Saudi Arabia, so it
is not immediately well-disposed to American efforts to please the Israelis. It is
not currently negotiating for the Kfir fighter, though it has shown interest in the
past, and will need something more sophisticated than its current F5s for air
defense in the 1980s. The Taiwan application for Phantoms remains on the table.
Against this background, Chinese hints about the possibility of Peking-Taipeh
negotiations in the future offer more hope to the U.S. than to Taiwan.
The Americans have been making little if any headway in their attempts to
secure from China some pledge about the peaceful solution of the never-ended
Chinese Civil war, such as might make the U.S. Congress more amenable to the
abrogation of the United States-Taiwan security treaty.
Obviously, were China and Taiwan to substitute accord for antipathy, it would
be that much easier for President Carter to grasp the normalisation nettle. But
as Taiwan reacted to Mr. Wolff's comments, and as China reacted to Taiwan, the
normalisation ball was left bouncing elusively around in Mr. Carter's court.
For Taiwan, the cooperative precedents cited to Mr. Wolff by the Chinese
hardly offer encouragement. The northern expedition ended with Mr. Chiang
Kai-shek purging the Communists, and Mr. Chou En-lai fleeing for his life from
Shanghai. The uneasy wartime united front against the Japanese was only secured
by the Communists after Mr. Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped at Sian in
1938 by his own troops.
With those and other memories, it was hardly surprising that a Taiwan Foreign
Ministry spokesman on July 17 maintained that "we have had bitter experiences
in negotiating and co-operating with the Chinese Communists in the past, and
therefore we will never hold talks, or get in touch with them."
On the other hand, Taiwan fears — realistically, in the view of responsible
State Department sources — that the only thing China will negotiate is their
surrender. The time is not ripe for China to be satisfied with a mere token ac-
35-200— 7S 8
knowledgment by Taipei of China's sovereignty over Taiwan, in return for
which Mr. Chiang Ching Kuo would be allowed to continue to preside unfettered
over Taiwan's flourishing economy.
On the other hand, any attempt by the mainlanders ruling Taiwan to reach
a one-China compromise could affect, political stability, since it would secure a
hostile reaction from the 14 million native-born Taiwanese.
For the latter, Mr. Chiang Ching-Kuo's continued rhetoric about "reconquering
the mainland" offers security, since it indicates continued willingness by the
government to sustain a Taiwan identity separate from that of the People's
Thus, for the time being, nationalism (with a small n) on both sides of the
Taiwan Straits is unlikely to be equal to the compromises which meaningful
negotiations would inevitably entail. This was emphasised on July 18 as the New
China News Agency attacked Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo for following his father's
policies and "selling Taiwan out to foreign interests."
The agency's article indicated that, "new realism" not withstanding, China
wall expect to have its normalisation cake and eat it too. Taiwan was attacked
both for trying to retain its close American links and for hints in the Taiwan
Press that it may develop ties with the Soviet Union.
This contrasts with what the Wolff party was told. When they raised the pos-
sibility of Taiwan-Russian links, high Chinese officials expressed confidence that
Taiwan's anti-Communism would inhibit any Taipeh-Moscow detente.
Conceivably, the NCNA writer had not got the same message from above,
but the article indicated the obvious — that China would react forcefully were
Taiwan to ever contemplate playing a Russian card against China. The irony is
that China accuses Taiwan of trying to disrupt Sino- American normalisation,
while also objecting to the situation that a normalisation, on China's terms,
alone, might bring about.
So President Carter faces the old dichotomy plus an additional element. He
must not merely try to elevate Sino- American relations without further exacerbat-
ing United States-Soviet relations and destablising Taiwan. He also has to main-
tain sufficiently strong links with Taiwan to make sure that Taipeh does not feel
desperate, and that China's paranoia in regard to the "polar bear" is not en-
hanced as a consequence.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 197S]
"New Realism" on Taiwan: Peking Edges Toward U.S.
(By Frederic A. Moritz, staff correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor,
China appears to have altered its position on the main obstacle to "normaliza-
tion" of relations with the United States, the problem of Taiwan.
Although displaying what is termed "a new realism," China's leaders still have
not ruled out the use of force to gain control of the island Republic of China.
But out of concern over possible encirclement by the Soviet Union and its ally,
Vietnam, they have endorsed an approach they once ruled out— -settlement of the
Taiwan problem through talks with the Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese)
government of President Chiang Ching-kuo.
This is the message brought back after a 10-day trip to China by U.S. Repre-
sentative Lester L. Wolff (I)) of New York, chairman of the House of Representa-
tives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
A conciliatory framework
In a July 15 Hong Kong press conference, he explained that Vice-Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping and other high Chinese officials had outlined the new approach to him
and other visiting I'.S. congressmen in Peking.
Mr. Wolff said the discussion of Taiwan contrasted sharply with one he had
had with Chinese leaders two years earlier.
"There was none of the rhetoric we had heard before of the 'murderers on
Taiwan.' Taiwan was mentioned in a much more conciliatory framework," he
Mr. Wolff's reporl comes at .-i time when China is stressing the need for increased
cooperation with the United States, both to oppose the Soviet Union and for
technical assistance in modernizing China.
The Chinese press, for example, has been widely publicizing aid in agricultural
mechanization given by four American engineers and technicians in an area near
the border with the Soviet Union. Teng Esiao-ping recently told a visiting Ameri-
can science and technology delegation dispatched by President Carter thai China
will learn advanced science and technology from all countries, Including I In-
The apparently moderated Chinese position does uot directly break the im-
passe between China and the United States over Taiwan. China demands that
the U.S. withdraw all military forces from the island, sever the mutual security
treaty, and break off diplomatic relations with the government of President
For its part the U.S. says it can make such concessions only if China recognizes
Washington's commitment to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. But P<
insists it retains the option of using force to settle what it regards as an internal
Still, if Mr. Wolff's account of what he was told is accurate, China appears to
have shifted its emphasis in a way that could lead to at least limited cooperation
and perhaps a form of peaceful coexistence with Taiwan's leaders.
BUT WOULD TAIWAN AGREE?
If such a relationship were gradually to develop, China would be accepting a
peaceful course toward settlement of the Taiwan question, thus meeting one of
the American requirements for normalization of relations.
But one big question is whether Taiwan's President Chiang is at all open to this
approach. To deal with the Chinese Communists would in effect require a total
transformation of the Nationalist claim to be the government of all of China, in-
cluding the mainland.
The Taiwan Government is set up with representatives from all of China's
provinces, and Taiwan itself officially is ruled as just one province headed by a
governor. So far this arrangement has been justified by the Nationalists' declared
aim of "recovering" the mainland.
Also it is unclear how much of a change in Taiwan's system of government
would be required by Chinese Communist leaders in order for them to deal with
The new Chinese approach, as outlined by Representative Wolff, was first
disclosed in late May by Chen I-sung, standing committee member of China's
National People's Congress.
In an interview with Japan's Kyodo news agency, Mr. Chen said that if the
United States accepts China's three conditions for normalization, there would be
no liberation of Taiwan by force, so long as Taiwan's President Chiang were
willing to hold peace talks with China. "China will never kill a peace-seeking
Chiang," he was quoted as saying.
Although Mr. Chen is not a member of the Communist Party, a Chinese
representative has confirmed that his comments were a trial balloon designed to
hasten normali z at i on.
Mr. Wolff said high-ranking Chinese officials cited as precedent for cooperation
with Taiwan two previous occasions on which the Communists and the Kuo-
mintang had cooperated. One was in the 1920s during the campaign to unify
China and end warlord rule. The other was during World War II, when Japan
was a common enemy.
[From the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2S, 197S]
China on the World Stage
(By David Bonavia)
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND OMAN IS A LOGICAL MOVE IN PEKING'S
Ideology has been the first casualty of China's drive towards a more dynamic
and effective foreign policy. A decade ago, ideology dominated Chinese foreign
policy to such an extent that the policy barely seemed to exist any more in its own
right. Now the opposite is true: the ideology, such as it is, is dictated by the real
A foreign policy is based principally on relations with other governments —
something China found to its cost in the late 1960s, when it disregarded the effects
of its policies on governments, in the interests of appealing to what it believed to be
mass movements sympathetic to itself. The result was almost complete isolation
and encirclement by powerful enemies. China is not about to make the same
mistake again. Its foreign policy since 1971 has been aimed at rallying as broad as
possible an international front to oppose Soviet expansionism, just as in the late
1950's it sought to broaden the anti-American front through recruitment of the
Chinese disillusionment with the nonaligned movement today is reflected
explicitly in commentaries about the machinations of Cuba — which claims to be
non-aligned — and implicitly in its numerous statements about the need for the
Third World to unite against Soviet "hegemonism." The fact that some Third
World countries, such as Angola and South Yemen, have clearly aligned themselves
with Moscow, makes rather a nonsense of the non-aligned movement from China's
point of view. At best it can be seen as a way by which countries like Burma express
their desire to be left alone.
Disappointed by the strategic possibilities of an alliance of the developing
countries, China has turned increasingly towards the West for an understanding
about mutual security. The two things are linked, as was made clear this month
to an American congressional delegation headed by Asian and Pacific Affairs
Subcommittee chairman Lester L. Wolff, which visited Peking and had talks with
yice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping and other senior officials.
As Wolff put it, his delegation got "a definite sense of the sobering effects of the
very real strategic and political problems facing China in the form of the Soviet
Union — the 'Polar Bear' — and what the Chinese call the Soviet Union's 'Asian
Cuba/ Vietnam." This was not in itself new, but the Americans got the clear
impression that in the face of these strategic threats, the Chinese were more willing
than before to consider patching up their quarrel with Taiwan, presumably in the
interests of a closer understanding with the United States and the desire to present
a more united front to a world where the Soviet Union and its allies are daily
Specifically, the visitors were told that the Chinese Communist Party had
cooperated with the Kuomintang in the past, and could do so again, "on the basis
of existing realities." It was no coincidence that, shortly before the Wolff dele-
gation's visit, China opened diplomatic relations with the oil-rich Gulf state of
Oman. Observers familiar with the politics of the Gulf say Oman would never have
made such a move without counting on the eventual approval of Saudi Arabia,
which itself maintains diplomatic links with Taiwan. Although the Saudis were
thought unlikely to compromise their own fierce anti-communism by switching
recognition to Peking, it is believed they will look reasonably benignly on relations
between China and other countries of the area, such as the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Bahrein.
The paradoxical situation is indicative of China's strategic posture worldwide.
Lacking the money and resources to exercise concrete influence on places as
distant as the Gulf, China can count only on modest trading relations (its con-
sumer goods being particularly well suited to the Middle Eastern market) and
on the desire of rich but small states in the area to see some counter-balance to
the creeping advance of Soviet influence. Thus anti-communism becomes China's
The Soviet Union has not done well in the Middle East lately. Its relatively
strong position in "democratic" South Yemen can only make it seem more
sinister to states BUch as Oman and North Yemen, with which South Yemen
has long-standing quarrels. Relations with both Syria and Iraq are cool, Egypt
has administered a resounding slap in the face, and Iran is busily building up
its armaments to resist Soviet domination of the area and prepare for the day
when its oil reserves start giving out.
This is :m ideal situation for China to move quietly but steadily into the Gulf,
where its low posture and avoidance of proselytising will enable it to avoid unduly
offending the powerful religious elements which dominate the politics of th* 1 area.
Later on, if left-wing ideas spread through the Gulf from Iraq or South Yemen,
( 'hiu a will he in a posit ion to ensure t li.it they are not the exclusive preserve of the
Soviet Union and its agents. And if revolutions eventually overtake the princely
families which are now so well entrenched, China will he there, with it- well-
established revolutionary credentials, to welcome the new states into the "anti-
hegemonist" movement. The dislike earned by the Soviets through their relative
inability to bridge cultural gaps in dealing with people of other races will
To occupy some sort of position in the Gulf is important, for it is West Asia's
gateway to the Indian Ocean, as well as being the key t>> the price <>f < nergy and
hence the economic stability of the Western world, China's new ally. However,
Peking can have no illusions about the extent of its influence cither in lie- .Middle
East or in Africa for the foreseeable future. These two regions — the most crucial
single arena of world confrontation today — together account for Western Europe's
most important sources of imported minerals, and lines of global communication.
China and the United States alike regard the security of Western Euro]
essential to their own. But much as China would like to help safeguard Africa and
the Middle East against further Soviet penetration, there is in practice little it
It is unfortunate for China that geography alone isolates it from the part of
the world where the biggest issues of the day are being decided. In addition, the
Chinese have had little historic contact with the peoples of the area, and are
fairly ignorant of their creeds and customs. Chinese diplomats are still insufficiently
trained even in English and French, let alone Arabic or Portuguese.
China's best ally is the Soviet Union's own over-involvement, which time and
again results in humiliating defeats, such as that suffered by Moscow in Egypt.
But the Soviet discovery of Cuba as anally in its expansionist process has brought
a new and menacing element into the equation. It enables the Soviets to keep
themselves relatively pure of the taint of military intervention overseas ; it saves
them arousing domestic discontent by wasting their young men in debilitating
wars in hot climates; and it makes Cuba work for the aid which still has to be
poured in to keep its economy going.
China regards this as a qualitatively new form of imperialism, Just as Lenin
saw capitalism as breeding imperialism and colonialism, the Chinese see "social
imperialism" as breeding Cubas and Vietnams and Angolas. The principle is
simple: find a small or new country with a revolutionary movement, aid its
revolution, egg it on into conflict with its neighbours, then ensnare it in debts
and political ties. Whereas Soviet expansionism of the old, creeping variety has
come up against Western resolve in such places as the Middle East, this new,
more random style (called "dominationism" by the Chinese) has scored some
One of these has been in Vietnam, and China, seeing its enemy's guns brought
almost literally into its own backyard, has been forced to devise a counter strategy.
In this case it is the alliance with Cambodia, which not only divdies Vietnam's
resources between two fronts, but also tars the Vietnamese with the brush of bully-
ing, which might otherwise have splashed China. This is not a new move in Chinese
foreign strategy: faced with Indian hostility in the 1960s, Peking compensated by
cementing its friendship with Pakistan. When Mongolia joined the Soviet Union in
the Sino-Soviet dispute, China found allies waiting in the Balkans.
On the broadest possible plane, China seeks to break out of Soviet encirclement
by reaching towards the United States, Japan and Western Europe. Not sur-
prisingly, this means that foreign policy must be de-ideologised, or rationalised
with a new ideology so obvious tailored to fit the needs of the situation that it
barely qualifies as Marxist and more. Although welcome in the Western world, the
increasingly non-ideological character of Chinese foreign policy might, one would
have thought, bring difficulties in Peking's relations with some of the more ideo-
logically-inclined countries of the Third World. So, far however, Albania is the
only country apart from Cuba which has taken ideology as the pretext for a break
In the Third World as a whole, China has been unexpectedly successful in
persuading smaller powers that it does not seek to impose its own ideology on
them. The Chinese have gained much credit in their aid programme for simply
doing the job quietly, then packing up and leaving unless specifically asked to
stay on. This reputation will serve them well in places like the Gulf, where reli-
gion — or in other places, nationalism or tribalism — take the place of ideology and
would resist being displaced.
None of this solves the basic weakness of Chinese foreign policy caused by
its defensive nature. Most modern states are either acqusitive of territory and
resources, or are grimly hanging on to what is left from past empires and spheres
of influence. Even the poorest country of the Third World can usually afford a
protracted feud with its neighbour. To aim primarily at security and 'mounting
prosperity within one's borders, without exercising domination over any other
state, seems almost quaintly idealistic, and inviting predatory attacks. Yet with
certain aberrations, such as its attempts to dominate Vietnam and its absorption
of Tibet, Chinese foreign policy in the past has generally been based on this
quietist approach. That is has been so is not a tribute to any mystically peaceable
element in the Chinese character, but to the abundance of resources within the
Chinese empire, which made foreign conquests unnecessary except for the securing
of the wilder frontiers.
Now,, however, half the world is a wild frontier from China's point of view, and
the nation's security can no longer be planned in terms of a genteel debate at the
imperial court, followed by an indecisive expedition against the barbarians. The
problem is that China has not yet evolved any truly effective alternative.
[From the Los Angeles Times, July 16, 197S]
China Reported Willing To Talk with Taiwan
(By Linda Mathews, Times staff writer)
Hong Kong. — China's leaders are willing to negotiate directly with the Na-
tionalist Chinese about the future of Taiwan and the question of reunification, an
American congressional delegation reported here Saturday.
Representative Lester L. Wolff (D-N.Y.), leader of the delegation, which just
concluded a 10-day tour of the mainland, said Communist Party Vice Chairman
Teng Hsiao-ping and other Chinese policy makers repeatedly raised the possibility
that the long-standing differences between the two regimes could be settled at the
Wolff said Chinese officials reminded the visiting congressmen that the Com-
munist Party had cooperated with the Nationalists twice before, first in a campaign
against the warlords of the 1920's and then against the Japanese invaders in the
1930s and 1940s.
"They said they saw no reason those precedents could not be repeated." Wolff
The statements attributed to Teng and other high Chinese officials appear to
be the most conciliatory Peking has made toward Taiwan President Chiang Ching-
kuo's government in recent years. Direct negotiations between the two sides
remain unlikely, however, given Chiang's adamant refusal to sit down with the
Chiang, the son of the late Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, dramatically an-
nounced last year that the Nationalist Chinese would have no contact with Peking
except "in the shape of a bullet." Other Taiwan officials, less ideological than
their president, have expressed fear that the merest suggestion of rapprochement
with the mainland would disturb investor confidence in their booming economy.
Chiang's tough stance is well known in this region, so the mainland leadership's
newly expressed interest in negotiations primarily may represent a bid to portraj'
him in a bad light and swing American public opinion to Peking's favor.
Even though they supposedly seek a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem,
the Chinese made it clear that they did not "rule out by any means the use of
force in liberating Taiwan, if that should become necessary," Wolff said at a
The Peking officials also gave no sign of retreat from their often-stated position
that, before full diplomatic relations can be forged with Washington, the United
must sevt'v its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, cancel its mutual defense
treaty with the Chiang government and withdraw the 1,000 American troops
stationed on the island.
The Carter administration has refused to take such steps without at least a
tacit promise from Peking that it will not recapture Taiwan byforce should the
United States withdraw. China has balked at the White House demand, though
the statements to the visiting congressmen may have been calculated to persuade
Congress and the American public that China has no immediate belligerent designs
"China's present leaders seem to be much more clued into the realities of Ameri-
can politics and the widespread American concern about the future of Taiwan,"
a diplomat lare observed after the press conference.
Only a year ago, two American journalists who asked China's Foreign Ministry
about reconciliation with Taiwan were lectured aboul th»- "unforgiveable crimes
committed by the Nationalists before they fled the mainland in 1949. Senior
Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan, a Peking hardliner, -aid then that Chiang owed
the people of China "blood debts" because of the many massacres <>f Communists
carried out by his father. Chiang Kai-shek.
Wolff, who heard similar anti-Taiwan diatribes on a visil to China two years
ago, said such rhetoric was conspicuously absent this time. He attributed the
change to a "new realism in China, on the part of her people and leadership,
concerning both dome-tie and foreign policy questions."
The nine-man congressional delegation found in Peking "an emerging emphasis
on seeking ways to settle the Taiwan question on a bilateral-basis, let ween the
Chinese (governments) themselves, in ways acceptable to both parties," said
Wolff, who is chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the
House International Relations Committee.
The legislators said the desire for negotiations with Taiwan seemed to be wide-
spread in Peking's top ranks. Conciliatory statements were "volunteered by many
people we spoke to * * * at several points in our discussions," Wolff said.
[From the South China Morning Post, July 16, 197S]
Peking Set for Taiwan Talks
(By Dennis Phillips)
Peking leaders are willing to discuss differences with Kuomintang officials
concerning Taiwan, the senior Vice-Premier, Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping, told a group
of American Congressmen during their visit to China last week.
Top-ranking Chinese officials pointed to historical precedents for Chinese
Communist Party-Kuomintang co-operation; first during the time of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen and the Northern Expedition and again against the Japanese during
World War II.
"They see no reason why history cannot be repeated," the Chairman of the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mr. Lester
Wolff, said yesterday at a press conference.
The apparent new sign of flexibility within the Chinese leadership was seen as a
reaction to growing Soviet influence in Vietnam and what is perceived as the
growing Soviet threat to their security.
Vietnam was referred to as the Soviet Union's "Asian Cuba," Mr. Wolff said.
"When coupled with repeated instances of our delegation being told that the
Chinese recognise what were termed the realities of the U.S. involvement with
Taiwan, our delegation emerged from the People's Republic with a definite sense
of the sobering effects of the very real strategic and political problems facing
China in the form of the Soviet Union * * * and Vietnam," Mr. Wolff said in a
China's willingness to cooperate with Taiwan was mentioned several times dur-
ing a discussion with Mr. Teng and the President of the People's Institute for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hao Te-ching.
"In this regard, the delegation sensed a growing Chinese willingness to discuss
Taiwan's future on the basis of existing realities," Mr. Wolff said.
The Congressmen would not comment on possible U.S. Government action to
encourage such a dialogue between Peking and Taipei, saying it is an internal
matter for the Chinese to work out.
Mr. Wolff said the discussion of Taiwan was in sharp contrast to a previous
meeting he had with Chinese leaders two years ago.
"There was none of the rhetoric we'd heard before of the 'murderers on Taiwan'
and what have you.
"Taiwan was mentioned in a much more conciliatory framework," he said.
The Chinese seemed "harder on the gang of four than on the leaders of
Taiwan," Mr. Wolff said.
The Chinese made it clear the mainland-Taiwan issue is something for them to
settle, without any outside interference.
"There was a strong admonition that this does not rule out the ultimate use of
force, if necessary, to reunite the mainland and Taiwan," Mr. Wolff said.
The willingness to discuss the Taiwan issue with the Congressmen during
their lO-da}^ trip was described as "a sense of 'new realism' in China" by Mr.
The "realism" seems based on a recognition of U.S. interests in Taiwan, as well
as a willingness to co-operate with the U.S. as a potential ally against a growing
Soviet influence in Asia, he said.
"They indicated Vietnam was strongly controlled by the Soviets and the Soviets
are using Vietnam's defence facilities," Mr. Wolff said.
He said the Chinese feeling towards Vietnam was "not one of fear, but one of
Mr. Wolff said China referred to the "Soviet encirclement plan," and pointed
out China had been encircled many times in the past, but had always broken
Mr. Wolff said the Chinese indicated that if the U.S. continues to sell fighter
planes to Taiwan "it would interfere with a negotiated settlement of the Taiwan
issue and retard normalisation."
On other matters, Mr. Wolff, who also serves as Chairman of the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, said there is no validity to accusa-
tions that China is behind Asia's drug trade.
[From United Press International, July 16, 197S]
Wolff: Peking Attuned to Taiwan Negotiations
"sense of new realism"
Hong Kong. — The leader of an American Congressional mission to Communist
China said Saturday members of the group "sensed a new realism" by Chinese
leaders toward the thorny Taiwan issue.
"In this regard, the delegation sensed a growing Chinese willingness to discuss
Taiwan's future with the Kuomintang on the basis of existing realities," said
Representative Lester L. W^olff, a New York Democrat, at a news conference.
Wolff, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and
eight other congressmen spent 10 days in China talking with Peking officials.
Among those was Teng Hsiao-ping, vice premier and vice chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party. This was Wolff's second visit to China.
He said that the "new realism" applied to both domestic and foreign policy
but it was on the question or Taiwan that it was "potentially important" for the
The reason for the changing Chinese attitude, Wolff said, is Peking's perception
of a Soviet threat to China.
Wolff said the possibility of negotiations between Communist leaders in Peking
and leaders of the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, in Taiwan was raised "sev-
eral times" during the group's conversation with a "very high Chinese official."
That official could only have been Teng Hsiao-ping, although Wolff declined
to say so publicly.
"In our discussion on this issue, the historical fact was raised that twice in the
past the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang have come together and
cooperated when it was in their common interest," Wolff said.
"When coupled with repeated instances of our delegation being told that the
Chinese recognize what were termed the realities of the U.S. involvement with
Taiwan, our delegation emerged from the People's Republic with a definite sense
of the sobering effects of the very real strategic and political problem facing China
in the form of the Soviet Union — the polar bear — and what the Chinese call the
Soviet Union's Asian Cuba, Vietnam.
The "high official" did not specify just how negotiations with Taiwan might
take place, asserting that there has not been any official communication with
Officials there, nor is there; any now.
J Jut, Wolff quoted the Chinese official as saying, there has been cooperation
between the Communist and Nationalist parties twice and "you cannot rule out
a t bird time.''
Wolff and other members of the mission emphasized that China has not altered
the main conditions for resolving the Taiwan issue so far as tin 1 United States is
Concerned. Those conditions are Withdrawal of American military forces from
Taiwan, a break in relations, and abrogation of the U.S. -Taiwan defense treaty.
Wolff, comparing this visit with his first trip two years ago, said tho "new
realism" was apparent everywhere the group went in the relaxed atmosphere,
reduced ideological rhetoric and flourishing of new ideas that relate less to the
policies of the late Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
Other members of the delegation included J. Herbert Burke (R.-Fla.), Eligiode
la Garza (D.-Texas), Billy Lee Evans (D.-Ga.), L. H. FountaiE (D.-N.C),
C. Tennyson Guyer (R.-Oreg.), Charles B. Rangel (D.-N.Y.), James R. Mann
(D.-S.C), and Larry Winn, Jr. (R.-Kans.).
The group returned from China, last Thursday and was to leave for the United
States Saturday afternoon. Before the news conference, the delegation had a
breakfast meeting with members of the American Chamber of Commerce in
[From the Hong Kong Standard, July 16, 19781
A Peking, KMT Deal?
(By Chris Yip)
A "new realism," although force is not ruled out
China is willing to settle the Taiwan issue with the Kuomintang regime on a
bilateral basis between themselves, according to the leader of an American dele-
gation of Congress representatives, Lester Wolff.
The United States, he said, would not be involved.
High-ranking Chinese officials have cited two historic occasions when the
Communist Party and the Kuomintang cooperated when it served their mutual
purpose. The first was during the era of Dr. Sen Yat-sen and the Northern
Expedition, and the second towards liberation during World War Two.
The Chinese are not ruling out a repeat of history for a third time, Mr. Wolff,
chairman of the American Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, claimed
Mr. Wolff led the congress delegation during a 10 day tour of China.
He said the question of China-Taiwan rapprochement was brought up by the
Chinese in response to a question by another member of the delegation.
"It was raised several times in a single conversation, once in response to ques-
tions by Mr. de la Garza (of the International Affairs Subcommittee) and the
others raised voluntarily and independently," Mr. Wolff added.
He declined to divulge the names of the Chinese officials making the remarks
apart from saying that they were ' 'high-ranking."
The Chinese did not, however, rule out the alternative use of force, if necessary
to reunite the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.
Describing himself as a "student of China" Mr. Wolff said: "Certainly no
visit of 10 days qualifies any group as expert on the policies or events of another
But members of the mission were agreed on what it considered to be certain
trends in the country which would bear close study in the weeks and months to
come, Mr. Wolff said.
There had emerged a "new realism" in China, on the part of its people and
leadership, concerning both domestic and foreign questions facing China at the
present time, he added.
"One area where we sensed a potentially important example of the new
realism would appear to be on the question of Taiwan." Mr. Wolff told an as-
sembled press conference.
"When coupled with repeated instances of our delegation being told that the
Chinese recognise what were termed the realities of the U.S. involvement with
Taiwan, our delegation emerged from China with a definite sense of the sobering
effects of the very real strategic and political problems facing China in the form
of the Soviet Union — the 'Polar Bear' — and what the Chinese call the Soviet
Union's 'Asian Cuba', Vietnam," Mr. Wolff said.
This perception of China's "new reality" was reinforced by the delegation's
visits to educational facilities, cultural institutions and factories alike.
The new realism is leading the Chinese to be receptive to American technology
and expertise to help them overcome the lost decade of the cultural resolution
and the so-called "Gang of Four", he said.
The country is no longer adverse to making use of the best from other nations,
while the Chinese remain determined to pursue self-reliance.
The Chinese conflict with the Soviet? was not seen as just part of an ideologica
battle between two Communist nations, but was perceived as an effort by the
U.S.S.R. to dominate the entire world, Mr. Wolff said.
The rhetoric which so pervaded during Mr. Wolff's last visit to China two years
ago was little heard of, he added.
The delegation had met with many Chinese officials, including Senior Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
[From the Times of London, Sept. 29, 1978]
"US: Peking Prepared to Make Taiwan Concessions, Washington
(By David Bonavia)
A series of hints and signals from Peking suggests that the Chinese leadership
is prepared to make certain concession?: to the United States over the issue of
Taiwan. The intention evidently is to follow the recent peace treaty between
China and Japan with a new diplomatic coup to block Soviet global expansion.
The first big hint came three months ago when a United States congressional
group led by Mr. Lester D. Wolff was told by Air. Teng Hsiao-ping, the vice-
chairman, that the Chinese Communist Party had in the past twice succeeded
in collaborating with the Kuomintang (nationalists) and could possibly do so
again. This remark was later repeated by Mr. Li Hsien-nien, co-vice-chairman,
to a Japanese visitor.
There have been other signals since then. During the recent opening of diplo-
matic relations between China and Libya, Peking for the first time did not insist
on a specific statement that it is the only capital of all China. This should not be
taken to mean any abandonment of Peking's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan — -
only a willingness not to labour the issue.
In further concessions, Thai International is expected to be allowed to continue
flying to Taipai even after starting its new service to Peking. This is an advance
over the arrangement with the Japanese, who had to rename an airline and go on
using the old airport of Haneda for their Taiwan flights, even after the opening
of the new airport at Narita.
In Britain's case, the links between the Hongkong-based airline Cathay Pacific
and Taiwan have so far stood in the way of an agreement to let British Airways
fly to Peking.
Apart from continued aviation access to Taiwan, what could Peking offer the
United States in return for rapid moves towards the establishment of a fully-
fledged American embassy in Peking? China is still adamant on its three demands
that Washington must break diplomatic links with Taipei, cancel its defence
agreement and withdraw its forces.
What has worried the Americans most is that if they did this, and Peking
then decided to invade and "liberate" Taiwan, America's prestige and credibility
around the world would suffer yet another blow. Taiwan has many friends in
America, who view agreements with the Chinese Communists as a national
To forestall the possibility of an invasion — which the Chinese say they still
retain as an option at their own discretion — it has been proposed that recognition
of Peking should be accompanied by a, unilateral statement on the part of the
United States president that America retains an interest in the keeping of the
peace in the Taiwan Strait, or some Mich formula.
Now it looks as though the Chinese might be prepared to let the United States
go on trading actively with Taiwan and maintaining cultural and other links
(diplomats for the United States liaison office in Peking are still mostly language-
trained in Taiwan).
There might also be a tacit Chinese agreement to stop talking about the "lib-
eration" of Taiwan by force, and perhaps a secret assurance thai this was not
Peking's intention. Such an operation 18 almost impossible militarily anyway,
considering China's security problems with Vietnam and the Soviet Union, ami
the strong air force whirh i lie Americans propose to leave* behind in Taiwan.
Recent unofficial reports from \\ ashington have suggested t hat President ( Sarter
may be aiming at normalization early next year, and that an agreement to this
effect was reached during last May's Peking "trip by Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
national security adviser.
If this scenario works out, the United States would probably b
desist from making any unilal sral statement about peace and □ the area,
which the Chinese see as an interference in their internal affairs.
The Taiwan regime is becoming increasingly nervous, as it- last diplomatic
partners fall away. Saudi Arabia, onei n recent years, is th
likely to follow Libya in establishing relations with Peking, while maintaining
fairly strong economic links with Taiwan.
Although the attitude; of Taiwan officialdom is as rigid as ever, there ai
doubtedly people there who beli rve it would be advantageous to follow up the Pe-
king leaders' offer of fresh talks. While China is so anxious to solve the problem
soon, it is possible Taipei would get better terms for itself, as souk- kind of auton-
omous part of China, than in the future when attitudes may harden again.
Why should Peking be so apparently keen to solve the Taiwan problem now
when it has not budged an inch over it since the signing of the famous Shanghai
communique with Mr. Richard Nixon in 1972?
Trade, technology and military needs seem to be the answer. The Peking leader-
ship is embarked on a programme of economic and technological growth SO ambi-
tious that it will be held back seriously if the United States, th'- powerhouse of
world capital and technology, continues to be excluded.
Chinese educational authorities have already suggested the sending of hum
of students to America to learn, as their forefathers did, the mo-t advanced science
and technology. Sending students to Europe and Japan is a partial substitute, but
it is America that Peking really has its eye on.
Fresh purchases of American grain, for the first time in two or three years, may
signal Chinese willingness to trade on a large scale with the citadel of capitalism,
and it is even likely that American oil companies will soon be invited to help to
explore for petroleum resources off the Chinese coast.
Most important of all, China cannot buy all the advanced weapons systems it
wants from the West if the United States opposes such sales.
[From the Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 26, 1978]
Two Chinas Muffle Hostility?
(By Daniel Southerland)
China watchers are looking forward to an event that amounts to another
potentially positive sign for United States-China relations.
Ten Chinese from Communist China and one from Taiwan are expected to
attend the same scientific conference in San Francisco starting Oct. 29. In the past,
one side or the other has refused to participate in any conference attended by its
adversary. A major change occurred two months ago when delegates from the
two Chinas showed up at a scientific conference in Tokyo.
The San Francisco conference, which is the annual meeting of the Society of
Exploration Geophycisists, will mark the first occasion on which both sides have
attended a conference in the United States. Peking's delegation will be led by
Chin Tsu-jung. vice-director of the Geophysicl Research Institute of the China
National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation. Taiwan will be
represented by Chen Wu-shong.
SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY?
American experts on China are constantly looking for sio-ns of whether Peking
is willing to be more accommodating on the question of Taiwan. It is this key
question which has delayed the establishment of full diplomatic ties between the
United States and China.
U.S. officials view Peking's willingness to attend conferences at which Taiwan
delegates are present as another sign of China's growing pragmatism and as a part
of its current "united front" campaign to woo Taiwan.
But U.S. China watchers are cautious about all this. They do not see any sign
that Peking has modified any of the principles it holds to on the Taiwan issue.
The change has been more a matter of tactics. U.S. officials also point out that
Peking has yet to talk publicly about a "peaceful resolution" or "peaceful re-
unification" with Taiwan, something which it had done in 1973 during a previous
united front campaign.
A WORD OF CAUTION
American officials thus caution against high expectations for full normalization
of relations with Peking any time soon. They believe expectations were raised
much too high after the initial opening to China and there was a distinct "letdown"
on both sides in 1974.
There has been much speculation on the subject of normalization recentty, with
some observers predicting that President Carter will make a forceful move in that
direction after next month's congressional elections. The President makes it clear
that he considers normalization of U.S.-China relations one of his top international
goals, and Mr. Carter's recent success at Camp David would appear to place him
in a better political position to move on the China issue.
But the U.S. is still seeking a formula on the Taiwan question which would be
acceptable to Peking but which would also guarantee the security of Taiwan.
Peking has yet to renounce the possible use of military force to "liberate" Taiwan,
to which the U.S. has defense treaty commitments.
THE NEW OFFENSIVE
In the meantime, U.S. officials are intrigued by what they call Peking's "smiling
offensive" toward the West and toward Taiwan.
Peking is wooing the West through ever increasing numbers of visitors to China.
A record number of four U.S. congressional delegations, including a total of 35 to
40 senators and congressmen, are expected to visit China during the current
congressional recess. Travelers to China report that the flow of visitors is such that
hotel accommodations are severely taxed.
A recent congressional delegation led by Rep. Lester Wolff (D) of New York is
preparing a report which will quote high-level Chinese officials as saying that
there had been two previous occasions when they had cooperated with the Chinese
Nationalists in united front-type arrangements and that they "would not rule
out" a third occasion when they might cooperate with the Nationalists on Taiwan.
Some observers interpret this as a sign of Peking's "flexibility" on the Taiwan
issue, but the Chinese Nationalists have not shown any signs, in public at least,
of responding to such gestures from Peking.
PRC "Defense White Paper" 1
Peking, July 30. — We are greeting the glorious festive day of the PLA's founding
anniversary in the excellent situation of winning significant victories in grasping
the key link and running the country well.
Combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice
of the Chinese revolution, the great leader and teacher Chairman' Mao blazed a
new path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power
by armed force.
At the critical moment of our defeat in the first revolutionary civil war, Chairman
Mao and his close comrades-in-arms, Premier Chou En-lai and NPC Standing
Committee Chairman Chu and other proletarian revolutionaries of the elder
generation, founded this heroic army of the proletariat and, at another critical
moment in the Chinese revolution as a result of Wang Wing's erroneous line, led
us in the w T orld-shaking Long March. The victory of the Long March laid the
foundation for defeating the Japanese aggressors, burying the Chiang family
dynasty and founding the new China. Now T the party Central Committee headed
by wise leader Chairman Hua, after scoring the historical victory of smashing the
"gang of four," has formulated the general task for the new period and is leading
us on a new Long March. This is another monumental world-shaking heroic
undertaking. "The Red Army fears not the trials of the Long March, holding light
ten thousand crags and torrents."
To celebrate the PLA's founding anniversary, we should make greater efforts
to carry forward the glorious tradition of the then worker-peasant Red army's
Long March and advance valiantly to realize China's Socialist modernization in
agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology.
It should be noted that our new Long March is being carried out in an inter-
national atmosphere of great disquietude. Building our country into a modernized
Socialist power pleases the people but frightens our enemy. That vicious enemy
who has not given up its ambition to subjugate China will certainly resort to all
possible means to undermine it, and it is possible that it might resort to war. In
an incisive analysis of the international situation, Chairman Hua has clearly
pointed out: "The factors for war. The danger of a world war is growing menace
to the people of the world" and called on us to "maintain a high level of vigilance
and be prepared against a war of aggression launched by the superpower.-." We
must hold aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao and, under the wise leadership
of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua, implement the line
of the 11th CCP National Congress, the general task of the new period and the
policy and tasks of grasping the key link and running the army well and being
ready to fight formulated by the Military Commission meeting. We must race
against the enemy for time and speed, strive to do a good job in preparedness
against war and always be ready to smash social imperialism and imperialism
in any aggressive war they might unleash.
A question that worries the people of all countries is whether a third world
war will break out. There was an interval of only 21 years between World War I
and World War II. Since the end of World War II, there has been no world war
in the ensuing 33 years. Although there have been incessant small wars and local
wars of a comparatively large scale. How long will this situation last? Can a
new world war be averted after all? World opinion varies on this question. The
Soviet revisionists allege that "detente has become a secure and irresistible
course" and that "conditions exist for negating the inevitability of war," while
U.S. imperialism claims that a Soviet-U.S. agreement on limiting strategic arms
3 Article by Hsu Hsiang-chien : "Heighten Vigilance, Be Ready to Fight," published in
Red Flag No. 81.
will avert a world war. All this is humbug. Western appeasers believe that com-
promising with, making concessions to and appeasing the Soviet Union will
enable them to attain peace through begging. Others believe that both the Soviet
Union and the United States have nuclear weapons, that each is afraid of the
other and that so long as the nuclear balance is not tipped, war might be averted.
The Marxist viewpoint is fundamentally different. We hold that in a class
society, war is a phenomena between two periods of peace. War is the continua-
tion of politics and also the continuation of peace. A new world war can only be
delayed, but it is inevitable. The people of our country and the whole world
cherish peace and oppose war. The longer the peaceful international environment
is preserved, the better it is for the people of all countries. However, as Lenin
once described it, the present remains an era of imperialism and proletarian
revolution. Imperialism and social-imperialism exist in this world, and so long
as those social systems remain unchanged war is inevitable. The two superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the United States, are both seeking world hegemony. Soviet
social-imperialism in particular is desperately contending for world hegemony
and has become the root cause of the further sharpening of all kinds of basic
contradictions in the contemporary world as well as the root cause of the world's
unrest. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are locked
in a fierce struggle for hegemony, and as a result, World War III will break out
one day. We have noted this point on a number of occasions. Is it because we
like war? No, we are resolutely opposed to war. Opposition to a new world war is
embodied in our nation's constitution. However, the danger of war stands out
as an objective reality. By looking at it squarely and emphasizing it, we want to
enable people to maintain a high state of vigilance against a new world war and
strive to put off the outbreak of war. Once war breaks out, we should form the
broadest global united front possible to deal a fatal blow to the one who unleashed
The international situation has undergone tremendous changes in the 33 years
since the war ended. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and
people want revolution. This has become an irresistible historical trend. U.S.
imperialism has slipped rapidly from its hegemonic position in the capitalist
world, while the Soviet Union has changed from a socialist country to a social-
imperialist country. The imperialist camp is split and disintegrated, the socialist
camp no longer exists. The contention by the two superpowers, the Soviet Union
and the United States, for world hegemony and the struggle by the world's
people against them have become the center of activities in current world politics.
Having scientifically analyzed the new changes in the international class struggle,
Chairman Mao put forth the great three worlds theory in which he denned the
principal revolutionary force, the middle force that can be won over and rallied,
and the principal enemy, thereby further exposing the nature of Soviet social-
imperialism, pointing out the danger of a new world war and charting a course
e people of the whole world in their struggle against the hegemonic powers,
particularly Soviet social-imperialism.
The Soviet social system has changed and so has its policies. This is reflected
in its foreign relations, in which it vigorously pushes hegemonism and expansion-
ism. The Soviet Union is an up-and-coming imperialism. While its economy is
based on highly concentrated state monopoly capitalism, its economic strength
tt incompatible with it, and thus it has to primarily rely on its military
might and threats of war to engage in expansionism. The Soviet Union has set
up a fascist dictatorship, thereby making il easier to militarize its entire national
economy and state machinery. It has totally inherited the reactionary mantle of
the old tsars while simultaneously cloaking itself in socialism. It is therefore
avaricious, adventurous and deceitful in nature. With the role of the United States
, the hands of the Soviet Union are reaching out farther and farther,
thereby becoming a source of world war far more dangerous than the United
The strategic goal of Soviet social-imperialism is to seek world hegemony. It
t ambition, namely, "intending to seize all of Europe, Asia and
' Regarding tic United States as its opponent, it has resorted to political,
economic and military measures to engage in a tierce rivalry for world hegemony.
Ii c0 ] I urope :i key area for contention, and it. has thus deployed more than
of it> military strength in Europe proper and Eastern Europe to
m Europe and pose a threat to Western Europe. Taking advantage
European countries, it has stepped up
oj crushinj them om by on*, 1; has amassed a large number of warships
in the southern and northern Btraits of Europe in order to encircle Western Europe.
Its northern and Baltic Sea fleets constantly -end fighting ships on cruises in the
Atlantic Ocean, and its Black Sea Fleet often appears in the Mediterranean to
display its power, in a vain attempt to cut oil" contact between Western Europe
and the United States in wartime. In order to outflank Europe and Bubdue tne
West European countries without attacking them, it has made desperate efforts
to contend for the Middle East, Africa and the ( rulf area, seize important Btrafc gic
positions, seek domination of the sea, foster and aid pro-Soviet forces, subvert
sovereign states and rob energy resources. Of Late, the Soviet Union has even
quickened its pace of aggression arid expansion by hook or by crook, and in a
more violent, flagrant way. In Africa, it has incited one country againsl th< other,
created incidents, provoked war everywhere and sent Cuban mer bo pull
its chestnuts out of the fire. Cuba has become the Soviet Union's satellite and
accomplice, as well as a Soviet agent in wrecking the nonalined movement. In the
south Asian and Red Sea regions, it has resorted to the most cruel and vicious
tactics to direct and support certain pro-Soviet forces to engage in assassination
and subversion and incite coup d'etats. It has even dispatched its military per-
sonnel to these regions to participate in the engineering of bloody incidents so as
to facilitate its southward advance toward ice-free ports. In Southeast Asia, it
has encouraged and aided that Vietnamese authority which pursues regional
hegemonism to provoke incidents everywhere, launch armed aggression aj
Kampuchea and serve as a Cuba in the East. Is there any region where a change
is taking place or a disturbance is going on where the evil shadow of Soviet social-
imperialism does not loom? It is because of its wild attacks that the danger of a
world war is obviously increasing.
In order to realize its ambition of seeking world hegemony by force, the Soviet
Union is locked in an arms race with the Tinted States on an unprecedented scale
and at unprecedented speed. In the past few years, its military expenditures have
reached more than $100 billion a year which, added to its other expenses allocated
for military purposes, account for 20 percent of its gross national product. The
number of its troops in combat readiness has increased from 3 million to more
than 4/million. In addition, it has stored nuclear weapons equivalent to some 10
billion Tons of TNT, produced several dozen thousand tanks and built up an offen-
sive naval fleet capable of fighting on the high seas. At present, the Soviet Union
possesses almost an equal number of strategic weapons as the United States, but
its conventional weapons surpass the combined number of those possessed by the
United States and the West European countries. It has therefore become a super-
military power. Atomic bombs and guided missiles are not bread and butter, and
aircraft, warships, tanks and cannons cannot be regarded as goulash. They are
not things you can eat or wear and their accumulation is for no purpose other
than to tight a world war. Is it for "self-defense? " Or for good appearance? The
new Soviet tsars are on the back of an unbridled horse of arms expansion and war
preparation moving from post to pillar and from pillar to post. At a certain time,
they will itch for action. This is independent of man's will.
The Soviet Union and the United States have both taken offensive and de-
fensive steps in their global rivalry, but the former is mainly in an offensive pos-
ture while the latter is in a defensive posture. In contending for each and every
place, the Soviet Union invariably seeks to seize a piece of meat off the U.S. plate.
Ambitious and covetous as it is, can the Soviet Union stop without having seized
all the meat off the U.S. plate? Meanwhile, the United States is still powerful to
a certain degree, but will it let the things it has already seized be robbed by others?
Chairman Mao said: "The United States wants to protect its interests in the
world and the Soviet Union wants to expand; and this can in no way be changed."
The contradiction between the Soviet Union and the United States is irreconcil-
able and their contention is bound to continue. Lenin had a famous saying: "The
content of imperialist politics is 'world domination' and the continuation of these
politics is imperialist war." Today, only the Soviet Union and the United States
want to and are qualified to fight a world war. It will either be the Soviet Union
or the United States that ignites the spark of war, and the danger comes mainly
from the arctic bear. Brezhnev and his ilk have asserted that "a world war is no
longer unavoidable." How can these Hitlerian lies cover up cruel reality!
A new world war is inevitable. We say this in terms of a law or a tendency and
by no means indicating that war is imminent and will be fought very soon. At
present, both hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have
their own weaknesses and problems. By nature, Soviet social-imperalism, is weak
and its ambition far exceeds its strength. Its aggressive and expansionist activities
have often met with frustration, and its global strategic plan for launching a world
war is yet to be completed. Beset with growing crises, the United States is also
finding the going tougher and tougher with each passing day. As long as we act
in accordance with Chairman Mao's great theory of differentiating the three
worlds to unite with the Third World, win over the second world, form an ex-
tensive international united front against the two hegemonic powers, the Soviet
Union and the United States, and lay emphasis on exposing and attacking the
aggressive and war policies pursued by Soviet social-imperialism, it is possible to
delay the outbreak of war.
Social-imperialism and imperialism only pay attention to positions of strength.
They will bully you if you are weak but be afraid of you if you are strong. To
cope with their counterrevolutionary policy of strength, we must carry out a
revolutionary policy of strength. Soviet social-imperialism is filled with arrogance
by virtue of its certain superiority in weaponry and equipment. However, it
will stop and think provided the people of all countries strengthen their own defen-
sive capabilities, make earnest efforts to insure their preparedness against war and
vigorously increase their strength against wars of aggression. We will be in an
advantageous position even if Soviet social-imperialism becomes so mad as to
provoke a war in disregard of all the consequences.
In launching a global war, social-imperialism and imperialism must establish
certain naval and air bases and seize and occupy certain ke}- strategic positions
in various places throughout the world. In order to delay the outbreak of war,
we must stand on the side of the people throughout the world and make earnest
efforts to disrupt the global strategic deployment of the two hegemonic powers,
the Soviet Union in particular. Wherever the Soviet Union is making trouble,
we should help and aid the people there so they can carry out a resolute struggle
against it. We should cut off the Soviet Union's claws wherever they stretch. The
more resolute the struggle we wage and the stronger the attack we make, we will-
be better able to throw into confusion the Soviet Union's timetable for launching
Appeasement is the catalyst of war. To postpone the outbreak of war it is
ary to oppose appeasement of the Soviet Union, regardless of whether it is
military, political or economic. The nature of Soviet social imperialism can never
change. Its methods, tactics and means of contending for hegemon} r ma}' change,
but not the goal of its established global stretegy. If you compromise and yield
to it, it will demand still more, whether you sign a so-called disarmament agree-
ment or a so-called SALT accord. The Soviets will not be bound by it. These
accords cannot maintain a so-called "nuclear balance" or "nuclear stalemate,"
nor can they forestall any conventional war by the U.S.S.R. The attempt to divert
the peril, the Soviet Union, eastward to China is to lift a rock only to drop it on
one's own feet. Giving loans, grain and advanced technology to the U.S.S.R. will
only help it overcome its economic difficulties and increase its strategic stockpile,
and will not in the least control it. A fed bear will not change its cannibal nature.
Why was Hitler able to initiate a war? Wasn't it because of Chamberlain, Daladier
and their i!k that he became much stronger militarily and economically? Today,
a trend toward appeasement is prevalent in the West. It suits the needs of the
Soviet Union for aggression and expansion, enhances its strategic global position,
and stimulates the growth of the factors for war. By pursuing such a policy, one
i< sure to reap the bitter fruits of his own sowing, just like nourishing a tiger so
thai it hecomes a source of trouble later.
The great People's Republic of China is a formidable obstacle to Soviet social-
imperialis] co 'cntion for world hegemony. "Soviet revisionism will never
relinquish its ambition of subjugating China" and harl ors inveterate hatred for
China. Tlii' Khrushchev- Brezhnev renegade clique has not only totally inherited
the ■ '. I tsars' policy of aggression and expansion, but has gone much further.
With malicious intentions Krnshehev proposed establishing a "joint fleet" and a
"longwave radio station" in China, engaged in subversive activities in the Sinkiang
area and raved about the so-called "yellow peril" in Western nations in an attempt
to have China destroyed by other people. Even more ferocious, Brezhnev has
I ;dl his fangs. The Soviet Union has stationed a million troops along the
Sino-Soviet border areas and in Mongolia, has deployed offensive strategic
weapons there, has greatly strengthened the power of its Pacific Fleet, frequently
holdfi large-scale military exercises with the intention of invading China and has
plotted to perforin "surgica] auclear operations" on China, posing a direct mili-
tary threat to China. It hat Constantly intruded into China's territorial land,
waters and airspace and created a series »>f grave incidents, including the Chenpao
Island and Tiehliekti incidents. It lias mobilized all ita propaganda machii
incite anti-China hysteria. Nol long ago, Brezhnev personally sn< aked into ."'i 1 eria
and tho Soviet Far East to encourage the Soviel troops and issue war cries. The
Soviet Union has been desperately trying to foster pro-Soviel forces, Beek military
bases and peddle the "Asian security system" in countries and areas around
China in a wild attempt to strategically encircle China. More recently, as the
Vietnamese authorities rabid anti-China activities have 3eriously <■■ 3ino-
Vietnamese relations, the Soviet Union has popped up from behind the Bcei
to fabricate lies, slander China and blatantly engage in incitement and agitation,
fully revealing its sinister intention of encirclii • in all poe - while
intruding into Southeast Asia, an area long-coveted by the Sovi< I . All < f
and threaten Japan, yet it is also making increasing eflfoi
aggressive war against China.
Soviet social imperialism is our chief and most dam my. We I
with it seriously. Faced with the lofty task of ing socialist coi struction
and realizing the four modernizations, the people of our country havi sing
need for a peaceful environment. However, we have never feared war and will
never beg for peace. In dealing with Soviet social imperialism, we will -till use the
old method for dealing with all reactionaries called tit for tat. ( hairn an Mao
has taught us: "We must be prepared to deal with surprise attacks. As
imperialists exist in the world, there will be some idiots who, in disr< - la-
people's opposition, will impose world war on the people. We must fully calculate
such possibility." We must continue to assume that the enemy will start a war
sooner than is expected. We must be prepared for a war that is bigger than ex-
pected, for a nuclear war and for the enemy's surprise attack. We should race
against time and do a good job in making every preparation for a war ag^i-
The most fundamental things in preparing well for a war against aggression are
holding aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao, resolutely implementing C hair-
man Mao's thinking on military affairs, implementing the line of the 11th party
congress and the general task for the new period, implementing the principles and
tasks of grasping the key link and running the army well and of being prepared
for war as decided on by the conference of the military commission, firmly grasping
the key link of exposing and criticizing the "gang of four," grasping the key links
in army work of "it is necessary to consolidate the army" and "prepare for
fighting," speeding up the achievement of our country's four modernizations,
speeding up the building of our army's revolutionization and modernization,
doing a good job in preparing mentally and materially for fighting, and laying a
concrete foundation for fighting a people's war under modern conditions.
People's war is the core of the system of Chairman Mao's military thinking.
It is a magic weapon with which to defeat the enemy and win victory and a secret
master plan for overcoming the aggressors bequeathed to us by Chairman Mao.
Chairman Mao said: "The army and people are the foundation of victory,'' "the
deepest roots of the power of war lie among the people," and "mobilizing the
ordinary citizens of the whole country means creating a vast ocean for pulling the
enemy down under the waves, creating conditions for making up for the short-
comings in weapons and other things and creating prerequisites for overcoming
all difficulties in war." In the past, by relying on the people's war we have de-
feated powerful enemies at home and abroad; in the future, we should still make
full use of our country's vast land and population, superior system, rich, glorious
tradition of people's war and other favorable conditions, and win victory in a
hard, bitter and protracted people's war.
In the future antiaggression war, our enemy's only superiority will be its slightly
better military technology, weapons and equipment. However, its military
theories are corrupt and reactionary, and the aggressive war they launch will be
unjust and divorced from the people and will be fought with soldiers who are low
in spirit and morale. Therefore, no matter what the quantity or quality of their
weapons and equipment, their role cannot be brought into full play. The higher the
degree of their modernization, the more they will depend on fuel, communications,
transportation and logistics and supplies. We have a sharp weapon — Chairman
Mao's most advanced thinking on military affairs — and weapons and equipment
that are far better than those we had in the past. If the enemy dares to invade,
we can rely on the principal armies and the local armies to wipe out large numbers
of them and we can mobilize the broad masses of militiamen and people to use the
enemy's weak points, strike at the enemy extensively and destroy its communica-
35-200— 7S 9
tions and transportation, gas pipelines and supplies. Each of us is a fighter, every
village is a bastion and every part of our land is a battlefield. No matter how many-
troops they have, they will not be able to withstand our kind of blows and attri-
tion. Did not those Westerners with some military foresight say: To attack socialist
China is a military taboo; if one is trapped there, one can never pull out. This
opinion is very incisive. The people's war has limitless power and great promise.
Because of this, we are filled with confidence in victory.
Chairman Mao has pointed out: "Marxism must become further developed and
should develop with practice. It should not remain stagnant. If it does and main-
tains old ways, it will be lifeless." The same is true for the theory of people's war
which must develop in line with historical developments. We must adhere to the
basic principle of Marxism and Mao Tse-tung thought — seeking truth from facts —
analyze and study the practical situation, and solve practical problems by pro-
ceeding from practical conditions. Modern war has many different characteristics
compared with past wars. Our enemy has greatly changed and we are also very
different from what we were in the past. This means that we must more closely
integrate Chairman Mao's thinking on people's war with the new historic conditions,
conscientiously study the new characteristics and laws of people's war under
modern conditions, and do a good job of making preparations in all fields.
The three-in-one system of combining the field armies, the regional armies and
the militia i-; the best way to organize a people's war. The future antiaggres-ion
war will be a large-scale people's war against the enemy who will be everywhere —
in the front, in the rear, in the air, on the sea, on the ground and under the ground —
and we will have all the more reason to adhere to the three-in-one system of com-
bining the armed forces. It is not only necessary to have a people's army with
modernized equipment under absolute party leadership. It is also necessary to
have the cooperation of the broad masses of militiamen. If we have only a regular
army without the broad masses of militiamen, we will not be able to maintan an
endless supply of troops and the powerful support of the masses. No matter how
powerful our field armies are, they will only be like a one-armed general. If we only
have regional armies and the militia without the field armies, we will be without
the main structure of a people's war. By opposing and disrupting the army and
engaging in a "second armed force," Lin Piao and the "gang of four" greatly
sabotaged army and militia building and the three-in-one system of combining
the armed forces. While doing a good job in building the field and regional armies,
we must also do a good job in providing the militia with a solid organizational,
political and military base, raising militia building to a new level; and developing
the broad masses of militiamen into a really powerful reserve force for the various
arms and services which will be able to efficiently attack and wipe out the enemy,
in cooperation with the PLA units, in time of war.
Actively defending and luring the enemy in deep are the basic principles of our
strategy for winning a future antiaggression war. Chairman Mao said that if a
fi-herman doesn't give any bait to the fish, the fish will not be caught. Resisting
the enemy outside the country has never been a good method. Our country is a
socialist country and our socialist system determines that our strategic principle
should be one of active defense. In dealing with aggressors, we will strike at the
enemy after we allow him to come in and then strategically gain mastery by
striking him again. The tricks peddled by Lin Piao and the "gang of four" — such
as "hooking horns" with the enemy "lock, stock and band" — totally reflected
the passive defense of resisting the enemy outside the country, a method which
has long since been criticized. The situation will be reasonable and favorable
for us and our struggle will be easier only if we allow the enemy to come in and
then strike at him. Only by doing so can we force the enemy to scatter his forces,
carry the burden on his shoulders and be encircled and trapped by all the people;
Only by doing SO can we utilize our strong points to attack the enemy's weak
points and destroy the enemy troops one after another. However, luring the
enemy in deep docs not mean allowing the enemy to go wherever he likes; it
means forcing him to move in the direction we want, organizing a strong defense
with our priorities well-placed, preventing the enemy from driving deep into
our areas, lending him to battlefields prepared and organized in advance, and,
in accordance with actual conditions, concentrating our superior forces on wiping
out the enemy troops by one one by using Chairman Mao's 10 major principles
on military affairs. We must adhere to the principle of protracted war. We firmly
believe that by carrying ou1 an arduous and protracted struggle, we will In 1 able
to gradually change the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves,
carry out a strategic counteroffensive and win final victory.
Strengthening education and training in army and military science research is
an important strategic task for improving fighting skills used in a people'8 war
under modern conditions. Engels pointed out : "With only enthusiasm but without
training and organization, nobody can win a war." Modern warfare places higher
demands on the army and militia with regard to organizational and <■< mmand
abilities and tactical skills. Wielding the big stick of a purely military viewpoint"
to wantonly attack people everywhere, Ian Piao and the "gang of four" practiced
out-and-out liquidationism with regard to military training and military science
studies. We must raise the levels of education and training in order to reach a
strategic position, increase military science studies, improve the military quality
and scientific and cultural levels of cadre fighters, and run the army a- a big
school. It is necessary to comprehensively and accurately study and implement
Chairman Mao's military thinking and conduct conscientious research on the
enemy's characteristics and the laws of modern warfare. To meel the Deeds of
actual war, it is essential to set strict standards for training and place strid de-
mands on the army, carry out mass military training programs in an extensive,
down-to-earth w r ay, improve the content and methods of training in light of the
improvements and most recent developments in military science and techniques,
and guard against formalism and championship mentality. It is imperative to use
Chairman Mao's military thinking to systematically adjust and sum up our
experiences in carrying out army building and combat and in developing advanced
military science which belongs to China's proletariat. It is necessary to run mili-
tary academies and schools of all categories well, and to train command and
technical personnel who are both Red and expert and capable of carrying out
modern warfare. It is essential to strengthen militia training and actively pro-
mote a mass campaign for learning military skills. By so doing we will be able to
achieve an improved state of the military art with which our country's army and
people can triumph over the enemy.
Acceleration of the development of national defense science and technology and
the national defense industry and improvement of weapons and equipment are
our material bases in increasing the strength of people's war under modern con-
ditions. We wage just wars and, as long as we bring the potential of available
weapons and equipment into full play and make flexible use of the strategy and
tactics of a people's war, we will be able to triumph over better-equipped enemies
with our inferior equipment. This is our historical experience. However, in the
present age in which science and technology is developing by leaps and bounds, we
will be the subject of attack if we do not have modernized and powerful national
defense strength and do not master all the weapons as well as the struggle tactics
and methods which the enemy already possesses or may possess. We should quickly
improve the backwardness of our army's weapons and equipment, caused by the
sabotage of Lin Piao and the "gang of four," and rapidly carry out a national de-
fense modernization program simultaneously with the acceleration of national
economic construction. It is also necessary to pay attention to learning from the
advanced experiences of foreign countries, effectively improve the weapons and
equipment of our army, navy, air force and militia and not only have modern
conventional arms and sufficient ammunition but also improve the quality of atom
bombs, guided missiles and other sophisticated weaponry and equipment. If our
army has high political consciousness, masters advanced military scientific theo-
ries and techniques, has the support of people throughout the country, and possesses
modern arms and equipment, we will be greatly strengthened and will be more
confident of defeating the enemy.
Building our strategic rear into a powerful, solid base area is a reliable means for
carrying out people's war. In modern warfare, no big differences exist between the
front and the rear and all areas affected by the war are subject to possible division
and isolation. This demands that we build the vast rear area into a strategic base
capable not only of supporting a protracted war but also of fighting the war in-
dependently. We must thoroughly criticize the crimes of Lin Piao and the "gang
of four" in undermining our army's construction work and accelerate the revolu-
tionization and modernization of logistics. In accordance with the principle of
integrating the army with the people and combining work during peacetime with
work during wartime, we should quickly build necessary communications, medical
and health facilities, oil pipelines, maintenance depots and other war-supportive
projects, gradually increase our reserves of strategic materials and build a firmly
complete, integrated network in a modern, well-stocked rear base.
Strengthening the building of people's air defense is a major strategic measure
for saving oneself and destroying the enemy in a modern war and a development
of Chairman Mao's concept of people's war under new historic conditions. In the
face of the stockpiling of guided missiles and nuclear weapons by social-imperialism
and imperialism and their habitual surprise attacks, we must conscientiously
improve the building of people's air defense so that in case of war we can conserve
our strength, minimize losses and avoid confusion, thus smoothly transforming
the country from a state of peace to a state of war. Lin Piao basically ignored the
work of people's air defense and "submitted it to the will of god." The "gang of
four" babbled that "there is still plenty of time to cany out construction projects
for people's air defense even after a war breaks out." They completely disregarded
national security and public safety. In light of Chairman Mao's instruction of
"dig tunnels deep" and the plans of the party Central Committee headed by
Chairman Hua, we must fully mobilize the masses to persist in the principle of
self-reliance and hard work. In response to the call for integrating peacetime pro-
duction with preparedness against war and offense with defense, we must speed
up the building of people's air defense projects, with good-quality work, not
only in important cities but in other cities when conditions are available, and in
vital localities. Future urban construction and capital construction must take into
full account the strategic requirements of people's air defense. It is necessary to
build our country's people's air defense s}^stem into an underground "great wall"
which will provide conditions for people to live, engage in production, defend
themselves, launch offensives, and carry out tunnel warfare and street fighting
at the same time.
Restoring and carrying forward the fine traditions of the political and ideo-
logical work of our party and army and giving full play to the power of this work
are important guarantees for winning a future war against aggression, as well as
for achieving our country's socialist modernization. Political work is the lifeblood
of our army, the source of its fighting capability and a decisive factor in upholding
absolute party leadership over the army and preserving our army's proletarian
nature. A future war against aggression will be the most fierce and most cruel
war ever. Therefore, our troops will have to have a higher degree of awareness,
a more heroic fighting spirit, stricter discipline, more centralized, unified purpose
and closer unity and cooperation. Without powerful political work, it will he im-
possible to meet all these requirements. Under the new historical conditions it is
necessary to enable vast numbers of commanders and fighters to always maintain
a high degree of revolutionary vigilance, overcome a false sense of peace and tran-
quillity, and always prepare well for crushing the subversion and aggression of
social-imperialism and imperialism and liberating Taiwan, all this requires greater
efforts in strengthening political and ideological work. We must thoroughly elim-
inate the pernicious influence of Lin Piao and the "gang of four" in political work,
oppose any tendency to weaken this work, conscientiously grasp class struggle
in the ideological field, straighten things out in every field of work, particularly
by consolidating the lading bodies, and strengthen political and ideological work
at the grassroots level so as to promote the fine political work traditions fostered
by Chairman Mao. We must also persist in the principles of seeking truth from
facts, proceeding with everything from reality, and integrating theory with prac-
tice, carry out political and ideological work in all fields to achieve the general
task for the new period and the various tasks in grasping the key link, running
the army well and preparing to fight, and make good use of the fine traditions of
political work in a modern war so that this work can play its dual role of leading-
all other work and guaranteeing its accomplishment. Only by so doing can we
successfully put modernization in command of revolutionization; insure a socialist
orientation in the development of our modernization; train more Lei Feng-type
cadres and fighters, I lard-Bone 6th Company-type companies and leading bodies
like the party committee of the 1st Air Force Flight Division; and, along with
thoroughly improving the army's combat strength, fight a vigorous, awe-in-
spiring people's war in time of war.
Chairman Mao repeatedly stressed: "The whole party must pay great attention
to war, study military affairs and prepare to fight." Stepping up war preparedness
i- not purely a military event but a major event for the entire party, people
throughout the country and all national fronts. A powerful national defense is
I on a Btrong national economy. Only faster development of economic con-
struction can provide greater progress in the building of national defense, and only
powerful national defense capabilities can reliably insure the motherland's seni-
lity and Bmooth realization of the general task for the new period. The working
Class, pooi- and lower-middle peasants, revolutionary soldiers and intellectuals in
our country must work hard at their posts to accelerate the realization of the four
modernizations and expand OUr country's economic and defense; strengths. In
other word-, they must contribute their share to stepping up war preparedness*
We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly
counterattack. Let the enemy who dares to launch a war of aggression against
our country have a go at it. The 800 million army men and people <>f cur country
have long been ready in their battle array. We are armed with Chairman Mao's
invincible military thought. We have the wise leader Chairman Hna to .-<
our supreme commander and the party Central Committee and its Military Com-
mission headed by Chairman Ilua to correctly guide us. We have battle-to
veteran proletarian strategists and the invincible People's Liberation Army,
vast numbers of militiamen and people of all nationalities who were tem]
during decades of war. We have rich experience in vanquishing the enemy through
people's war and fine political work traditions. We have the sympathy and support
of people all over the world. No matter when and where the enemy attack- us, we
will wipe him out lock, stock and barrel.
Chairman Mao pointed out: "Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with
tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their
transformation." If social-imperialism and imperialism insist on imposing a new
global war on the people of the world, they will spur the world's people to rise
in revolution. Social-imperialism and imperialism definitely cannot escape their
destiny — total destruction. Socialism and communism will prevail all over the
Summaries of 1977 Xormalizatiox Hearings Held by the
Subcommittee ox Asian and Pacific Affairs
"Normalization With the PRC : Global Implications," September 20, 1977
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
A. Doak Barnett, Brookings, finds P.R.C.-U.S. relations at a critical juncture
and is concerned that, unless these relations move forward, they may very likely
weaken to the detriment of U.S. global and regional interests.
Barnett sees little hope for a "Two China" policy. Both Peking and Taiwan
have reiected it and whatever chance it once had disappeared with the admission
of the P.R.C to the U.N., and its recognition as the Government of China by
over 100 nations.
Barnett believes that even after normalization Taiwan can continue to prosper.
The P.R.C. has made clear its willingness to accept a continuation of non-govern-
ment United States-Taiwan ties. Moreover, the P.R.C. presently lacks the mili-
tary capacitv to launch an invasion of Taiwan and in the future it will be deterred
by the political risk of rekindling U.S. antagonism. The future of Taiwan, he
asserts, "will take years to decide * * * and will depend essentially on long term
trends in both China and Taiwan, rather than on what the U.S. does or does not
Barnett argues that our future success in arms control and nuclear non-pro-
liferation negotiations requires the participation of the P.R.C. and that long run
regional stability likewise requires P.R.C. participation, or at least its acquiescence.
Thus, "our ability or failure to establish and maintain a viable relationship with
the People's Republic of China could have a tremendous impact on broad U.S.
interests * * * and full normalization of relations is clearly a prerequisite for
establishing a viable relationship".
Pohert A. Scalapino, University of California, argues that Soviet-American
relations are, and. for the foreseeable future, will continue, to be of greater im-
portance to the United States than Sino-American relations. Scalapino cautions
Hint a policy of aligning with China will "inevitably" result in a deterioration of
Soviet-American relations and a destabilization of conditions in Asia.
While emphasizing that a decision to normalize relations with the P.R.C. can-
not be equated to an alliance, Scalapino warns that a decision on normalization
must address the question of whether it can be done without damaging United
States credibility and commitments. Scalapino maintains that, in light of our
recent experience in Southeast Asia, a decision to break relations with Taiwan
would be interpreted as signifying a broad scale U.S. withdrawal from Asia and
raise questions of our credibility and commitments not only within the region,
but also within an international context.
Scalapino concludes that the U.S. must make the critical distinction "between
playing Peking's game of allowing ourselves to be drawn into confrontation with
i * * * and maintaining an economic, political and military posture that
assures -ill states of our will and capacities regarding those commitments and
policies which we believe to be in our interests."
Allen S. Whih'nr, University of Michigan, cautions against undue delay in
recognizing the P.R.C. and urges that the normalization process be completed
before the onset of the next presidential campaign.
While acknowledging thai all signs indicate a continuation of Sino-Soviot
antagonism, Whiting wains against ruling out tactical changes in Sino-Soviot
relations within the next five years, particularly if the current stalemate in
U.S.- P.R.C. relations continues.
Whiting emphasizes that normalization is not the end for Taiwan, Tho T P.R.C.
made clear its acceptance of continued United States — Taiwan commercial-
economic ties along the lines of the Japanese formula. Moreover, signs indicate
that the P.R.C. is more concerned with the abrogation of the U.S.- R.( >.C. mutual
defense treaty than with the immediate reintegral ion of Taiwan with the mainland.
Whiting concludes that, with a well prepared approach to the completion of
the normalization process, including assurances oi our continuing Buppoii for our
Asian allies, recognition of the P.R.C. will well serve P.R.C— U.S. relation
well as regional development and stability.
Nathaniel Thayer, Johns Bopkins, takes up the attitudes of various
governments with reference to the normalization of relations between the United
States and the P.R.C. Thayer (-(includes that the governments of the Philippines,
South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, and Australia all view normalization
as inevitable, but differ concerning the impact of the decision on the region.
Australia, the most optimistic. South Korea, the most pessimistic.
Many of those same governments are concerned with the fate of Taiwan after
normalization and worried as to how far the United States will go for the P.RJ .
They place the fate of Taiwan in a context of relations between Large states and
small states, and watch the U.S. treatment of Taiwan for clues to their own fate*
should their interests ever conflict with those of a major power.
Thayer believes that normalization will strengthen the international system.
At the same time, he also believes that the United States must fully reassure its
allies with regard to our credibility and commitments.
Thayer concludes: "We are too big to play big-power politics and ignore small
states. If anything, we should follow the edict of Chairman Mao and lean to one
side — the side of small states. That has been our strength in the past. That will
probably be our strength in the future."
"China Normalization: Legislative and Legal Implications," September
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
Jerome Cohen, Harvard, feels the United States should move as rapidly as
possible to normalize, but stresses "no one is talking about unconditional normali-
zation". Cohen feels international law precedents imply that all United States-
Taiwan treaties and agreements will automatically lapse with withdrawal of
recognition from the ROC.
Cohen disagrees with Victor Li (below) that the U.S.-ROC treaties, particu-
larly the Mutual Defense Treaty, could survive in any form without Peking's
express permission following normalization.
"I do not know of any case in which a country that has transferred recognition
from Taipei to Peking has been able to maintain its treaties with Taipei". The
Japanese Formula is "an elaborate web of unofficial agreements to replace
* * * treaties it had previously maintained."
However, to replace the Mutual Defense Treaty, Cohen feels "* * * the U.S.
is free to make a unilateral defense commitment through a Presidential state-
ment * * * or through Presidential-Congressional cooperation."
Cohen's main point is that normalization is a political decision which, having
been made, will compel the legal problems to be worked out, and he urges Congress
to help anticipate the switch by passing the needed amendments and new legis-
lation in advance.
Victor Li, Stanford, agrees with Cohen's device of using the "authorities on
Taiwan" as a method of dealing with the de facto control over Taiwan which
Taipei will exert even after de jure recognition of Peking as the Government of
China takes place.
But, Li strongly disagrees with Cohen's contention that all treaties and agree-
ments will automatically lapse. Li feels that specific U.S. abrogation — particularly
of the Mutual Defense Treaty — would not only be required, but would be useful.
Li wants the United States to give Taiwan the 12-month "notice" required
by the defense treaty terms so Taiwan could gain time to psychologically adjust
to what it has to date characterized as a disaster.
Li feels the problems surrounding the security aspect — and the defense treat}' —
to be the key to unlocking the political dilemma surrounding normalization. He
urges "clearing away the underbrush" to focus on the security aspect. All else is
mere detail, and will follow suit once the political decisions are made.
Li says the key to breaking the impasse lies in the fact that the Shanghai
Communique does not require the United States to break the defense treaty,
only to withdraw troops and recognize the P.R.C. as the Government of China.
Therefore, by continuing to deal with "the authorities on Taiwan," considerable
flexibility will be gained in the U.S. bargaining position with the P.R.C. regarding
Taiwan's economic future.
Francis Valeo, former Secretary of the U.S. Senate, stresses the political nature
of the decision, feels it is almost entireh T up to the President, the sole role for
Congress being the economic enabling legislation, which can be "after the fact."
Valeo does not feel Senate "approval" of abrogation of the Mutual Defense
Treat}' is Constitutionally mandated by the fact that the treaty was approved
by the Senate in the first place.
Valeo offers a "Draft Joint Resolution on Chinese Relations" he feels will
simplify the otherwise terrifyingly complex task of amending in detail the laws
and regulations governing relations, commerce and trade with Taiwan. His resolu-
1. In any existing provision of law or regulation pursuant thereto, the term
Republic of China or variations thereon shall be deemed to apply only to the
territory referred to in Article 6 of the Mutual Defense Treaty (the island of
Taiwan and the Pescadores). * * *
2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, laws and regulations referred
to in Sec. 1 of this Resolution shall remain in force for * * * [Taiwan and the
Pescadores] * * * regardless of the state of diplomatic relations between the
United States and China unless terminated by Presidential declaration, with
Eugene Theroux, Washington attorney, China trade specialist, endorses normal-
ization in the same terms as Victor Li: "the question is not whether, but how."
But Theroux urges the United States to "confine its negotiations with the P.R.C.
to the terms on which an exchange of Ambassadors can occur between Washington
and Peking. In this process, neither side should expect the other to make un-
"The question of Taiwan and its relationship to the mainland of China must
be left to the Chinese themselves," Theroux urges, noting both the P.R.C. and
the ROC exercise de facto political authority over their specific territories, but
not over each other. "The burden is therefore upon those who favor change in
the status quo to make a convincing case that it is in our national best interest
in * * *" to go further than exchanging Ambassadors with the P.R.C.
Theroux says the United States should urge the two parties to meet and directly
negotiate their differences: the Mutual Defense Treaty "should not be an obstacle
to progress in their negotiations, since the P.R.C. has indicated its intention to
resolve the Taiwan question peacefully."
On the many treaties and agreements between the United States and Taiwan,
he agrees with Victor Li: "There appears to be no principle of international law
that withdrawal by one government of political recognition of another ipso facto
either terminates or continues prior treaties or agreements between them," there-
fore, Congress and the President must study the situation and act to keep in force
what they will."
"Normalization with the PRC: Formulas," September 2S, 1977
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
Ros* Terrill, Harvard, warns against U.S. "complacency" because U.S.-PRC
relations are better now than pre-1972. He cites the present lack of opportunity for
full trade and diplomatic exchange as "frustrating", and inherently damaging to
1 r.S. hopes of influencing the PRC politically through exchanges of visits, Wash-
ington-Peking. Consequently, he urges U.S. acceptance of Peking's "Three
Points", thus officially recognizing the end of the Chinese civil war which we
presently support by backing the Nationalist regime and its "mission" to liberate
However, Terrill emphasizes that "to recognize Peking is not to abandon Tai-
wan," and that the President or Secretary of State should pointedly visit Taipei
following recognition of Peking to stress the "essential normalcy" of the United
States-Taiwanese relationship, particularly regarding trade, and the security issue.
Terrill noted that a key part of the negotiation process should include strong
U.S. representations regarding the security of the Taiwan straits (although with-
out specifically naming Taiwan) adding "if this is unacceptable to the PRC then
negotiations are dubious anyhow."
Ten-ill makes the same "do jure" and "do facto" distinctions which charad
the testimony of other witnesses, adding that the break with Taiwan mm
positive in nature — the "United States stressing its concern for formulating a ra-
tional, realistic Asia policy, particularly concerning Japan.
Ralph Clough, of Brookings Institution, proposes that in negotiating with
China the United States arrive at an "American formula" which would protect
its interests in Taiwan, but would not preclude a negotiated peaceful settli □ ent
of relations between Taiwan and the mainland Chinese. To this end the I
States ought not accept quickly and without appropriate reciprocal concessions
Peking's three conditions for normalization.
As part of the "American formula," economic connections will be significant
and Clough believes, may depend on political support. Sine the U.S. approaches
these matters more legalistically than the Asians do, the extremely extra
Japanese approach will not be workable for the United States. Also highly im-
portant will be maintenance of consular relations between the United States and
Taiwan, even after diplomatic ties should be severed. Recognizing that the
British were unsuccessful in obtaining diplomatic ties with Peking while they
kept a consulate in Taipei, Clough considers American ties sufficiently more
valuable to China than the United States would be able to obtain the desired
In addition to economic and consular ties, there remains the question of de-
fense relations with Taiwan. Clough believes the treaty probably must be set
aside. Defending this action will be difficult because there is no guarantee that
the mainland would not launch an attack on Taiwan, aside from the military
and political risks Peking would run if it did so.
Clough proposes that the "American formula" stop with the Shanghai Com-
munique regarding the connection of Taiwan with mainland China, leaving that
question open. Finally, he urges that if the United States accepts Chinese pre-
conditions, and adheres to the Shanghai Communique concerning Taiwan's
status, the PRC should be willing to make the concessions necessary to "ensure
the security and enonomic well-being of Taiwan." Once that is done, there could
be further progress toward normal relations between the United States and
Donald A. Zagoria, Columbia University, argues for a rapid normalization of
relations with the PRC and believes that a formula can be found which will enable
the United States to recognize the PRC without sacrificing the interests or se-
curity of Taiw r an.
Zagoria believes that the PRC is anxious to prevent any post-normalization
initiatives by Taiwan in the direction of independence and thus, "in the im-
mediate future — five to ten years — Peking should be willing to reach an under-
standing with the United States that will in effect rule out the use of force against
As a substitute for the U.S.-ROC Security Treaty, Zagoria suggests a joint
U.S.-PR.C statement that "without specifically mentioning Taiwan, commits both
the United States and the PRC, to the continued maintenance of peace and se-
curity in Northeast Asia." He further recommends that the United States unilat-
erally make clear its understanding that the area defined by the joint statement
does include Taiwan.
Zagoria concludes that, through the normalization process, the United States
and the PRC will be able to arrive at an informal security arrangement to replace
the current U.S. treaty commitment to Taiwan.
Robert Barnett, the Asia Society, argues that abrogation of the Mutual Defense
Treaty is in our best interest, because it facilitates recognition of the PRC.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, abrogation is also in Taiwan's interest
because the securitj^ and stability of the region will be enhanced by a rational
U.S. policy of full relations with PRC, Barnett argues.
Barnett feels that maintenance of the treaty will be harmful to the United
States precisely because of the "credibility" issue some of Taiwan's defenders
raise. A treaty the United States is not really prepared to support militarily will
breed "credibility" problems for obvious reasons, as well as raise the question of
the American ability to assess its genuine national interest (in Europe as well as
in Asia), he says.
However, Barnett believes, and the other witnesses agreed, it would be "both
honorable and sensible" for the United States to make clear to Peking its inten-
tions for Taiwan regarding trade and security post-normalization.
Finally, Barnett stresses the importance of the "one China" idea to both
Taipei and Peking, saying it is a prime factor in allaying U.S. and Asian — particu-
larly Japanese — fears Peking might resort to force to regain Taiwan.
A "Chinese solution" to Taiwan's future is the best solution and perhaps a
"Hong Kong" solution will be in the works, once the United States helps set the
process on the right road by establishing full relations with the PRC.
"Normalization With the PRC: The Issue of Taiwan," September 29, 1977
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
Ray Cline, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, states
that in his view there are really two China's today, with distinct cultures and
separate territories. The Republic of China has the right to exist with de facto
control of Taiwan, the offshore islands, and the Pescadores, and a population of
17 million. As a constitutional government, the ROC is essentially representative
and a comparatively open society. It is economically and defensively viable.
The PRC in contrast has suffered instability during change of governments,
marked by intrigue and infighting among hopefuls to the premiership. It has
taken a hard position on what the United States must relinquish to obtain normal-
ized relations. Expanded diplomatic relations will not provide an improvement in
this situation. Americans who have visited the PRC know the limits of contacts
with Chinese. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's trip to Peking was not successful,
according to Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, because in Cline's words, Vance
"did not bring diplomatic gifts in tribute and kowtow to the rulers of the Central
Kingdom." Complying with Peking's demand on withdrawal from Taiwan would
not be favored by the American people.
The United States cannot expect the PRC to throw its weight into the balance
against the U.S.S.R. ; to the extreme that China will do so depends on forces
not influenced by American policy. Further, Chinese military power is not limited
in everything but man power. Given China's tendencies to be non-aligned in this
set of relations, it would be futile to expect a strong alliance with China. Mao and
his followers speak kindly of the United States onh T in contrast to the Soviet
Union, and Chou En-lai has made it clear that good relations with the United
States is a tactic, not a long term commitment.
The Shanghai Communique does not require us to abandon Taiwan, and is a
"calculated ambiguity," communicating only an agreement in effect that "it is
desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples." Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger stated hard on the heels of the Shanghai Communique that
the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan "will be maintained. Nothing has
changed on that position." It would be erroneous to assume that if the United
States normalizes relations with Peking on Chinese terms, the ROC's situation
would not be threatened. And, American credibility with its allies would be
damaged, popular pronouncements to the contrary.
In conclusion, Cline strongly emphasizes that the United States must be fair in
its dealing with Taiwan and mainland China, including a firm adherence to our
treaty ties with the ROC. Further, we should encourage general acceptance of
Taiwan as a de facto sovereign state. Something on the order of a German arrange-
ment, with two sovereign states, would be a reasonable mode 1 !. While there is one
Chinese civilization, there are two Chinese states. Recognition of this fact is the
beginning of a policy based on reality, not myth.
Parris Chang, Pennsylvania State University, offers an "American formula" as a
means of resolving the current US-PRC deadlock. He proposes that the United
States recognize the PRC as the government of mainland China and, at the same
time, maintain diplomatic and security ties with Taiwan on the condition that the
government of Taiwan proclaims that it is the government of "Taiwan and the
Chang argues that his "American formula" has several merits. One is that it
Corresponds to political realities both on the mainland and on Taiwan. Secondly,
by guaranteeing the independence and security of Taiwan, the United States will
demonstrate to t he world its concern with the fate of small nations in the planning
and execution of its foreign policy. Moreover, it may encourage other nations to
resume diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
He concedes that his plan initially will be opposed by the V\IC bu1 argues that
the PRC will "eventually . . . have to come to terms with international realities.' 1
As for the United States, Chang concludes that: "It is both our moral obligation
and national interesl to insure the security of Taiwan and not to jeopardize the
freedom of the people in Taiwan to deride their own political future.
Harold Hinton, George Washington University, deals with the issues of Taiwan
and normalization from a Chinese as well as an American perspective.
China, he points out, has had a long history of not onl\ territorial disunity hut
also of great flexibility in dealing with territorial disputes. Consequently: "There
is no reason why Peking in time should not show some flexibility with Taiwan."
Hinton calls for an understanding between the P.R.C. and Taiwan along the
lines of "Two Germanics" formula and argues that an understanding will be
facilitated if the stronger P.R.C. is not in a position to coerce Taiwan.
However, in the years since the Shanghai Communique, the PRC attitude
towards normalization has become increasingly inflexible as evidenced by its
imposition of the three conditions for normalization. This suggests that the PRC
"is not really serious about normalization, at last in the near future."
He concludes that the United States is under no obligation to normalize rela-
tions and advocates a continuation of the current status quo until Taiwan and
he P.R.C, on their own, are able to define a new relationship.
Hungdah Chiu, of the University of Maryland Law School, discusses the
Shanghai Communique, analyzing wmethcr it required American acceptance of
the PRC's three conditions for normalization of relations. Since the United States
has repeatedly assured the ROC that such is not the case, that the American
treaty commitment to Taiwan will be kept, it can only be assumed that the
Shanghai Communique does not bind the United States to abrogate its ties with
the ROC. Further, the Department of State has stated that the President alone
cannot bind the country by an explicit commitment; therefore the Shanghai
Communique cannot require the United States to abandon a treaty commitment.
The legal status of Taiwan, according to Chiu, is not necessarily that of an
integral part of China. Under international and treaty law, Taiwan is not clearly
a part of China. The ROC does not claim sovereignty over all the mainland.
Further, Taiwan could legally claim to be "terra delicta," and therefore in a
position to be independent if it can exert sovereignty over its own territory. While
the R.O.C. no longer intends to claim the mainland for force, the P.R.C. still
claims the right to "liberate" Taiwan forcibly. Chiu suggests that in view of
Taiwan's practical independence this would be contrary to the U.N. Charter.
With regard to the implications for Taiwan of normalization of U.S.-PRC
relations, Chiu states that much would depend on the way in which the United
States retained its connections with the ROC. Chiu suggests a series of possibilities,
ranging from virtual maintenance of the current arrangement, to the "Japanese
formula." These would vary in acceptability from the first, which would be pre-
ferred, to the last, which would seriously affect the ROC's ability to function. Chiu
concludes by saying that the Mutual Defense Treaty is the cornerstore of Taiwan's
relations with the United States, and that stability in the Far East would be
disturbed if the treat}' were terminated.
American Bar Association Delegation
[The following report was prepared by Gerald Lepp, a Council Member, Section of
International Law, American Bar Association. Mr. Lepp was a member of an ABA delega-
tion in Cbina at the same time as CODEL Wolff, and bas kindly given permission for bis
report to appear at tbis point.]
Members of ABA Delegation
A delegation of 12 from the American Bar Association (ABA) was invited by
the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (Friend-
ship Association) to visit China for two weeks to make contacts and exchange
views with various organizations and departments on legal questions of interna-
tional trade and other topics of mutual interest.
The invitation reflects both the changed Chinese internal developments of the
last 18 months as well as an element in China's current program to improve its
relations with the United States.
The Chairman of the Delegation was William B. Soann, Jr., President of the
ABA from 1977-78. Others included S. Shepherd Tate, the current ABA President;
Leonard S. Janofsky, President-Elect ; Chesterfield Smith of Florida, ABA Presi-
dent during the Nixon impeachment proceedings; Bert H. Early, ABA Executive
Director; and John P. Bracken, Past ABA Chairman, House of Delegates. Chief
Justice Vincent L. McKusick of the Maine Supreme Court and Judge Cecil F.
Poole of the U.S. District Court, California, represented the American judiciary.
Professors Ruth Ginsberg, Columbia Law School and Don Wallace of George-
town Universal Law School were also members of the delegation. My qualifica-
tion was both as in-house legal counsel for a multinational corporation and special-
ist in maritime and commodities arbitration. Attorney Stan Lubman, who
specializes in Chinese business transactions acted as secretary of the delegation.
The delegation visited Peking, Shanghai and Hangchow. Peking is the political,
cultural and spiritual center of China and home to seven million people. All
Foreign embassies are located here. Peking is the headquarters of all China's
major agencies concerned with foreign trade, including the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, Bank of China, the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade (CCPIT) and China's eight Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs).
Shanghai is one of the three municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the
central government of the People's Republic of China. It has an integrated
industrial base as well as one of China's main ports for foreign trade. Its total
population is 10.8 million.
Hangchow is a resort area. To the west of the city is West Lake which became
famous for its scenic beauty as early as Tang Dynasty.
Peking University Law Department
The Peking University Law Department was reopened within the past IS
months. During the Cultural Revolution it had been closed as had law depart-
ments in four other universities and political legal institutes. With the smashing
of the "gang of four" and Lin Piao the Legal departments and institutes have been
Members of the Peking faculty are currently engaged in revisions and codifica-
tions of the civil and criminal law, procedure and environmental protection laws.
Members of the faculty were engaged in the drafting of the new constitution.
The present enrollment in the law department is 300 students and faculty and
stafi' of about 100.
There are no full-time lawyers in China hut only part-time lawyers. Members
of the faculty from time to time act as Lawyers and represent individuals in
criminal cases and family matters.
A defendant in a criminal action may either defend himself or he defended by a
member of his working unit, neighbor or part-time attorney.
Prior to 1956 full-time lawyers and lawyer associations existed. We were told
that law clinics were closed because of their non-use. An alternative explanation
was the use of legal clinics by private citizens was significant enough to cause
alarm to the authorities.
The new Constitution adopted March 8, 1978, is of major importance since it
makes clear for all Chinese people their role in the post-Cultural Revolutionary
period. Emphasis is upon three aspects: (1) Class struggle, (2) production, and
(3) scientific progress. The functions and tasks of State Councils and National
People's Congress are more explicit than in the past as well as their relationships
to each other.
Respect for the law is a basic tenet. The new Constitution restored the practice
of having a procuratorial department separate from the public security depart-
ment. The "gang of four" had advocated "smashing the public security organs,
procuratorial organs and people's courts."
Law, Politics, Privacy
The Chinese believe there is no need for lawyers because everyone is aware
of the law. Every week for several hours small units of neighbors, workers and
housewives meet to discuss problems of their particular units. All Chinese are
included in one of these study groups. These discussions will include a particular
individual's conduct, family disputes, neighbor disputes, family planning priorities.
Deviations by individuals in the group from accepted political orientation will he
discussed with a view toward reforming the deviant. Individuals are urged to
evaluate their own conduct at these meetings (self-criticism) and to reform them-
Although crime does exist in China, it is nowhere near the proportions existing
in the U.S. Minor disburbances which in the U.S. go unnoticed will be discussed in
China by the neighborhood unit and the particular individuals urged to correct
Privacy is virtually unknown. For example, neighborhood medical clinics,
staffed by para-professionals (barefoot doctors), post a chart on the clinic's
wall showing the menstrual cycles of the neighborhood women as well as the
birth control device they use. Neighborhood units have a quota for newborn
children and the neighborhood will decide which family is to have the children.
Families are limited to two children and preferably one child. The consequences
of more than two children are not clear, but it seldom happens.
The people appear to be healthy, well fed, adequately clothed and housed.
China Council For Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)
One of the organizations of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade is the CCPIT,
whose function is trade with non-socialist countries including those having no
diplomatic relations with Peking. The CCPIT represents China's Foreign Trade
Organizations in these foreign countries as well as sending trade delegations,
receiving foreign delegations, participating in international trade fairs and collect-
ing and disseminating information concerning international trade.
We met with Jen Tsien-Hsin, who is the head of the Legal Department of the
CCPIT. He is also Secretary General of the two arbitration commissions within
the CCPIT, namely, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC) and
Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC).
The work of the CCPIT Legal Department includes general average adjustment,
trade mark registration, legalization and certification of documents and research
on foreign trade and maritime law.
CCPIT stresses settlement of disputes through friendly negotiation and settle-
ment, or conciliation. The two arbitration bodies are concerned only if one of the
parties is foreign. Disputes between two Chinese parties are settled by economic
commissions at all levels.
The main feature of Chinese arbitration procedure is a combination of arbitra-
tion with conciliation. Before the formation of an arbitration tribunal, the CCPIT
attempts to settle disputes!)}' conciliation. Subsequently, the tribunal will attempt
to conciliate the dispute. In Chinese view, most of the cases can be settled by
In 1977 — Joint Conciliation by CCPIT and AAA of disputes arising in trade
between the U.S. and China was proposed. AAA proposed a Joint Commission
and procedure for joint conciliation. Although CCPIT thinks the idea of a bilateral
arrangement is a good one, CCPIT believes there is not sufficient experience for
a written agreement to be negotiated.
Choice of law — In the Chinese view, each party prefers that the law of his
country be the applicable law in any arbitration. Accordingly, Chinese arbitration
commissions will consider the following three sources of appropriate applicable
law and principles: (1) Chinese law and law of other contracting party, (2) con-
tract terms (3) international practices.
We attended in Peking the trial of defendant, Ri Chun Yuan, a 28 year old man
accused of several thefts of amplifiers and TV sets from his employer, the Capital
Auto Rental Company, and from a nearby police box. All the items stolen, worth
about U.S. $1,000 were recovered.
The panel consisted of Chief Judgre Wang Chi (a woman) of the Intermediate
People's Court of Peking, and two People's Assessors, one a Cadre (Staff) in the
Peking General Rubber Plant and the other a worker at the defendant's work
place, who had been invited by the Court. The Secretary of the Court made a
The prosecution's case was presented by a man and woman from the Peking
Municipal Public Security Bureau. Neither was a lawyer.
At the defendant's request, he was represented by two part-time lawyers who
were also lecturers at the Law Department of Peking University.
Three hundred people attended the trial, including workers from the defendant's
unit, neighbors, friends and the public.
The defendant had confessed his crimes to the Public Security Bureau and also
to the responsible person (leader) of his work unit. The defendant had not been
represented by counsel.
Prior to the trial, the Public Security Bureau had conducted an investigation,
interviewing witnesses, workers at defendant's place of employment, as well as
interviewing his neighbors.
The most important mission of the Chinese criminal process is to implement the
policies of the Chinese Communist Party. When Party policy changes, the laws
must be changed to reflect the new policy. At the trial, the defendant and his
part-time attorneys emphasized that defendant had been misled by the policies
of the gang of four.
A principle of sentencing is leniency to those who confess their crimes and
severity to those who resist. Chinese criminal process seeks to reform and rein-
tegrate the offenders into the socialist society. The offender is urged to repent and
to I"- re-educated.
At the trial, the defendant had the right if he chose to challenge members of the
Court. He accepted the court panel. He described for the Court his life history.
His parents and two of his brothers were workers in Peking. He described how he
had taken the stereo equipment and TV's from his employer. He pointed out
however his brother and not he had taken a particular amplifier. The defendant
wanted to build a hi-fi set and tv for himself but didn't have sufficient money. He
feared detection by his parents and disassembled the items he had taken and hid
them under his bed.
Following the defendant's testimony, the Court read written statements from
several witnesses including the Party Secretary at the Capital Car Company and
the statement of defendant's prior good character by Party Secretary of the
Defendant's part-time lawyers did not cross examine any of the witnesses,
although they were given an opportunity.
The defense lawyers did not question his confession but emphasised that de-
fendant had served in the army receiving commendations on three occasion-. lb
had never taken anything before. He had returned all of the items taken. Tin*
defendant had been badly influenced by the gang of four, but now had voluntarily
confessed his crimes and was repentant.
Following the open hearing, defendant and the witnesses exited the courl room.
the three judges left their scats on the raised court bench, and took seats a1 tie-
front of the audience. Members of tie- audience were now invited to comment on
the evidence as well as to recommend an appropriate sentence. The consensus was
the crime was serious because it involved the theft of State property. Sine*
defendant was young, had confessed and was repentant, and apparently had been
misled by the disrespect to law and order at the time of the gang of four, a two-year
sentence' was recommended. In fact, defendant was sentenced to two years of
Modernization, Agriculture, Ceroilfoods
China has set a goal of modernization by the year 2000. The four modernization-
emphasized are: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and tech-
Priority should be given to agriculture as the foundation for all development.
Unless agriculture production rises, industry cannot respond. The Chinese have
set as their production goal for 1985, 400 million tons of grain.
Chairman Hua has stated that "* * * All provinces must endeavour to become
more than self-sufficient in grain and ensure an all-round development of agri-
culture, forestry, livestock breeding, side-occupations and fishery.
Our delegation visited Changcheng (Long March) People's Commune in Peking.
The Commune is principally engaged in the production of vegetables plus some
small industry. The commune is divided into production teams (twenty to thirty
families) and brigades (several production teams make up a production brigade).
In addition to commune owned farms, each family has a very small private plot
whose production can be consumed by the family or sold outside the commune
at a fair for that purpose.
In Peking, I met with Shih Yun Ching, Deputy Manager, Import Department
of the China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corpora-
tion (Ceroilfoods). Since I was a Continental executive, I was welcomed as a
friend of China. However, I was the first attorney to meet with him and he asked
whether there were any problems. I assured him this was a visit by another friend
and no particular problems to be discussed.
Commercial contracts are drawn by the merchandisers of Ceroilfoods. No per-
son within that organization was identified either as a lawyer, legal expert, or
contract specialist. The import manager was familiar with standard commodities
contract such as GAFTA and NAEGA. These forms are not used by CEROIL-
FOODS. I was told that with friends such as Continental, special contracts are
I presented several publications and articles concerning GAFTA and NAEGA
standard form contracts and arbitration procedure. I was told that among friends,
the Chinese settled disputes and seldom referred differences to arbitration.
The Chinese have stated three requirements for full diplomatic relations 1 >e-
tween the U.S. and China (normalization), namely: (1) U.S. recognition that
Peking is the exclusive representative of China; (2) terminating the Mutual De-
fense Treaty of 1954 between Taiwan and the U.S.; and (3) withdrawal of all
U.S. forces from Taiwan. (In fact, only a small number of American military
personnel remain on Taiwan. The Military Assistance Advisory Group is being
In the Shanghai Communique of 1972 signed by President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai, the L T .S. acknowledged that "there is but one China and Taiwan is
a part of China * * * "(The U.S. reaffirmed) its interest in a peaceful settlement
of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind,
(the U.S.) affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and
military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes." Both
parties agreed in the Communique that "progress towards the normalization of
relations between China and the U.S. is in the interests of all countries."
Our delegation met with our host, Wang Ping-Nan, President, Chinese People's
Association For Friendship with Foreign Countries. He had been an associate
of Chou En-lai and Chinese Ambassador to Poland. Ambassador Wang stated
China seeks peaceful relations with the U.S., based on five principles, namely,
(1) mutual respect, (2) non-interference, (3) non-aggression, (4) mutual benefit
and (5) peaceful coexistence.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
lo2 3 1262 09119 3283
Ambassador Wang stated that the status of Taiwan is an internal matter.
Traditionally the Chinese have said that they would liberate Taiwan by force.
However, Ambassador Wang noted that in July Communist Party Vice Chairman
Teng Hsiao-Ping said to U.S. Representative Lester Wolff that the Chinese
would negotiate directly with the Nationalists. On two prior occasions the Com-
munist Party and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) had cooperated. Ambassa-
dor Wang stated that China has taken notice of the U.S. economic interests in
Taiwan. After normalization, China will not place restrictions on contracts
between the U.S. and Taiwan. Ambassador Wang suggested that the U.S. follow
the example of Japan and end diplomatic relations with Taiwan but continue
trade relationships informally.
Subsequently, we visited the Great Hall of the People in Peking and met Vice
Premier Chi Teng K'uei, who is a political hardliner. He stated that the Mutual
Defense Treaty was like China making a defense treaty with the State of Texas.
He asked how the U.S. could ignore 900 million Chinese.
He was reluctant to recall the past but remembered the U.S. had aided Chiang-
Kai-shek with $6 billion of military equipment. Chiang Kai-shek had lost the
war, but nonetheless, the U.S. failed to establish diplomatic relations with China.
Mistakes of the past can be corrected, he said. When Dulles was Secretary of
State, China was blockaded by the U.S. The Vice Premier spoke favorably of
recent communication between the U.S. and China. However, he recalled that in
1975, when China planned to send its Performing Arts Group to the U.S. the
trip was cancelled by the Chinese because they were not permitted to sing "Taiwan
The Vice Premier continued that the social systems of the two countries were
different — the U.S., a developed capitalist country and China, a developing
socialist country. Under U.S. law, private property is inviolable. In China,
public property is inviolable and the government is entitled to confiscate private
In China there is mass democracy with the right of 95% of the people to criticize
and to write wall posters. However, 5% of the people have no rights. These people
are landlords, rich peasants who refuse to transform themselves and counter-
revolutionaries. In China, all legal institutions are instruments of the proletarian
revolution. Legal institutions are not intended to protect the reactionary class.
For final emphasis, the Vice Premier stated that China had no intention to
export its legal system, nor did it desire to import that of the U.S.
Other Places Visited
The delegation also visited in Peking, the Bank of China, the Institute of Law
of the Chinese Academj^ of Social Sciences, and the Peking Municipal Peoples
High Court. In Shanghai we visited the prison, the District Court, and toured
one of the Shanghai residential areas. In each of the cities, we were hosted to
banquets by the Friendship Association and we in turn gave banquets in their
honor. The food was excellent and varied. We visited the Great Wall, Ming
Tombs, Forbidden City, and Summer Palace. We heard a concert performed with
traditional Chinese instruments. All in all, it was an interesting tour, packed
into sixteen days.
The following is a list of key persons I met with in China during my recent visit:
(1) Chi Teng- K'uei, Vice Premier (Public Security and Law), Peking.
(2) Wang Ping-nan, President, Chinese People's Association for Friendship
with Foreign Countries, Peking.
(3) Shih Yun Ching, Deputy Manager, Import Department, China National
Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, Peking.
(4) Han Yu-t'ung, Director of the Law Institute Academy of Social Sciences,
Pekin of .
(5) °Jen Tsien-hsin, Legal Affairs Director, China Council for Promotion of
International Trade, Peking.
(0) Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, United States Liaison Office, Peking.
(7) Stapleton Roy, Deputy Chief of Mission United States Liaison Office,
(S) William Wayt Thomas, Jr., Chief, Commercial/Economic Section, United
States Liaison Office, Peking (Telephone 522033-215).